Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The accused was charged with being in care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown established that the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired, with a projected blood alcohol level between 70 to 125 mgs/100ml.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the vehicle.

Although the accused occupied the driver's seat, triggering a statutory presumption of care or control, the court found the accused successfully rebutted this presumption.

The accused testified he sat in the driver's seat to wait for his mother to fall asleep after a family dispute, keeping the door open to smoke and avoid using the ignition.

The court accepted his evidence as logical and consistent with circumstantial evidence, finding no realistic risk of danger and no evidence of intent to set the vehicle in motion.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellant, a company convicted of breaching a municipal zoning bylaw by stacking shipping containers to a height exceeding the maximum permitted height of 5 metres, appealed the conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The fresh evidence consisted of internet-sourced information regarding standard shipping container sizes.

The court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the evidence was available and discoverable at trial, the issue of container height was clearly foreseeable, and the appellant's legal counsel had been aware of and addressed this issue during trial.

The appellant's decision not to call evidence at trial was an informed tactical decision by counsel, and the appellant could not now introduce such evidence on appeal.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five Criminal Code offences arising from a series of incidents on September 7-8, 2018.

The defendant stole a relative's pickup truck and engaged in a prolonged dangerous driving incident on Highway 10 in Grey County, repeatedly ramming a vehicle driven by Ms. A. and her two passengers.

After the victims escaped to a gas station, the defendant led police on a high-speed chase across three counties, evading multiple police services, driving at speeds up to 161 km/h in an 80 km/h zone, and deliberately ramming a police cruiser.

The defendant was sentenced to 12 months in custody (after 9 months pre-sentence custody credit), a three-year driving prohibition, three years probation with treatment conditions, and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The defendant was charged with "turn not in safety" contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision at the intersection of Solina Road and Taunton Road in Clarington.

The prosecution alleged the defendant's right turn from Solina Road onto Taunton Road caused emergency maneuvers by other vehicles.

The court found that the defendant completed her right turn safely into a gap in traffic and had stopped on Taunton Road waiting to turn left when the collision occurred.

The collision resulted from vehicles two or three cars behind the defendant, not from the defendant's initial turn.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal and judgment of acquittal issued by a Justice of the Peace on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The defendant company operated a construction yard where an employee was fatally struck by a reversing dump truck.

The Crown established that the company violated regulatory requirements regarding signallers.

The court allowed the appeal in part and decided the outstanding issue of due diligence on the evidentiary record.

The court found that the company had established due diligence through its safety protocols, training, and monitoring procedures, despite the tragic accident.

The company was found not guilty.

The defendant was charged with two offences: having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

The defendant admitted to being impaired and having a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the defendant had care or control of the motor vehicle.

The defendant entered his truck after declining a driving service, sat in the driver's seat, then moved to the passenger seat while waiting for another driving service to arrive.

The court found that the defendant had a concrete plan to obtain a ride home through a driving service and would not have changed his mind about driving.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with three offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on November 5, 2015: careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act, failing to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act, and making a false statement in a collision report contrary to section 9(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown presented evidence from the victim, an independent civilian witness, and a police officer.

The defendant testified in her own defence.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and reliable, particularly the corroborating testimony of the independent witness.

The defendant's testimony was found to be problematic, inconsistent, and contradictory.

The court found the defendant guilty on all three counts.

The appellant was convicted of failing to yield the right of way on entering a highway from a private road, contrary to section 139(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision occurred when the appellant's vehicle exited the Travel Lodge parking lot and struck the vehicle of Paul LaFrance, who was turning left onto Elgin Mills Road from northbound Yonge Street.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidentiary foundation that her vehicle had entered from a private driveway.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial record provided a sufficient factual basis for the conclusion that the appellant's vehicle had entered from the Travel Lodge parking lot and failed to yield to oncoming traffic.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

A corporation charged with regulatory offences arising from a critical workplace injury brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The defendant argued that the delay from charge to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that although the delay exceeded the ceiling, transitional provisions applied because both parties had relied on the previous legal framework requiring proof of prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had failed to actively pursue expedited proceedings, had only once raised Charter rights, and had consented to all adjournments.

The court also found the matter was complex and serious, involving a severe workplace injury and six days of trial time with competing expert evidence.

The defendant was charged with acting as a vendor of a new home without being registered pursuant to the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The defendant purchased a lot, built a home, obtained an occupancy permit, and occupied the residence before selling it approximately one month later.

The central issue was whether the defendant occupied the home within the meaning and intent of the Act.

The court found that the defendant did occupy the home as his primary residence despite minimal furnishings and a short occupancy period.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant sought to strike a guilty plea to careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant had appeared unrepresented at a judicial pre-trial and entered a guilty plea without legal advice.

Subsequently, upon retaining counsel, the defendant moved to strike the plea.

The court found the plea was voluntary and unequivocal but determined it was not fully informed due to the complexity of the charge, the extensive disclosure (87 pages), the defendant's limited education (grade 10), and the absence of legal representation.

The court struck the guilty plea and ordered the matter to proceed to trial.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 427 in Toronto on August 16, 2010, which resulted in the death of the front passenger, Allison Stachyra.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented evidence of the accused's manner of driving, including testimony from civilian witnesses describing dangerous driving behavior, and expert evidence from a collision reconstruction specialist.

The defence argued that intervening factors, including the passenger's failure to wear a seatbelt and the possibility that the passenger grabbed the steering wheel, broke the chain of causation.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on the charge of dangerous driving causing death, applying the minimal threshold test for committal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown proceeded on the basis of care and control rather than actual operation.

The court found that while the accused was in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and was impaired, the vehicle was truly inoperable due to severe structural damage that prevented it from moving or being started.

The court distinguished between an "immovable" vehicle (stuck but potentially drivable) and an "inoperable" vehicle (incapable of being driven).

Finding the vehicle inoperable and thus incapable of creating a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, the court acquitted the accused despite the presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance and failing to display license plates.

The central issue was whether the vehicle operated by the defendant—a power-assisted bicycle with detachable pedals that were removed at the time of operation—constituted a "motor vehicle" under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that the vehicle qualified as a power-assisted bicycle within the statutory exception to the definition of motor vehicle, and therefore was not required to be registered or insured.

The charges were dismissed.

An appeal of a careless driving conviction under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant was charged after a motor vehicle collision that resulted in a pedestrian fatality.

The appellant claimed he suffered an involuntary coughing/choking episode that caused his eyes to close for several seconds, during which he lost control of his vehicle.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, rejecting his due diligence defence.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by inferring the appellant had "chosen" to close his eyes and by characterizing several seconds of driving as an "extended period."

The accused was charged with seven offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on August 29, 2010, on Six Nations Territory.

The charges included failing to comply with a recognizance, operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing bodily harm (four counts), and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing death (two counts).

The court found that the accused was driving at excessive speed (100-120 kph in an 80 kph zone) while significantly impaired by alcohol (blood alcohol concentration between 66-144 mg/100mL), with defective vehicle brakes and tires, in foggy night conditions.

The other driver, who was also impaired, made a left turn into the accused's path.

The court convicted the accused on all counts, finding that his impaired driving was a significant contributing cause to the deaths of two passengers and injuries to three others.