Bobby Harinder Sachdeva

The applicant brought a consent motion to transfer a commercial lease application from Brampton to Toronto to be heard with a companion application.

The sole reason for the requested transfer was to secure an earlier hearing date, as the parties were dissatisfied with the dates available in Brampton.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the desire for an earlier hearing date does not justify transferring a proceeding to a jurisdiction with no connection to the matter, as doing so would inappropriately use other regions to arbitrage court schedules.

The plaintiff Receiver sued the defendant purchaser for damages after the purchaser failed to close a $12.2 million agreement of purchase and sale for a luxury residential property.

The purchaser argued he was entitled to terminate the agreement and receive his deposit back because the property suffered substantial water and mould damage prior to closing, and that the Receiver anticipatorily breached the agreement by refusing to extend the closing date.

The court found that the damage was not substantial, the Receiver did not repudiate the agreement, and the purchaser breached the contract by failing to close.

The Receiver was awarded over $5.3 million in damages, including the deficiency in the resale price, auction fees, and holding costs.

A case management conference was held to address procedural issues in several consolidated actions.

The court scheduled a motion to clarify a previous order dismissing the plaintiff's motion for default judgment against one of the defendants.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to examine non-parties and obtain documents prior to a Rule 21 motion to strike, noting that no evidence is admissible on such a motion.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a related action from Toronto to Newmarket and to consolidate four separate actions commenced by the self-represented plaintiff.

The actions all arose from the plaintiff's termination from his employment and involved claims of wrongful dismissal, conspiracy, and defamation.

The plaintiff consented to the transfer and partial consolidation but opposed consolidating two of the actions because one defendant had been noted in default.

The court granted the motion in its entirety, finding that the actions shared common questions of law and fact, and that consolidation would be the most cost-effective and efficient way to proceed while avoiding conflicting findings of fact.

The applicants, judgment creditors of the respondents for over $26 million USD arising from a fraudulent lending scheme, moved to discontinue the payment of living expenses and legal fees to the respondents and their related trusts from the receivership estate.

The trusts brought a cross-motion to strike the Receiver's Eleventh Report, arguing the Receiver exceeded its mandate by tracing funds and making observations about badges of a sham trust.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the Receiver acted within its court-ordered investigatory powers and did not usurp the court's role.

The court granted the applicants' motion to terminate funding, holding that the respondents had exhausted their appeals, were now judgment debtors, and failed to meet the test for funding from frozen assets, as they had not provided full disclosure and the funds belonged to their creditors.

The parties, equal shareholders in six corporations holding real property, were engaged in a commercial dispute involving competing oppression claims.

The motion judge appointed a Sales Officer to initiate a process for the potential sale of the properties.

The appellant appealed the order and sought a stay pending appeal, while the respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory and required leave.

The Divisional Court held that the order was interlocutory because any actual sale required further court approval, meaning no substantive rights were finally determined.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of leave, and the motion for a stay was dismissed as premature since no irreparable harm could occur before a sale was approved.

The defendant brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action on the basis that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

The plaintiff, a UK national residing in Bahrain, had entered into an oral loan agreement with the defendant, who claimed to reside in Pakistan.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant was domiciled or resident in Ontario, or carried on business in Ontario.

The court found that while the defendant carried on business in Ontario, the presumption of jurisdiction was rebutted because there was no real and substantial connection between the loan agreement and the defendant's business activities in Ontario.

The action was stayed for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter.

The plaintiff, a minority shareholder in a taxi dispatch business, brought a motion to compel the defendants to satisfy outstanding undertakings and produce financial records, and to be added as a mandatory signing officer for cheques over $500.

The court granted the request for undertakings and production, ordering the defendants to provide the requested documentation.

However, the court dismissed the request for signing authority, finding insufficient evidence of oppressive conduct or financial mismanagement to justify overriding the Unanimous Shareholder's Agreement and altering the status quo pending trial.

The third party brought a motion for default judgment on its counterclaim against the defendants, while the defendants brought a motion declaring the counterclaim improper.

The parties resolved the substantive issues on consent but could not agree on costs.

The court reviewed the conduct of both parties, noting the third party's premature noting in default and the defendants' failure to retain counsel promptly.

The court concluded that both parties bore some responsibility for the costs incurred and ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicants and respondents formed an incorporated partnership to acquire and develop a hotel and adjacent lands.

The applicants alleged that the respondent unilaterally altered the corporation's capital structure to give himself absolute voting control, engaged in self-dealing, and funneled corporate funds to personal accounts.

The court found the respondent's conduct constituted oppression under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

Given the complete breakdown of trust and lack of alternative remedies, the court ordered the winding up of the corporation and appointed a liquidator.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting a shareholders' agreement regarding the purchase rights of shares held jointly by a deceased shareholder and his spouse.

The appellant argued that shares held jointly with right of survivorship should not be subject to purchase options upon the shareholder's death, and that the respondent, as a non-founder, had no right to acquire founder's shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that Article 2.7 of the agreement required jointly-held shares to be treated as owned by the deceased shareholder for all purposes of the agreement, including purchase options.

The court also found that when the respondent became the sole surviving shareholder, he was entitled to exercise his option to purchase all remaining shares.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board dismissing its Requests for Hearing regarding the removal of vascular ultrasound services from its licences.

The Board had dismissed the requests due to an inordinate 15-year delay causing prejudice, and found the requests moot because the appellant failed to comply with Minutes of Settlement that provided a mechanism to restore the services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and its application of the test for administrative delay correct.

The plaintiff sought indemnity from a builder corporation and several individual investors for payments made to homeowners under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The claim relied on a Tarion standard-form indemnity agreement allegedly signed by the individual defendants.

The court found the individual defendants had only signed a single signature page that had been fraudulently inserted among unrelated financing documents by another defendant, and that earlier versions of the agreement submitted to the plaintiff were forgeries.

Although the defendants were careless in signing the document, the plaintiff’s own lack of diligence in accepting altered net worth statements and failing to verify the indemnitors contributed materially to the circumstances.

Balancing the competing principles from fraud and non est factum jurisprudence, the court held the defendants were not liable under the purported indemnity agreement.

The appellants, creditors of a bankrupt corporation, sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence a negligence action against the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the proposed action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellants argued that subsequent appeals of a Registrar's decision regarding the trustee's misconduct tolled the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that all material facts were known to the appellants by June 23, 2008, and the subsequent appeals did not affect the limitation period.

The moving creditors in a bankruptcy sought leave under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence an action relating to the administration of the bankrupt estate, and also sought leave under s. 215 of the Act to include the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and two of its employees as defendants.

The proposed claim against the regulatory authority and its employees alleged negligence in the investigation and handling of complaints about the trustee’s conduct.

The court held that all material facts supporting the negligence claim were known by June 23, 2008, when a registrar issued a decision finding misconduct by the trustee.

Accordingly, any claim against the regulatory authority defendants was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Leave to include those defendants was refused, but authorization under s. 38 to pursue claims against other defendants was granted.

Following a civil trial where the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining judgment for a loan debt, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant sought approximately $35,000 in costs, arguing that the plaintiffs’ litigation conduct unnecessarily prolonged and complicated the proceeding.

The court found that the plaintiffs had engaged in inappropriate conduct, including threatening correspondence, attempts to undermine the defendant’s professional reputation, and late disclosure of documents.

Although the plaintiffs were successful on the merits, the court held that their conduct justified a significant departure from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

Partial indemnity costs of $17,000 were awarded to the defendant and ordered to be set off against the plaintiffs’ judgment.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding them liable for defamation and awarding the respondent $50,000 in general damages and $25,000 in punitive damages arising from articles published in a newspaper.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, noting the appellants admitted to publishing the articles in their statement of defence.

The court also upheld the general damages award, finding it generous but within the acceptable range for mental suffering.

However, the court set aside the punitive damages award, concluding that malice was neither pleaded nor proven, and the lack of an apology alone did not justify punitive damages.

The appellants appealed an order granting them an adjournment on the condition of a limited draw against debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's order.

The court held that since the appellants sought the indulgence, the terms imposed were an entirely reasonable exercise of the motion judge's discretion.

The appellants, major creditors of a bankrupt estate, appealed a Superior Court decision that varied a registrar's taxation of the trustee's final Statement of Receipts and Disbursements.

The registrar had drastically reduced the trustee's fees to $1, disallowed significant legal disbursements, and ordered the trustee to personally pay solicitor and client costs due to misconduct.

The Superior Court judge restored many of the fees and disbursements, finding the registrar exceeded his jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the registrar did have jurisdiction under s. 152(6) of the BIA to review previously taxed solicitor accounts.

The Court fixed the trustee's fees at $49,464.44, allowed $100,000 for the estate solicitor's fees, and ordered the trustee to personally pay half of the appellants' costs of the taxation hearing on a solicitor and client scale due to his misconduct.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation and awarding punitive damages.

They argued the trial judge erred by refusing to admit a 1996 newspaper article regarding the respondent's reputation, failing to consider a notice to admit, improperly using contempt evidence, and misapplying the test for punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or procedure.

The Court also upheld the punitive damages award, noting the malicious and outrageous nature of the defamation warranted punishment and deterrence.