D. E. Short

The applicant sought to assess the legal accounts of her former lawyers more than two years after the retainer ended and the accounts were paid.

The respondent lawyers brought a motion to strike the assessment application as statute-barred under the Solicitors Act.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding no special circumstances to justify the delay and noting prejudice to the respondents.

However, the court granted the applicant's cross-motion, ordering the respondents to return the remaining balance of funds held in trust.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The action arose from a 2013 contractual dispute over HVAC services.

The plaintiff's counsel experienced a series of severe personal and professional crises, including the death of a colleague, illness, and a ransomware attack, which caused significant delay.

The court found the delay was not intentional and that the defendant failed to establish a substantial risk to a fair trial, noting the defendant's own failure to preserve evidence.

The motion to dismiss was denied and the action was permitted to proceed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to disqualify the law firm Adair Goldblatt Bieber LLP (AGB) from representing the defendants in a legal malpractice action.

The plaintiffs argued that their counsel had previously consulted with a partner at AGB about potentially acting as an expert witness for the plaintiffs, during which confidential information was allegedly shared.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the discussion was brief, general in nature, and did not involve the disclosure of confidential information attributable to a solicitor-client relationship that could prejudice the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the production of data, correspondence, and reports from two environmental consulting firms retained by the defendants.

The defendants claimed litigation privilege over the documents.

The court found that litigation was not the dominant purpose for the creation of the documents, as the parties were still working cooperatively to solve an environmental remediation issue at the time.

Furthermore, the court held that even if privilege existed, the defendants implicitly waived it by directing the plaintiff to share information directly with the consultants without advising that the process was privileged, and by claiming the consultants' costs in their counterclaim.

The motion for production was granted.

This motion concerned a solicitor's negligence claim where the defendants sought further and better production of documents from the plaintiff, including a particularized Schedule 'B' for privileged documents.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to amend the statement of claim, notably to include a Charter-based claim against the defendants.

The court granted the defendants' motion for further production, emphasizing the plaintiff's obligation for fulsome disclosure in a solicitor's negligence claim, and ruled that solicitor-client privilege was impliedly waived regarding the legal advice and litigation strategy in the underlying criminal matter.

The court denied the plaintiff's proposed Charter amendment, finding no legal basis for such a claim against a private actor.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a default judgment granted against them in January 2019 for failing to file a defence to the plaintiffs' action regarding unpaid real estate loans.

The court applied the three-part test from Hanratty v. Woods and found that the motion was not launched forthwith, the default was intentional, and the defendants failed to present a triable defence.

Relying heavily on text messages where the individual defendant personally guaranteed repayment, the court dismissed the motion to set aside the default judgment.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion on the eve of trial to compel the defendant employer to produce communications between its internal legal counsel and a third-party workplace investigator.

The defendant argued the motion was barred by Rule 48.04 as the action had been set down for trial, and asserted privilege over the documents.

The court held that leave was not required because the motion sought to enforce a prior production order.

The court further rejected the defendant's claims of solicitor-client and litigation privilege, ordering the production of the withheld communications within five days.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion seeking to examine the defendants' former lawyers and for a declaration that solicitor-client privilege had been waived.

The defendants, mortgagors, alleged they did not understand various mortgage-related documents they signed, claiming non est factum and forgery, thereby putting the legal advice received from their former counsel into issue.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that the defendants' assertions directly challenged the legal advice and their contemporaneous understanding of the documents, thus implicitly waiving solicitor-client privilege.

The former lawyers were ordered to attend examinations, and conditional solicitor and client costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against a property.

The plaintiff, who had sold the property to relatives of her real estate broker with an alleged unwritten agreement to repurchase, had fallen into default on rent and faced health issues.

The court, exercising broad discretion under Section 113 of the Courts of Justice Act, granted the plaintiff a "last chance" to repurchase the property at current market value, to be determined by a specific appraisal process.

Failure to meet the conditions by September 30, 2020, would result in the CPL's discharge.

The plaintiff, J.A.L. Developments Inc., brought a motion for leave to conduct further discovery after the action had been set down for trial, pursuant to Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The case involved a profit-sharing agreement for a real estate project where the plaintiff invested $200,000 and alleged fraudulent conveyances and significant discrepancies in accounting, showing a swing from anticipated profits to stated losses.

The court reviewed the evolving test for granting leave under Rule 48.04(1), preferring a flexible "interests of justice" approach over the more rigid "substantial or unexpected change in circumstances" test, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on court operations.

The court granted leave for both parties to conduct further discovery, emphasizing the importance of full pre-trial disclosure for a just, expeditious, and least expensive resolution on the merits.

The plaintiff was injured after colliding with an unlit street light pole on a sidewalk.

She initially sued the City of Toronto, believing it owned and maintained the pole.

Years later, she learned the City had sold the street lights to Toronto Hydro.

The plaintiff brought a motion to correct the defendant's name on the basis of misnomer.

The Master found that the 'litigating finger' was clearly pointed at the entity responsible for the pole, and granted the misnomer correction, awarding substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, although noting the decision was practically moot as a parallel appeal had already added Toronto Hydro as a defendant.

The defendant brought a motion to amend its defence and counterclaim and to add a third party claim, alleging that the plaintiff's asset sale violated the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendments and third party claim were statute-barred.

The court found that the defendant knew or ought to have known the material facts underlying the proposed claims more than two years before bringing the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the proposed claims were statute-barred and that adding them would cause non-compensable prejudice to the impecunious plaintiff.

In an application seeking a declaration that certain promissory notes were forged, the respondents brought a motion under Rule 30.04(2) to compel the applicants to produce the original promissory notes for inspection.

The applicants argued they did not possess the originals and that the motion was an abuse of process.

The Master granted the motion, ordering both parties to produce any original promissory notes in their possession or provide sworn evidence explaining their whereabouts, emphasizing the importance of verifying pivotal documents.

The Master addressed a dispute over costs and interest following the full payment and discharge of a mortgage.

The defendant, Juleth Dawson, sought a credit for amounts paid, including a higher post-default interest rate and legal fees incurred by the mortgagee in an unsuccessful motion to add her spouse, Rod Byrnes, to the action.

The Master clarified an earlier misunderstanding regarding the application of Rule 64 (Mortgage Actions) and applied Rule 1.04 (proportionality).

The Master found it inappropriate to grant full indemnity for costs of a motion lost by the lender and for initiating a second action against a party who was subsequently dismissed with no costs.

An overall net credit of $6500 was fixed to be repaid to Juleth Dawson.

The plaintiffs moved for an order granting additional time to set their medical malpractice action down for trial, five years after its commencement.

The motion proceeded as a status hearing under Rule 48.14, requiring the plaintiffs to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for delay.

The court considered the explanation for delay, the alleged non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, and the overarching principle of resolving disputes on their merits.

The court found the plaintiffs provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, particularly given the complex medical issues, the death of the lead plaintiff, and difficulties in securing expert evidence.

The court was not convinced that the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The motion to extend time was granted, and a timetable was to be established.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike several paragraphs from the defendant insurer's statement of defence.

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a motor vehicle and suffered catastrophic injuries.

The insurer, added as a defendant, pleaded that the collision was an intentional act in self-defence and included allegations about the plaintiff's past criminal record, gang affiliation, and drug involvement.

The court found these allegations to be irrelevant evidence that improperly cast a derogatory light on the plaintiff's character.

The court struck the offending paragraphs under Rule 25.11, concluding that their prejudicial effect outweighed any potential probative value.

The plaintiffs, promoters of a wind farm project, brought a motion to compel answers to questions and production of documents refused by the Crown during examinations for discovery.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Crown's refusal to issue a Renewable Energy Approval was due to bad faith political interference during the 2014 provincial election.

The Crown argued the questions were res judicata and the documents were not in its control or were protected by Cabinet privilege.

The Master granted the motion, finding the issues were not res judicata, the documents were relevant and within the Crown's control, and the public interest in disclosure outweighed any claim of Cabinet privilege.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in 2019 to enforce a judgment obtained in 1997, seeking a further accounting from the judgment debtor and leave to examine third parties in aid of execution.

The court found that the plaintiffs' extreme delay constituted laches and that any potential claims against the third parties were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the request to examine third parties but ordered the self-represented judgment debtor to re-attend an examination to answer specific questions on a best efforts basis.

The plaintiff's motion to add Ken Rubin as a defendant in a defamation action based on his freedom of information requests was previously dismissed.

In this costs decision, the Master applied the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act by analogy.

Finding no reason to deviate from the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7), the Master awarded the successful proposed defendant his requested costs of $15,000.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's administrative dismissal of its action for delay.

The action, which sought a declaration regarding mining royalty obligations, was dismissed after the plaintiff's tickler system failed to alert counsel to the five-year deadline while awaiting mediation dates from the defendant.

Applying the Reid test, the Master found the delay was adequately explained, inadvertent, and promptly addressed once discovered.

The Master also found no actual prejudice to the defendant, noting the defendant's own delays and failure to provide mediation dates.

The motion was granted, the dismissal set aside, and costs awarded to the plaintiff.