Environmental Law

The plaintiffs purchased a motel and gas station from the defendants.

Prior to the sale, the defendants represented that the fuel tank system was in good condition and only required routine testing, concealing outstanding TSSA orders and a history of non-compliance.

The Agreement of Purchase and Sale included a clause requiring the defendants to provide a report confirming the system was safe and compliant, which they failed to do.

The plaintiffs subsequently discovered the system was non-compliant and faced closure by the TSSA, forcing them to incur significant costs to install a new system.

The court found the defendants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.

The court also found the plaintiffs' real estate lawyer negligent for failing to adequately protect them in the transaction.

Liability for the $635,189.12 in damages was apportioned 80% to the defendants and 20% to the lawyer.

The applicants, a First Nation and its former Chief, brought an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) and (h) seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the Environmental Assessment Act and the Crown's Duty to Consult and Accommodate.

The application arose in the context of the proposed Marten Falls Community Access Road in the Ring of Fire region.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite legislation or provide a de facto reference on how the Crown should discharge its duty in the future without a live factual dispute.

The court held that the application did not raise a justiciable issue and was not properly brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicants, who were unsuccessful in their constitutional challenge regarding Ontario's response to climate change, and the respondent, who successfully defended the application, both sought costs.

The respondent sought $45,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicants sought $96,999.79 or, alternatively, no costs.

The court applied the factors for public interest litigation and declined to award costs to the successful respondent, noting the applicants had no pecuniary interest, the issues were of existential public importance, and the respondent had superior capacity to bear costs.

The court also declined to award costs to the unsuccessful applicants, finding this was not one of the rare cases justifying such an award.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against the City of Thunder Bay for negligence and private nuisance, alleging that the City's addition of sodium hydroxide to the municipal water supply caused pinhole leaks in copper plumbing pipes, resulting in property damage.

The City brought a cross-motion to strike the nuisance claim, arguing it was barred by s. 449 of the Municipal Act, 2001, which provides immunity for nuisance claims connected to the escape of water from water works.

The court granted the City's motion to strike the nuisance claim, finding it was plainly and obviously barred by the statute.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion to certify the negligence claim, finding it met all the criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for validation of service of the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim and motion record on a defendant in the Netherlands, for leave to issue a Further Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, and for an extension of time to serve it.

The motion was opposed by affiliated defendants.

The court granted leave to amend the claim, finding no withdrawal of an admission.

The court also granted an extension of time for service, finding no prejudice to the foreign defendant and a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The request for validation of service was denied, as the motion record was properly served under the Rules and the Hague Convention, and the extension of time for the claim was granted nunc pro tunc.

The applicant sought to quash the Regional Municipality of Niagara's Woodland Conservation Bylaw, arguing it was ultra vires, conflicted with a historic Crown Patent and provincial statutes, and was impermissibly vague.

The applicant contended that the Crown's previous relinquishment of tree reservations meant the municipality could not regulate tree destruction on the property.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the bylaw was a valid exercise of the municipality's regulatory powers under section 135 of the Municipal Act.

The court held that the Crown Patent did not supersede provincial or municipal authority to regulate land use, and the bylaw's definitions were sufficiently clear.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend its statement of claim to add a third party as a defendant in an action concerning environmental contamination.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the material facts giving rise to a plausible inference of liability against the proposed defendant more than two years before bringing the motion.

Consequently, the limitation period had expired, and the motion to add the party was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for environmental contamination migrating from the defendants' property onto the plaintiff's adjacent lands.

The court found that chlorinated solvents (TCE) originated from the defendants' property and flowed via groundwater onto the plaintiff's lands.

The court held the defendants liable in nuisance, negligence, and trespass.

The court also pierced the corporate veil, finding the individual defendant jointly and severally liable due to his egregious conduct and failure to remediate the property despite promises to do so.

The court ordered the defendants to remediate their property and awarded damages of $1,809,908.80, with a further $2,800,000 payable if remediation is not completed on schedule.

The defendants brought a motion on the eve of trial seeking an adjournment, leave to serve a late expert report, and leave to amend their Statement of Defence to add a counterclaim.

The underlying action involved allegations of environmental contamination flowing from the defendants' property to the plaintiff's property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the individual defendant, who had been self-represented for much of the litigation, had known about the issues for years but failed to act until the eve of trial.

The court held that granting the relief would cause significant delay and non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action against General Motors, Bosch, and a GM dealer, alleging that certain diesel vehicles contained 'defeat devices' designed to cheat emissions tests.

The plaintiffs sought certification of the class action, while the defendants moved to strike the statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the certification motion and struck the statement of claim without leave to amend, finding that because the regulator (the EPA) had not taken any action and the vehicles had valid Certificates of Conformity, there was no basis in fact for the alleged regulatory breach, misrepresentation, or compensable harm.

The City of Kawartha Lakes brought an application for a permanent injunction, a closure order, and a mandatory remediation order against the respondents for operating an illegal commercial fill site on environmentally sensitive land.

The City also brought a motion for contempt against one respondent for continuing the fill operation in breach of a prior interim injunction.

The court granted the permanent injunction, closure order, and mandatory order, finding the respondents had blatantly violated municipal by-laws and imported massive amounts of contaminated fill.

The court also found the respondent in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered him to purge his contempt by remediating the property at his own expense.

The plaintiff hotel sought an injunction to restrain the neighbouring defendant tire shop from servicing commercial vehicles, alleging the noise constituted a nuisance and breached municipal by-laws and the Environmental Protection Act (EPA).

The court found that the noise from servicing commercial vehicles likely caused an adverse effect, breaching s. 9(1) of the EPA and, consequently, the municipal zoning by-law.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted an injunction restraining the defendant from servicing commercial vehicles between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. to prevent irreparable harm to the hotel's reputation.

The plaintiff appealed a master's decision dismissing its motion under Rule 32.01 for intrusive testing on the defendant's adjacent property to investigate environmental contamination.

The master found that the proposed testing would not be probative because the plaintiff's construction had already altered the soil and groundwater conditions, and that the prejudice to the defendant outweighed any benefit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the master's exercise of discretion.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to prevent the Town of Caledon from enforcing a work order requiring the removal of 5,500 tonnes of illegal fill from his property, as well as an order of mandamus for document disclosure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, noting the high hurdle for enjoining a public authority enforcing its by-laws in the public interest.

Finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the Town, the court dismissed the motion for injunctive relief and mandamus.

The moving parties, a company and its CEO, commenced a private prosecution against a court-appointed receiver under the Environmental Protection Act, alleging the receiver stored excess organic waste.

The receiver brought a motion to stay the prosecution, arguing the moving parties failed to obtain leave of the court as required by the receivership order and that the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice held that a private prosecution is a 'proceeding' requiring leave under the receivership order.

The court refused to grant leave and stayed the prosecution, finding it was an abuse of process because the moving parties were attempting to relitigate the exact same allegations that had previously been dismissed by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal in a prior motion for leave to sue the receiver.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' environmental contamination action on the basis that it was commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiffs argued that the limitation period was tolled under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act because the ongoing involvement of the Ministry of the Environment constituted an alternative process, making a court proceeding inappropriate.

The court held that the Ministry's involvement did not toll the limitation period because it was not an alternative dispute resolution process with a reasonably ascertainable end date, and the plaintiffs' decision to delay litigation was tactical.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a condominium developer, brought a motion under Rule 32.01 for an order allowing its expert to conduct invasive soil and groundwater testing on the defendants' adjacent property, which operated a dry-cleaning business.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants' property was the source of chlorinated solvent contamination found on its lands.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed testing would not be probative because the plaintiff's extensive excavation and construction had irrevocably altered the subsurface conditions.

The court also applied the equitable doctrine of laches, noting the plaintiff's unreasonable delay in seeking the inspection prejudiced the defendants.

The defendant vendor moved for partial summary judgment to release a $100,000 holdback from the sale of a commercial property intended for a gas station.

The holdback was agreed upon at closing because the plaintiff purchaser's environmental consultant had concerns about the vendor's Phase II environmental report.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the delivery of the report itself, as the vendor provided what was contracted for.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the remedy for the vendor's breach of a separate condition precedent to satisfy the purchaser's consultant's concerns before the funds could be released.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.