Breese Davies

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision ordering a hospital to disclose a linen services contract and a memorandum summarizing its terms.

The applicant argued the records contained financial information supplied in confidence during a bid process, exempting them from disclosure under s. 17(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator reasonably concluded that the contract was the product of negotiations and the information was mutually generated, not supplied in confidence.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of I.R. Smith J. dated February 25, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs in the amount of $5,000.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of Fraser J. The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, but restricted it solely to issues concerning COVID-19 vaccination.

The court recommended the appeal be heard alongside a related case and awarded costs of $2,500 to the moving party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order and a costs order made by the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were awarded on the leave motion.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, but restricted it solely to issues concerning COVID-19 vaccination.

The court recommended the appeal be heard alongside a related case and ordered the responding party to pay costs of $4,500.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of D.L. Edwards J. dated February 4, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs in the amount of $2,700 all inclusive.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy for allegedly threatening another tenant.

The landlord did not oppose the appeal, provided no costs were ordered against it.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel of the Board.

The Court declined to award costs to the appellant, noting that self-represented litigants are only entitled to costs if they can demonstrate a lost opportunity to earn income, which the appellant failed to do.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a decision quashing her application for judicial review against the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP).

The applicant sought survivor benefits following the death of a plan member.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the finding that HOOPP is a private pension plan not exercising a statutory power or state authority, and therefore its decisions are not subject to judicial review.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision not to apply issue estoppel or in the costs award.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision and a reconsideration decision denying her claim for accident benefits for chiropractic treatment.

She argued the adjudicator breached procedural fairness and failed to provide sufficient reasons by not explicitly referring to a medical report from her orthopedic surgeon.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that an adjudicator is not required to refer to every piece of evidence in their reasons, and the reasons provided were detailed and demonstrated a firm grasp of the evidentiary record.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting the respondent tenant a rent abatement and damages for illegal entry, lockout, and harassment.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding he was a landlord rather than a roommate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's arguments raised questions of fact, not law, which cannot be appealed under s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court also declined to award costs to the successful self-represented respondent for lost wages.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of J.R. McCarthy J. dated December 22, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Myers J. dated March 2, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $1,095.99.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and fixed the costs of the motion at $5,000, with the determination of entitlement reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded all-inclusive costs of $3,500 to the municipal respondent and $5,000 to the regional and corporate respondents, payable within 30 days.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board regarding whether certain bargaining proposals were central or local issues under the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act.

Following the Board's decision, the parties reached an agreement that the disputed issues were central, resolving the underlying conflict.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the matter because the Board's procedural decision did not set a dangerous precedent requiring appellate intervention.

The appellant lawyer appealed the revocation of his license to practice law by the Law Society Tribunal.

He had been found to have knowingly assisted clients in mortgage fraud across multiple real estate transactions.

The appellant argued that the findings of fact and credibility from an initial hearing panel, which had acquitted him of knowing assistance, should have bound the second hearing panel after a new hearing was ordered.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an order for a new hearing results in an entirely new hearing, and the second panel was not bound by the first panel's findings, which were based on an incorrect legal understanding of fraud.

The penalty of license revocation was upheld.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge.

The single judge had dismissed her motion to extend the time to appeal a finding that her family law claims were statute-barred.

The panel found no error in the single judge's conclusion that the date of separation was res judicata and that the limitation period under s. 7(3) of the Family Law Act had expired.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing its application to evict the tenant and recover damages for a fire.

The Board found the fire was caused by a discarded cigarette butt from elsewhere, not by the tenant, which the Divisional Court held was an unappealable finding of fact.

Although the tenant breached the lease by failing to maintain liability insurance, the Board granted relief from eviction under s. 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court found no reason to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy and ordering her eviction for seriously impairing the safety of another person during a physical altercation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's challenges to the Board's evaluation of the evidence were questions of fact, not law.

The Court also held that the Board made no error of law in its analysis under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act, as it properly considered the circumstances of both parties before exercising its discretion to grant and briefly postpone the eviction.

This motion concerned the interpretation of "spouse" under section 29 of the Family Law Act, specifically the phrase "are the parents of a child." The applicant, Mr. Elkind, sought a declaration that he and the respondent, Ms. Addeo, were not spouses, arguing their child's death before separation negated spousal status.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the phrase means two people who have a child together while cohabiting in a relationship of some permanence are spouses, regardless of whether the child is alive at the date of separation.

The decision emphasized that economic consequences and mutual commitment arising from the decision to have a child persist even if the child does not survive.