Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace after the respondent pleaded guilty to leaving the roadway not in safety contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent had originally been charged with careless driving but agreed to plead guilty to the reduced charge.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $500 fine with 180 days to pay.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a $350 fine instead, undercutting the joint submission.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to invite further submissions before rejecting the joint submission and by failing to make a finding that the submission was contrary to the public interest.

The court also criticized the trial judge's comments regarding the victim fine surcharge and its comparison to Criminal Code provisions.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered in his absence under section 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act for failing to stop at an amber light contrary to section 144(15) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant did not appear at trial on July 25, 2018, and was deemed not to dispute the charge.

The appellant argued the Certificate of Offence was a nullity because his address was recorded incorrectly.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the address was surplusage and that the certificate contained all essential information necessary for the appellant to make an informed decision about how to respond to the charge.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing bodily harm, failing to stop at the scene of an accident knowing bodily harm was caused, driving while disqualified, and possession of a counterfeit mark.

The offences arose from a motor vehicle accident on April 12, 2017, at the intersection of Dundas Street West and McQuay Boulevard in Whitby, Ontario, where the accused drove at excessive speeds through city streets during lunch hour, ran a red light, and struck another vehicle, causing serious injuries to the driver.

The accused had an extensive criminal record spanning 20 years with 51 convictions, including numerous driving-related offences and breaches of court orders.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years in the penitentiary, with sentences for each offence imposed consecutively, less pre-trial custody credit and enhanced credit for assault in custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while using a handheld device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge found that the appellant held a cell phone in his hand while driving.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the officer's testimony lacked sufficient detail to establish that the object was a cell phone and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's observations were sufficient to establish that the appellant was holding a cell phone and that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or apply an incorrect standard of proof.

The appellant appealed her conviction for careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision occurred when the appellant's vehicle struck a pickup truck from behind on Taunton Road in Oshawa.

The primary factual dispute concerned whether the appellant had an opportunity to stop.

The trial judge found that the appellant could have avoided the collision and failed to do so because she was not driving with due care and attention.

The appellant argued that the pickup truck driver's credibility was suspect due to a mistake about when he reported to the collision centre, and that the charge was laid prematurely without reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the findings of fact were based on reasonable inferences, and the law was correctly stated.

The appellant appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of failing to signal a lane change contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial court had erred in law by requiring proof that other vehicles were actually affected by the failure to signal.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the offence requires only that another vehicle "may be affected" by the movement, not that it actually be affected.

The appeal was allowed and a finding of guilt was entered.

The accused was charged with undertaking to communicate with a public office holder for payment and failing to file a return with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, contrary to section 5(1) of the Lobbying Act.

This is a strict liability offence.

The central issue was whether the accused, as an employee of a lobbying firm, was required to file an individual return under section 5(1) or whether the corporation's filing obligation under section 7 applied.

The court found that the accused, as an individual consultant lobbyist, was required to file a return within 10 days of undertaking to communicate with public office holders on behalf of a third-party client for payment.

The court rejected arguments that the exception in section 5(6) applied or that section 7 was the governing provision.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from a watershed enforcement officer regarding the freshness of topsoil observed at a property.

The officer opined that topsoil was "very fresh material" based on observations of construction equipment, lack of vegetation, and crisp bulldozer tracks.

The court applied the four-element test from Regina v. Graat to determine whether the lay opinion evidence was admissible.

The court found that all four elements were satisfied: the officer was in a better position than the trier of fact to form the conclusion; the conclusion was one that persons of ordinary experience could make when combined with the officer's experiential capacity; the officer had the necessary experiential capacity despite not being an expert; and the opinion was a compendious mode of stating complex facts.

The opinion was admitted into evidence.

The defendant was charged under the Dog Owners Liability Act with failing to exercise reasonable precautions to prevent her dog from biting a person.

The complainant alleged that the defendant's German shepherd bit her while she was riding her bicycle on a public road.

The defendant maintained that her dog was properly secured when she left the property and that the complainant frequently trespassed on her property and provoked the dogs.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that the steps taken by the defendant to secure her dog constituted reasonable precautions, particularly given the absence of prior aggressive behaviour by the dog and the ambiguity regarding where the bite occurred.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and while having an excessive blood alcohol concentration after being found asleep behind the wheel of his parked car in an underground garage at the Rogers Centre.

The Crown conceded that the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual care or control of the vehicle.

The court applied the analytical framework from R. v. Boudreault and found that while certain factors favored the Crown, the totality of circumstances—including that the vehicle was parked as the defendant's intended destination for sleeping, was not running, was in a fully reclined position, and the defendant had no reason to drive until after completing his next work shift—did not establish a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.

A corporate defendant charged with two counts of permitting an entertainer to provide services in an area not clearly visible from the main stage and patron area, contrary to section 5(6) of the City of Mississauga Adult Entertainment Establishment Licensing Bylaw 507-2005, brought a motion to quash the information on the grounds that the bylaw provision was unconstitutionally vague.

The defendant argued that key phrases in the provision, including "any services," "clearly visible," "main stage," and "obstruction," were impermissibly imprecise and failed to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct or to limit enforcement discretion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that section 5(6) was sufficiently precise to allow for intelligible legal debate when read in context with the entire bylaw, its definitions, and the licensing requirements that obligated the defendant to submit floor plans identifying the main stage and patron seating areas.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol, dangerous driving, and assault on police following a motor vehicle collision on New Year's Day 2012.

The accused was convicted of dangerous driving and exceeding 80 mg, but acquitted of assault on police due to reasonable doubt regarding his intent to apply force.

The court found that the accused was subjected to excessive use of force during arrest, constituting a serious breach of his Charter rights to security of the person.

However, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, finding the misconduct did not meet the exceptional threshold required.

Instead, the court imposed concurrent suspended sentences with probationary conditions, including alcohol counselling and driving restrictions, to balance the seriousness of the criminal conduct with the Charter breach.

The appellant appealed her conviction for careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The conviction was entered in her absence after she failed to appear for trial on February 3, 2013.

The appellant challenged the Certificate of Offence on the ground that it was deficient in failing to specify the municipality where the offence occurred, stating only "Wyecroft Rd., E. of Burloak Drive." The court held that under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, a certificate must be complete and regular on its face for a conviction to be entered in the defendant's absence.

The omission of the municipality constituted a fatal defect, and the conviction was quashed.

The defendant was charged with willfully failing to inform the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of a material change in circumstances in connection with his entitlement to benefits within 10 days after the change occurred, contrary to section 149(2) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997.

The charge covered the period between October 11, 2010, and September 1, 2011.

The prosecution alleged that the defendant was gainfully employed and had demonstrated improved physical and psychological functioning, which constituted material changes he failed to report.

The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed it.

The Crown brought a forfeiture application seeking to forfeit a New Holland T6050 Tractor and F250 Loader used by the offender when he was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so.

The offender's father, who claimed a partnership interest in the farm equipment, opposed the forfeiture.

The court applied the three-step test for forfeiture under Section 490.1 of the Criminal Code and found that while the equipment was offence-related property and all interested parties were properly notified, the forfeiture would be disproportionate under Section 490.41(3).

The court concluded that the tractor was essential to the family farm operation and that forfeiture would cause undue economic harm to the legitimate farming enterprise beyond the offender alone.

The defendant was charged with 22 counts of acting as a motor vehicle salesperson without being registered under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, contrary to s. 3(1)(b).

The charges related to his employment at Jack McGee Chevrolet-Cadillac Limited from June 24, 2009 to November 14, 2009, during which time his sales license was suspended pursuant to a Consent Order.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the offence through testimony from dealership employees and customers establishing that the defendant engaged in various sales activities including showing vehicles, arranging financing, and negotiating extended warranties.

The defendant's due diligence defence failed as he did not take reasonable steps to verify his understanding of licensing requirements despite his extensive experience in the motor vehicle industry and prior notice from OMVIC that he was not to participate in motor vehicle transactions.

The officially induced error of law defence also failed as the defendant did not consult with appropriate officials or receive permission to sell vehicles.

Convictions were registered on all 22 counts.

The Crown brought an application under section 15(4) of the Justices of the Peace Act requesting that a careless driving charge involving a fatality be heard before a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice rather than a justice of the peace.

The defendant did not oppose the application.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the fact of a fatality alone does not mandate trial by a judge.

The court found no complex legal issues, constitutional challenges, significant precedent value, or broader public interest factors beyond the fatality itself that would justify assignment to a judge.