Breese Davies

The Law Society of Ontario sought judicial review of a Law Society Tribunal decision granting a paralegal licence to the respondent, who was serving a conditional sentence for child luring.

The LSO argued that an applicant serving a criminal sentence cannot be of good character.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable as there is no absolute statutory or jurisprudential bar to finding good character while serving a sentence.

The court also rejected the LSO's argument that the hearing division's delay in releasing its decision amounted to procedural unfairness or bias.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 15, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The appellant sought to rescind a 2002 settlement for Statutory Accident Benefits, arguing the insurer's disclosure notice failed to strictly comply with regulatory requirements.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed her request, finding the notice adequate.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Tribunal erred in placing the burden of proof on the insured and applying a 'some compliance' standard instead of the bright-line test from Smith.

However, applying the correct test, the Court concluded the defects in the notice were merely technical and did not deprive the appellant of important information.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a Member of Provincial Parliament, sought judicial review of a censure decision by the Legislative Assembly of Ontario following her social media posts about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The respondents moved to strike the application for want of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and dismissed the application, holding that the censure and the motion leading to it fell squarely within the established categories of parliamentary privilege, specifically the control over debates and proceedings and the disciplinary authority over members.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the matter, even on Charter grounds.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Akazaki J., along with motions to extend time and for a stay/injunction pending appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal based on the materials filed, rendering the other motions moot.

The court noted, however, that it did not agree with the lower court's finding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an urgent motion before a proceeding is commenced, citing Rule 37.17 and the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The self-represented appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Centa J. dated February 26, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Ontario Land Tribunal dated January 2, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 31, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all-inclusive to the responding parties.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his discrimination complaint against a security guard.

The applicant alleged he was unlawfully removed from a convention centre but explicitly denied the discrimination was based on a prohibited ground under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and procedurally fair because the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over general allegations of unfairness unrelated to the Code.

The appellants appealed a decision granting the respondent leave to bring a derivative action.

The appellants argued the motions judge applied the wrong burden of proof regarding good faith, erred in finding the action was in the corporation's best interest, and failed to consider whether an oppression remedy was more appropriate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's factual findings on good faith and the corporation's best interests.

The court also declined to consider the oppression remedy argument as it was not raised before the motions judge.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion for a stay of a Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division decision finding the respondent to be of good character and directing that he be licensed to practise law.

The Law Society argued that licensing the respondent before its judicial review application was heard would irreparably harm the public interest, given his past sexual misconduct.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding that the Law Society raised a serious issue, that the public interest would be irreparably harmed if an applicant who did not meet the good character requirement was licensed, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The applicant filed a complaint regarding police conduct during encampment clearings.

After the Toronto Police Service investigated and substantiated only one minor allegation, the applicant sought judicial review of the investigation's adequacy.

The Toronto Police Service brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application was bound to fail because the applicant had not exhausted the mandatory administrative review process under section 71 of the Police Services Act, which requires seeking a review by the OIPRD before applying for judicial review.

The Landlord and Tenant Board terminated the appellant's tenancy for non-payment of rent and ordered his eviction.

The appellant appealed the decision and obtained a stay of the eviction order.

After the appellant failed to comply with an order to pay monthly rent and arrears, the court lifted the stay and ordered him to confirm his intention to proceed with the appeal by a specified date.

The appellant failed to comply with this condition, and the court dismissed his appeal.

The appellant contractor commenced a Small Claims Court action for unpaid invoices against the respondent homeowners, who had previously commenced a Superior Court action against the appellant for deficient roof repairs.

A Small Claims Court judge stayed the small claims action pending the resolution of the Superior Court matter.

The appellant appealed the stay order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the stay was an interlocutory order, not a final order.

The court also declined to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review, as a single judge lacked jurisdiction and the proposed application lacked apparent merit.

The appellant, Marco Franco, appealed his conviction for driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood causing bodily harm, and his six-month custodial sentence.

The appeal challenged the lawfulness of the roadside breath demand, whether he was arbitrarily detained, whether his right to be informed of the reason for arrest was violated, and whether his right to counsel was delayed.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the breath demand lawful, no arbitrary detention, no s. 10(a) Charter violation due to a "fresh start" by the breath technician, and no s. 10(b) Charter violation despite some delay in accessing counsel.

The court also found the six-month sentence was fit and within the appropriate range, upholding the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

The landlord brought a motion to lift the statutory stay of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order pending the tenant's appeal.

The tenant owed over $70,000 in rent arrears and failed to comply with multiple case management directions ordering him to pay ongoing rent and make modest contributions to the arrears.

The Divisional Court found that allowing the tenant to continue occupying the premises without paying rent constituted an abuse of process.

The motion was granted and the stay of eviction was lifted.

The appellant, OHIP, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board which granted the respondent funding for a vaginoplasty without penectomy in Texas.

OHIP argued the procedure was not a specifically listed insured service and was experimental.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the plain reading of the Schedule of Benefits lists vaginoplasty and penectomy as separate procedures, and that interpreting the schedule to require a penectomy would be inconsistent with the WPATH Standards of Care and Charter values.

The court also declined to allow OHIP to raise a new argument on appeal regarding out-of-country funding criteria.

The Township of Oro-Medonte and a ratepayers' alliance appealed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision that repealed a zoning by-law amendment aimed at regulating short-term rentals.

The Tribunal had found the by-law created a new land use prohibition that was overbroad and not in the public interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal afforded procedural fairness, correctly interpreted the existing zoning by-law, and made no error of law in concluding the amendment did not represent good planning.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the order of Doi J. dated October 12, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $4,746.00.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 13, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.