Human Rights

The decision addresses the admissibility and weight of evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on the negligent loss of a police entry video documenting the state of the apartment before a search.

The court finds a breach of section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence but declines to exclude the evidence, instead giving reduced weight to the testimony of the officers responsible.

The accused is found guilty on the drug trafficking counts but acquitted on the proceeds of crime count.

The accused was charged with sexual assaults of two men and sought a stay of charges based on Charter violations (sections 7, 8, and 15) challenging the constitutionality of police authority to publish media releases identifying the accused and detailing accusations, as well as on grounds of lost evidence due to police negligence.

The court ruled that the determination of whether the Crown proved the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt would precede consideration of the constitutional challenge and lost evidence issues.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a young child and sentenced to three years imprisonment with orders under s. 161(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code prohibiting attendance at places where children under 16 are present and prohibiting employment or volunteer work involving positions of trust or authority over children under 16.

On appeal, the appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of these orders for the first time, arguing they constitute punishment contrary to s. 11(i) of the Charter and were retroactively applied.

The Crown opposed raising the constitutional challenge on appeal.

The court granted leave to raise the constitutional argument, finding that the interests of justice favoured permitting the appellant to advance the argument despite it not being raised at trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis addressing both the merits and a Charter application.

The defence alleged a section 8 Charter violation arising from police monitoring of the accused while she used the toilet on two occasions while in short-term police custody.

The Crown obtained breath samples of 160 and 143 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The trial judge found a serious section 8 violation and excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with speeding 80 km/h in a 50 km/h Community Safety Zone under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a section 7 Charter application challenging the prosecution's disclosure obligations, arguing that outstanding disclosure items were required to be provided.

The court considered the binding precedent from Region of York v. McGuigan and found that the prosecution was not obligated to disclose the requested items, as they did not constitute "fruits of the investigation" in a routine regulatory speeding offense.

The court dismissed the section 7 Charter application, finding no infringement of the defendant's rights.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence challenged the validity of the arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing that the right to counsel was not provided forthwith and that the accused was unlawfully over-held.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the timing of right to counsel advice, but declined to exclude evidence.

The court also found no Charter violation regarding the continued detention, as the officer's decision to hold the accused to allow her to sober up and calm down was reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted of invitation to sexual touching under section 152 of the Criminal Code following a consensual romantic relationship with a 14-year-old complainant when the accused was 19 years old.

The age difference was five years and 35 days, placing the accused just outside the five-year close-in-age exception under section 150.1.

The sentencing court found that imposing the mandatory minimum 90-day custodial sentence would be grossly disproportionate to the circumstances, including the consensual and non-exploitative nature of the relationship, the complainant's lack of harm, the accused's excellent character and remorse, and the minimal difference from the statutory exception.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, 25 hours community service, DNA registration, and a 10-year SOIRA order.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired, blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The Crown alleged the defendant operated a vehicle in an erratic manner, struck a mailbox, and fled the scene.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of statements and evidence on Charter grounds, arguing improper detention and lack of grounds for arrest.

The court rejected all Charter claims, finding no detention prior to arrest, proper grounds for the breath demand, and voluntary statements.

The court found the defendant guilty of all charges based on eyewitness testimony of erratic driving, observations of impairment indicators, breath test results showing blood alcohol level more than twice the legal limit, and admissions by the defendant.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation of a person with a mental disability in September 2013.

The trial evidence was completed in January 2017.

The defence applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the accused's Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that the net delay of 512 days fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

The court attributed significant delay to defence conduct and found that exceptional circumstances, including surprise witness testimony leading to expanded investigation and case complexity, reasonably explained the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge heard Charter and voluntariness voir dires on a blended basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, ultimately proceeding only with the section 10(b) right to counsel argument.

The defence also challenged the voluntariness of statements made to police.

The trial judge found that all statements were voluntary but that the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated because police failed to wait a reasonable time for the defendant's second counsel of choice to call back before proceeding with breath testing.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample readings of 260 and 240 milligrams, approximately three times the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 9 were breached when police held him for a show cause bail hearing without reasonable grounds, contrary to the presumption of release.

The court found an arbitrary detention breach based on the accused's status as a resident alien with property in Florida, coupled with insufficient police investigation into his Ontario roots.

The breath sample readings were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the criminal charges but subject to a common law peace bond.

The accused was charged with Drive Over 80 following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown obtained breath samples showing readings of 247 and 230 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure arising from videotaping in a police cell and an arbitrary detention.

The court found Charter breaches but declined to exclude evidence or grant a stay of proceedings, finding no nexus between the breaches and the evidence obtained.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 13 months.

The court found that while a reasonable intake period of 6 weeks was appropriate, the Crown's delay in providing disclosure was unjustified, taking over three months to provide 14 pages of police notes.

The court also found that the defendant suffered actual prejudice in the form of emotional and physical symptoms, including depression, anxiety, and stress-related health issues.

Balancing the factors under the Morin test, the court found the delay unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with possessing 2 grams of marijuana contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, allegedly discovered during a strip search at a detention centre.

The accused challenged the legality of the search under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the strip search was unauthorized and based on insufficient grounds, constituting a serious breach of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood (exceed 80) following a random sobriety checkpoint conducted by police at a strip mall parking lot.

The defendant advanced two Charter arguments: (1) arbitrary detention and unlawful search based on targeting a specific location, and (2) violation of the right to counsel due to failure to provide advice in Portuguese regarding the right to consult private counsel.

The court rejected both arguments and found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs on May 24, 2012.

The trial was scheduled for September 3, 2013.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court found that the total delay was approximately 15 months, with the Crown responsible for at least 2.5 months of delay due to delayed disclosure and institutional delay accounting for 11.5 months.

The court determined that the institutional and Crown delay was unreasonable and granted the application, imposing a stay of proceedings.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and held in police custody for approximately 16 hours, with the investigation completed prior to 6:30 pm.

Although the initial decision to delay her release was reasonable, the court found that the accused was not reassessed for release as the hours passed, resulting in an unlawful and arbitrary detention.

The accused was held in harsh conditions in a cold cell without adequate bedding or clothing, and was denied food and water for extended periods.

The court found a breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and imposed a remedy of pre-trial custody credit for time served plus a nominal $1 fine in satisfaction of the statutory minimum penalty, along with a mandatory one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on a breathalyzer test result of 150 milligrams.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved roadside screening device (ASD) demand on grounds of breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer detected an odour of alcohol at the initial contact but unreasonably delayed making the ASD demand to conduct routine license inquiries.

The court further found that the total delay of 21 minutes from the formation of reasonable suspicion to the point the officer was ready to require a breath sample provided a realistic opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel, which was not afforded.

The court concluded that section 8 rights were breached and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile while having excess alcohol in his blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the officer complied with the requirement that an approved screening device (ASD) test be administered "forthwith." The defendant was detained for approximately 19 to 21 minutes after the officer formed reasonable suspicion before being given an opportunity to comply with the ASD demand.

During this period, the defendant was not informed of the reasons for detention or provided with his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found multiple Charter breaches and excluded the breath test results, leading to dismissal of the charge.