Human Rights

The accused was charged with failing to comply with judicial interim release conditions (curfew and weapons prohibition) after a traffic stop.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the accused's detention became arbitrary, his s. 10(a) rights were violated by delayed notification of reasons for detention, and his s. 10(b) rights were violated by delayed access to counsel and incomplete information.

The search of his person and wallet was also found to be illegal.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court excluded the seized weapons due to serious police misconduct and significant impact on the accused's Charter rights, leading to a finding of not guilty on the weapons charge.

The curfew charge was dismissed earlier by the Crown.

The defendant brought a motion to stay proceedings on a charge of defrauding the public (offence dates 2013-2018), alleging a violation of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The Crown and defence disagreed on the calculation of net delay.

The court determined that the net delay was 19 months 28 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months.

The Crown presented no exceptional circumstances to justify the extension.

The court granted the stay of proceedings on the consolidated count and addressed the status of remaining multi-count informations.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg% following a single motor vehicle accident on the Gardiner Expressway.

The trial involved multiple Charter applications, including claims under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b), as well as procedural challenges regarding delayed disclosure and the timing of new Charter allegations.

The court dismissed all Charter claims and found the accused guilty on both counts based on credible police evidence, proper grounds for the approved screening device demand, and reliable breath sample results.

The accused was found asleep in a vehicle parked on the side of Highway 400 with the engine running.

A police officer detected an odour of alcohol and conducted an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test at the roadside, which led to further testing and charges of Over 80 and Impaired care or control.

The impaired count was dismissed.

The defence challenged the ASD demand as lacking reasonable suspicion and argued the demand was not made forthwith, constituting a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court found the demand was based on reasonable suspicion and was made in a timely manner.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty of care or control with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The defendants, RBC Insurance Agency Ltd. and Aviva General Insurance Company, brought a motion to strike various paragraphs from the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim, alleging no reasonable cause of action or insufficient particulars.

The plaintiff claimed constructive dismissal, misrepresentation, Human Rights Code violations, and malicious investigation.

The court struck paragraphs related to malicious investigation, misrepresentation, Human Rights Code violations, and negligent infliction of mental suffering, but granted leave to amend for all.

Allegations of common employer and certain paragraphs pleading evidence were allowed to remain.

The court emphasized that pleadings define the scope of discovery and that leave to amend should generally be granted at this stage.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while having more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood.

The central issue was whether police breached the accused's Charter right to counsel of choice by failing to provide him with access to his preferred lawyer.

The court found that police made reasonable and extensive efforts to locate and contact the accused's counsel of choice, including attempting multiple phone numbers, connecting him with an associate lawyer, and facilitating calls to duty counsel.

The court rejected the argument that police failed in their informational and implementation duties and found no Charter breach.

The accused was convicted.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to stop for an amber light contrary to s. 144(15) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing an adjournment and proceeding with trial where the appellant received disclosure on the trial date.

The appellant had delayed requesting disclosure until five weeks before trial, despite receiving clear instructions in the Notice of Trial and online guide.

The court held down the matter twice on the trial date to allow the appellant to review the disclosure, including officer's notes and in-car camera video.

The appellant agreed to proceed with trial after reviewing the materials.

The court found no error in proceeding and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excessive amount of alcohol in his blood following a single-vehicle accident near Simcoe, Ontario.

The accused alleged that police violated his section 8 Charter rights by videotaping him using toilet facilities while in police custody without providing adequate privacy protections.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached on two occasions when he used the toilet at the police station.

Although the police had a policy of providing privacy gowns to detainees, the implementation of this policy was inadequate.

The court applied the Grant test and determined that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's privacy and dignity outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The breath sample analysis results were excluded as evidence, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with robbery of a cell phone store.

Following arrest, the accused initially declined counsel but later requested to speak with a specific criminal lawyer.

Police made inadequate efforts to contact the lawyer, providing the accused with erroneous information about the lawyer's availability.

The accused then waived his right to counsel without receiving a meaningful Prosper warning.

The court found a serious breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the inculpatory statement under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with driving dangerously, failing to remain and provide particulars following a motor vehicle collision, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The defendant brought Charter applications seeking to exclude evidence for violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded that two constitutional violations occurred: arbitrary detention and failure to immediately inform of the right to counsel.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation regarding an unlawful search of the defendant's garage but rejected the section 9 and 10(b) violation claims.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded only the defendant's brief confession made outside the garage, while admitting all other evidence.

The accused were charged with three counts of break, enter and theft and two counts of possession of property obtained by crime.

They brought a pre-trial application challenging the validity of a search warrant on the basis that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating their section 8 Charter rights.

Additionally, one accused alleged a violation of his section 10(b) rights to counsel.

The court found that while the Information to Obtain contained misleading information and conclusory statements, the remaining evidence was sufficient to support issuance of the warrant.

The court also found a serious breach of section 10(b) rights but determined that the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the breach was not temporally or factually connected to the seizure of the evidence.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit.

The Crown's evidence showed breath samples with a BAC of 100-110 mg/100ml.

The accused challenged the validity of the police investigation on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure, arbitrary detention, and right to counsel.

While the court found the approved screening device demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion, it found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel of choice by steering him toward duty counsel without providing him with the means to select a lawyer of his choosing.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter rights outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

A corporate defendant brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The defendant was charged with three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a workplace injury.

The court considered whether the Jordan framework applied to regulatory matters and corporate accused, and whether the net delay of approximately 25 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The court found that Jordan applies to both regulatory prosecutions and corporate defendants, that the delay was presumptively unreasonable, and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the stay of the remaining charge.

The accused was charged with over .08 and impaired operation following a motor vehicle collision.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to make the breath demand and that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the nature of the accident combined with evidence of alcohol consumption provided an objective basis for the breath demand.

The court also found that a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel did not constitute a breach of s. 10(b) rights.

The application for Charter relief was dismissed and the breath tests were admitted as evidence.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device in compliance with a demand made by a police officer under subsection 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the demand for breath testing was valid, the testing was conducted forthwith despite a 30-minute delay caused by the unavailability of an approved screening device, and that a technical breach of Charter section 10(b) rights regarding the failure to communicate the free legal aid telephone number was admissible under subsection 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle over the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence raised three Charter-based issues: two alleged breaches of section 9 (arbitrary detention) relating to placement in the police cruiser and overholding at the station, and one alleged breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) relating to a pat-down search.

The court found that placing the accused in the cruiser was reasonable and necessary for administering the ASD test.

The pat-down search was found to be unlawful and a breach of section 8, but evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was not serious enough.

The court assumed a breach of section 9 regarding overholding for approximately three hours but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with Over 80 Operation of a Motor Vehicle following a motor vehicle collision on October 15, 2014.

The Crown proved that the accused was involved in a rear-end collision, had a faint odour of alcohol on his breath, failed a roadside screening device test, and provided three breath samples to an Approved Instrument with results of 240, 218, and 206 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 10(b), and contended that one of the breath samples was deemed unsuitable by the breath technician and therefore should not be used.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty based on the expert toxicology evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police entry onto her property.

The officer attended at the accused's residence in response to a dispatch report of a possible impaired driver.

The property was secured by a motorized metal gate at the end of a 200-metre driveway, with intercom and security camera systems.

The officer entered the property by following a security guard through the gate without explicit permission.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful entry onto the property in violation of section 8 rights, and an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court excluded all evidence obtained after the officer passed through the gate, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police investigation based on information from a confidential informant.

Police conducted surveillance, observed the accused retrieving a duffle bag from a residence, and arrested him.

The court found no violation of s. 9 (arbitrary detention) or s. 8 (unlawful search) of the Charter, as the arrest was supported by reasonable and probable grounds based on the informant's information combined with police observations.

However, the court found a violation of s. 10(b) rights (right to counsel) due to a ten-hour delay in allowing the accused to contact counsel.

The court convicted the accused of simple possession of marijuana, finding that the Crown failed to prove the marijuana was possessed for the purpose of trafficking, as the expert evidence regarding THC degradation was insufficiently established.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of section 11(b) rights (trial within a reasonable time) in a speeding charge under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged on April 24, 2011, and filed a Notice of Intention to Appear on April 29, 2011.

The central issue was whether the five-month delay in scheduling a first attendance meeting with the prosecutor should be counted as institutional delay or treated as a neutral intake period.

The court found that the defendant had voluntarily requested the first attendance meeting and was aware that a trial date would not be scheduled until after the meeting.

After deducting various neutral periods and the first attendance meeting delay, the remaining institutional delay was 6 months and 24 days, which fell below the acceptable guideline of 8 to 10 months.

The application was dismissed.