Indigenous Legal Issues

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of race and disability against his employer, a First Nations umbrella organization, and his supervisor.

The respondents sought dismissal on the basis that the corporate respondent is a federal undertaking and its labour relations fall under federal jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Applying the functional test from NIL/TU,O, the Tribunal found that the corporate respondent exercises a form of comprehensive First Nations governance, including policy-making and political functions, and is not subject to provincial control.

The Tribunal concluded that the corporate respondent is a federal undertaking and dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicants, appealing their convictions, sought disclosure or production of band lists used by the Court Services Division to prepare jury rolls in the Kenora District and Simcoe County.

They argued the lists were necessary to demonstrate systemic underrepresentation of First Nations persons on the jury rolls, which violated their Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the requested records met the 'likely relevant' test for third-party production under O'Connor, as they could be used to test the statements of Crown deponents and understand the jury roll preparation process.

The applicants sought directions on how to proceed with their applications for disclosure of certain First Nation Band lists in furtherance of a constitutional challenge to their criminal convictions.

The Crown argued that the issue of public interest privilege should be heard and decided before determining the disclosure process (Stinchcombe or O'Connor) and whether disclosure is required.

The Court of Appeal directed that all three issues be argued at a single hearing to proceed expeditiously.

The Court also ordered that notice encompassing all three issues be given to the affected Bands to ensure transparency and allow them to make submissions.

The appellant appealed her custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to obtain Gladue information for the Aboriginal offender and by incorrectly characterizing the offence as a breach of trust.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding the impact of residential schools and pervasive oxycontin use in the appellant's community.

The sentence of imprisonment was reduced to time served, with the 18-month probation order remaining in place.

The families of two deceased First Nations persons and the Nishnawbe Aski Nation sought to challenge the representativeness of the jury rolls for two coroners' inquests, arguing that First Nations persons living on reserves were systematically excluded.

The presiding coroners refused to issue summonses to the director of court operations to inquire into the jury roll preparation.

The Court of Appeal held that coroners have jurisdiction by necessary implication to inquire into the representativeness of a jury roll and to remedy an unrepresentative list.

The Court found sufficient evidence to warrant the summonses, allowed the appeals, and ordered a new inquest into one of the deaths.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's disposition, noting the trial judge considered all relevant principles, the seriousness of the offence, a Gladue report, and the respondent's substantial progress in addressing his alcohol problem prior to sentencing.

The respondent's post-sentence progress further confirmed the wisdom of the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal two interlocutory orders: one temporarily staying the action pending the resolution of related tax proceedings, and another striking claims of conspiracy and misfeasance in public office with leave to amend.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions and no conflicting decisions warranting leave.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant First Nation enacted its own labour relations code after a union was certified to represent workers at a casino located on its reserve.

The appellant argued that its code displaced the provincial Labour Relations Act based on its aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish an aboriginal practice, custom, or tradition that supported the right to enact a labour relations code.

The Court also held that the Crown did not breach its duty to consult and accommodate, as the appellant's claim was not sufficiently credible and the appellant had taken unilateral action.

The Crown breached its fiduciary duty in 1886 by making an improvident sale of the appellant's timber rights.

The trial judge valued the timber rights at $31,600 and awarded simple interest adjusted for inflation, denying the appellant's claim for equitable compensation including compound interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the valuation but allowed the appeal on compensation, finding that the trial judge erred in failing to compensate the appellant in equity for its lost opportunity to have the funds invested.

The Court held that an award of equitable compensation including compound interest is not barred by the Crown's historic immunity from paying interest, and ordered a new hearing to determine the appropriate compensation.

The respondent sued the Ministers of National Revenue and Indian Affairs and CRA officials, alleging they targeted him and his business regarding the tax exemption in s. 87 of the Indian Act.

The appellants moved to strike the Amended Statement of Claim.

The motion judge dismissed the motion in part.

The appellants appealed, focusing on the Superior Court's jurisdiction to declare a GST assessment null and void.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim for declaratory relief, finding the pleadings did not provide a basis in fact or law for such a declaration, without deciding the broader jurisdictional issue.

The appellant, a member of the Aroland First Nation (Treaty 9), was charged with hunting moose without a licence in Treaty 3 territory.

He argued he had a constitutionally protected right to hunt there because he was married to a member of the Lac Seul First Nation (Treaty 3) and had been accepted into that community.

The justice of the peace acquitted him, but the appeal judge entered a conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the appellant was entitled to shelter under Treaty 3 rights as he was hunting in accordance with Ojibway custom and had been accepted by the Treaty 3 community to share in their harvest.

The appellants, members of the Walpole Island First Nation, were convicted of hunting without a licence in the Robinson-Superior Treaty territory.

They argued they were sheltering under the treaty rights of the Michipicoten First Nation, an Ojibway community that is a signatory to the treaty.

The Court of Appeal held that while Aboriginal persons can shelter under another First Nation's treaty rights if supported by custom, the appellants failed to establish they had obtained the necessary communal consent in advance to share in the harvesting resource.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which requires a different methodology for assessing a fit sentence for an Aboriginal offender.

The Court of Appeal, having reviewed a full Gladue report, granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence to time served (approximately 5 months) followed by probation.

The appellants were charged with illegal hunting practices on an Indian reserve under the Migratory Birds Convention Act.

They argued that a 1955 band council by-law passed under the Indian Act constituted a comprehensive code that ousted the application of the federal Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the two regulatory regimes did not conflict, as compliance with one did not require breach of the other.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the appellants could be charged under either the Act or the by-law.

The appellants, members of various First Nations, sought to bring a class proceeding against the federal government and church entities for harms suffered at the Mohawk Institute Residential School between 1922 and 1969.

The motion judge and Divisional Court denied certification.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the criteria for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met, including identifiable classes, common issues such as systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and the preferability of a class action.

The appellants, the chief and band council of the Wasauksing First Nation, appealed a decision dismissing their application to rectify the corporate records of Wasausink Lands Inc. (WLI) to reflect that all band members were members of WLI and the band council were its directors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the factual basis for rectification was not established and that s. 309(1) of the Corporations Act is not intended for fundamental corporate restructuring.

The Court also declined to impose a constructive trust as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and rejected the claim for a constitutional exemption based on aboriginal rights.

The Attorney General of Canada brought an application to determine which Indian Bands were the beneficial owners of the Agency One Reserve, created in 1875 pursuant to Treaty 3.

The applications judge found that the reserve was set apart solely for the use and benefit of the Rainy Lake Bands, based on historical evidence including a 1908 surrender of land.

The Rainy River Bands appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's decision on entitlement, finding it supported by the evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and cross-appeal regarding costs, ordering the Crown to pay the bands' costs of the application on a substantial-indemnity basis due to its fiduciary role and its responsibility for the historical uncertainty.

The appellants, comprising children of residential school attendees and estates of deceased attendees, appealed an order striking their claims against the federal Crown and other defendants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the secondary plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the federal Crown, finding it was not plain and obvious that the duty did not extend to them despite not being born at the time of the alleged breaches.

However, the Court upheld the striking of the Family Law Act claims, as the Act does not operate retroactively, and the estate claims, which were statute-barred under the Trustee Act.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding her entitlement to Indian status, alleging the Registrar unconstitutionally presumed her unknown paternal grandfather was not an Indian.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Registrar simply applied the Indian Act and did not employ the alleged presumption.

The Court noted the appellant could still challenge the constitutionality of the Indian Act and the Registrar's decision in separate proceedings.

The appellant mother, a member of the Cree First Nations, appealed a decision denying her access to her six-year-old child, who had been a Crown ward in non-Indigenous foster care since she was three months old.

The mother sought access to instruct the child about her Cree culture and heritage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the mother's intentions were positive, the proposed access would disrupt the child's secure and loving foster family unit and would not be in the child's best interests.