Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing the death of a five-year-old child and impaired driving causing bodily harm to the child's parents.

The defendant, a 24-year-old first offender with no criminal record, had consumed alcohol at a Toronto nightclub and drove back to Newmarket with little sleep.

He fell asleep at the wheel on Highway 9, crossed into oncoming traffic at excessive speed, and collided head-on with a vehicle carrying the Gomez family.

The collision killed five-year-old Lux Peyton Gomez and seriously injured her parents.

The court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment for the death and four years concurrent for the bodily harm offences, along with a ten-year driving prohibition.

The defendant corporation brought a disclosure application seeking either a stay of proceedings or a disclosure order, alleging the prosecution failed to disclose relevant information regarding a guarding project conducted at the defendant's facility between 2007 and 2009.

The defendant was charged with failing to ensure prescribed measures and procedures were carried out in the workplace, contrary to the Occupational Health and Safety Act, specifically regarding failure to guard a machine.

The application was heard on the first day of trial.

The court denied the application, finding that the requested information was not in the possession of the prosecution, was not part of the fruits of the investigation, and was not obviously relevant to the defendant's case given the significant time lapse and modifications made to the equipment between 2007-2009 and the alleged 2016 offence date.

The Regional Municipality of York sought leave to appeal a provincial court appeal judge's decision that set aside a stay of proceedings in a speeding charge against Steve Tomovski.

The appeal judge had found that while the delay breached the Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under the R. v. Jordan framework, the breach was attributable to the defendant.

The appeal judge also opined that the presumptive delay ceiling for Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings should be 13 to 15 months, rather than the 18 months established in Jordan.

York sought leave to appeal on questions of law regarding the appropriate presumptive delay ceiling and the application of Charter s. 11(b) to Part I POA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that York was seeking to appeal the reasons for judgment rather than the judgment itself, and that the appeal judge's opinion on the presumptive delay ceiling was not a "judgment" appealable under s. 139 of the POA.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to challenge a justice of the peace's ruling that a charge under the Conservation Authorities Act was not statute-barred.

The applicants argued that the two-year limitation period commenced earlier than determined by the justice, rendering the charge out of time.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the justice's ruling was made within jurisdiction and was not so obviously wrong as to warrant intervention during the ongoing trial.

The court emphasized that certiorari should be granted rarely in such circumstances, especially when an appeal is available post-trial, and that the policy considerations favour a non-interventionist approach to avoid fragmenting proceedings.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving, fail to stop for police, and drive while disqualified arising from a high-speed chase on November 17, 2015.

The Crown sought consecutive sentences totalling 12-15 months, while the defence sought a global 12-month sentence, arguing for reduced sentences due to serious immigration consequences.

The court imposed consecutive sentences totalling 12 months (6 months for impaired driving with 3-month credit for restrictive bail conditions, 4 months for fail to stop for police, and 2 months for drive disqualified), along with a 10-year driving prohibition and 3 years probation.

The court considered collateral immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act but ensured sentences remained proportionate to the offences.

The appellant municipality appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace who reduced a statutory minimum fine of $200 for failing to stop at a red light to $100.

The Justice of the Peace had announced in advance that she would never impose the statutory minimum fine and made comments suggesting bias against the prosecution.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by disregarding the statutory minimum penalty without evidence of exceptional circumstances or undue hardship justifying relief under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to the statutory minimum of $200 plus costs.

This is a Crown appeal from acquittals on charges against a motor vehicle dealer and two salespersons for engaging in an unfair business practice by making an unconscionable representation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.

The trial involved a complex transaction where the consumer purchased a 2011 GMC Acadia with negative equity financing, trading in a 2011 Saturn.

The Justice of the Peace acquitted all defendants after finding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an unconscionable representation had been made.

The appellate court upheld the acquittals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and failing to surrender a motor vehicle permit contrary to section 7(5)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The incident occurred at a four-way stop intersection on August 9, 2012.

The Crown presented evidence from two civilian witnesses and a police officer establishing that the defendant entered the intersection at high speed and struck the victim's vehicle on the passenger side.

The defendant claimed the victim was travelling in a different direction and failed to stop.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as inconsistent and implausible, finding it contradicted by independent witness testimony and physical evidence including tire scuff marks.

The court convicted the defendant on both counts, finding the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove without due care and attention and failed to produce her vehicle permit.

Four defendants—two corporations and two individuals—were charged with twelve counts of offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a fatal accident on May 12, 2008, at a condominium construction site in Toronto.

A piece of cast iron pipe fell from the 23rd floor and struck a senior supervisor, Emilio Piccinin, causing his death.

A former co-defendant, Maple Leaf Structural Ltd., pleaded guilty to one charge.

The remaining defendants pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.

The court found that while Maple Leaf bore primary responsibility for the accident, the remaining defendants exercised due diligence and did not breach their statutory duties under the Construction Projects Regulation.

All charges against the remaining defendants were dismissed.

The defendant, a licensed taxi driver, was charged with failing to be civil and well-behaved while operating a taxi cab in Toronto, contrary to the Toronto Municipal Code.

The complainant passenger testified that the defendant made discriminatory and insulting comments about various groups including Jamaicans, Jewish people, police officers, Canadian women, and the city of Mumbai.

The defendant denied making the statements.

The court found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, determining that his comments violated both the municipal licensing requirement and the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner contrary to s. 249 of the Criminal Code.

Two Ontario Provincial Police officers observed the defendant's vehicle traveling southbound on Highway 400 over approximately 15 kilometres and 8 minutes.

The officers testified to observing repeated instances of speeding (up to 140 km/hr), tailgating at distances of one-half to two car lengths, and unsafe lane changes on a wet roadway at night.

The defendant testified that he was keeping pace with traffic at 110-120 km/hr and had only passed two vehicles.

The court accepted the officers' evidence and found the defendant guilty, determining that the totality of the driving conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding on the grounds that his language rights under s. 16(1) of the Charter and his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter were infringed.

The trial court failed to provide a French trial on the scheduled date, resulting in an 8-month delay before trial commenced.

The court found breaches of both language rights and the right to trial within a reasonable time due to administrative failures and an inflexible pre-scheduled French trial system.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide breath samples following a collision with a fire hydrant in Mississauga in the early hours of November 3, 2011.

The Crown established that the accused was intoxicated and in care or control of the vehicle.

The accused challenged whether the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code applied and whether the breath demand was valid.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, determining that he was occupying the driver's seat, presenting a realistic risk of danger, and that the breath demand was valid despite the accused's refusal to comply.

The appellant appealed her conviction on four provincial offences: failing to surrender an insurance card, proceeding contrary to an intersection sign, driving without a current plate validation, and driving while under suspension.

The trial justice found all charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed fines totalling $1,270.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Crown failed to prove the location of the offences was in Toronto, an essential element; and second, that the trial justice provided excessive assistance to the prosecution, creating a reasonable perception of bias.

The appellate court dismissed both grounds, finding that the well-known intersection of Queen Street West and Bathurst could be judicially noticed, and that while the trial justice's interventions were unfortunate, they did not compromise the overall fairness of the trial when assessed in their totality.

An appeal from convictions under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The appellant was convicted of three offences: constructing a new home without being registered as a builder, commencing construction without notifying Tarion and paying the prescribed fee, and knowingly furnishing false information in an enrolment application.

The appeal court found that the trial court erred in admitting documentary evidence without compliance with the best evidence rule and without proper authentication.

The court also found that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted.

As a result, there was insufficient admissible evidence to support the convictions, and the appeal was allowed with acquittals substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failure to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the appellant driving a dump truck without an apparent shoulder restraint during a brief observation of approximately 20 to 30 seconds at a traffic light intersection.

The trial justice convicted the appellant based on the officer's evidence.

On appeal, the court found that the appellant's evidence, though not explicitly stating he was wearing a seatbelt, logically conveyed that he was wearing one at all times.

The court determined the trial justice misapplied the burden of proof and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.