Howard Levitt

The applicants, students at Seneca College, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the college's mandatory Covid-19 vaccination policy.

They argued the policy violated their rights under sections 2(a), 7, 8, and 15 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to establish a strong prima facie case.

The court held that their objections were based on personal preference rather than a comprehensive moral code, and the policy did not force medical treatment but rather presented a choice with consequences.

The court also found no irreparable harm and held that the balance of convenience favored the public interest in health and safety.

The appellant was constructively dismissed after approximately 14 years of employment during which the respondent's management systematically marginalized him.

The central issue was whether damages for breach of the implied term to provide reasonable notice encompassed a long term incentive plan payment that was triggered by the sale of the employer approximately 13 months after the appellant's departure.

The Court held that courts must apply a two-step analysis: first, whether but for the termination the employee would have been entitled to the bonus during the reasonable notice period; and second, whether the terms of the employment contract or bonus plan unambiguously limit or remove that common law right.

Applying this framework, the Court found that the Realization Event occurred within the reasonable notice period and that the LTIP's contractual terms did not unambiguously extinguish the appellant's common law entitlement to damages.

The Court further clarified that a breach of the duty of good faith in the manner of dismissal is a distinct contractual breach from the failure to provide reasonable notice and carries its own analytical framework.

The plaintiff, a former associate lawyer, brought a motion to consolidate her wrongful dismissal action against her former employer with a subsequent libel action against the employer and their legal counsel.

The libel action arose from comments made by the employer's counsel to a legal publication regarding the wrongful dismissal pleadings.

The court dismissed the motion to consolidate, finding that doing so would likely force the defendants' counsel to step down due to conflicts of interest and risk breaching solicitor-client privilege.

Instead, the court ordered a stay of the libel action pending the resolution of the wrongful dismissal action.

The defendants moved to settle the order following a previous decision striking portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The court addressed the sealing of motion materials and the impact of the Apology Act, 2009 on the pleadings.

The court ordered the contested documents sealed from the public file and confirmed that references to an apology in the statement of claim must be struck, as the Apology Act prevents such statements from being used to establish liability.

The defendants brought a motion under rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to strike or expunge large portions of a statement of claim arising from a wrongful dismissal dispute between a lawyer and her former employer.

The court reviewed extensive jurisprudence on the proper function of pleadings, emphasizing that pleadings must contain concise statements of material facts rather than evidence, argument, or scandalous allegations.

Applying proportionality and the rules of pleading, the court struck numerous paragraphs and subparagraphs of the statement of claim that were found to contain evidentiary detail, inflammatory allegations, or unnecessary particulars more appropriately addressed through discovery or particulars.

Certain causes of action, including negligent infliction of nervous shock and defamation, were struck with leave to amend due to insufficient particulars.

The plaintiff was granted leave to deliver a fresh amended statement of claim, and the defendants were permitted to file a fresh amended statement of defence.

The plaintiffs, founders of a family-owned welding supply business, sued for wrongful dismissal after the business was sold to the manufacturer whose products they distributed.

The manufacturer argued that a term should be implied that the plaintiffs would retire upon the sale of the business given their senior age.

The court rejected this argument, finding that a term of reasonable notice is implied by law in employment contracts.

The court awarded 18 months' notice based on the plaintiffs' actual compensation, resulting in a joint and several damages award of over $1.1 million against the manufacturer and the business.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial, the only remaining issue concerned the quantum of partial indemnity costs payable by the employer to the employee.

The employee sought over $455,000 in costs, including a large disbursement for services provided by a corporate entity associated with a lay witness who assisted counsel and testified at trial.

The court found several categories of claimed legal fees excessive, particularly for pleadings and trial preparation, and held that the defendant should not bear the cost of premium legal services retained by the plaintiff.

The court also significantly reduced the claimed disbursement for the lay witness’s advisory services, noting that much of the evidence was rejected and the invoices lacked sufficient detail.

Fees and disbursements were therefore substantially reduced.