Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law

The Crown sought a review of a bail decision that released C.T., who was charged with firearms trafficking.

The Crown argued there was a material change in circumstances (a defaced, loaded firearm registered to C.T. was found with suspected bank robbers), an error of law by the bail justice (mischaracterizing the offences as not involving firearm use), and that the decision was clearly inappropriate.

The court found a material change and an error of law, necessitating a de novo bail hearing.

While the strength of the Crown's case, gravity of the offences, firearm use in trafficking, and potential lengthy imprisonment all favored detention, the court ultimately maintained C.T.'s release, citing his successful four-month house arrest and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic within correctional facilities.

Robert Lepp sought to vary his judicial release order, challenging a broad prohibition on mentioning complainants online (Term 6) and restrictions on internet use (Term 7).

The court, applying R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, found Term 6 to be opaque, overbroad, and not necessary for public protection, striking it entirely.

Term 7 was varied to allow unsupervised internet use for employment and legal purposes, and supervised use for other purposes, recognizing Lepp's rights as a self-represented litigant, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Non-contact terms (Terms 4 and 5) were also adjusted to remove one complainant's name while re-introducing another's due to new charges.

The Crown sought a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the respondent on bail following serious charges including failing to comply with a recognizance, discharge of a firearm, uttering a threat to damage property, and break and enter of a residence.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law and principle by failing to adequately analyze the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, and by allowing the COVID-19 pandemic to disproportionately influence the decision without a robust supervision plan.

The court concluded that the proposed supervision plan was inadequate given the seriousness of the allegations and the respondent's criminal record.

The respondent's bail was vacated, and she was ordered detained.

The applicant sought bail on a charge of first-degree murder, which involved a highly organized, gangland-style execution.

The Crown opposed release on all three grounds: flight risk, danger to the public, and erosion of public confidence.

The court found the applicant's pre-apprehension behavior alarming, the offence grave, the Crown's case compelling, ties to the community minimal, the release plan weak, and a history of non-compliance with court orders.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions, the court concluded that detention was necessary on all three grounds, particularly given the brazen nature of the attack and the applicant's role in a sophisticated criminal plot.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The applicant sought to vary bail conditions to permit driving, citing material changes in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the disproportionate length of the driving prohibition compared to potential Highway Traffic Act penalties, and the need to care for his ill mother.

The Crown opposed, arguing the driving prohibition addressed secondary ground concerns related to Criminal Code charges.

The court found the pandemic and associated delays constituted a material change, and that the driving prohibition was not directly and necessarily related to the criminal offences alleged.

The application was granted, varying the bail conditions to allow driving for work, with surety, or for necessities of life, and requiring identification.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully causing unnecessary pain to his dog by spraying it with bear spray and assaulting it, contrary to s. 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from his mother for their truth.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, specifically regarding substantive reliability as per R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found that while the trial judge made some errors in identifying corroborative evidence, the overall analysis correctly concluded that the hearsay statements were admissible due to compelling circumstantial evidence negating untruthfulness or mistake.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Evans Okwara, was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and unlawfully importing heroin into Canada.

The Crown presented evidence including cell phone records showing knowledge of the shipment details and searches related to the delivery address, as well as a storage locker access card found in the accused's wallet, which contained additional heroin.

The accused's testimony denying knowledge and involvement was found to be inconsistent with the evidence.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed and imported heroin for trafficking.

Sahilan Surendran was sentenced for manslaughter after pleading guilty to the shooting death of Kyle Baker.

The incident occurred during a drug deal where Baker accosted and assaulted Surendran, who then fired multiple shots, including fatal ones after Baker had released him.

The court considered aggravating factors such as Surendran's extensive criminal record, use of a firearm while subject to prohibition orders, and lack of assistance to the victim.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, expression of remorse, unstable upbringing, a childhood head injury, and acting under provocation.

The court also noted the limited weight given to a forensic psychiatrist's report due to lack of confirmatory information.

The sentence emphasized denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the prevalence of unlawful handguns in the community.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The defence brought a Charter application arguing that the police violated section 8 rights by making a breath demand without reasonable and probable grounds as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter violation, as the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was driving while impaired within the three-hour window.

However, on the trial proper, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired at the time of driving, despite proving the over 80 charge through breath sample evidence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

Following the Crown's case, the defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on the grounds of an alleged violation of her right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant argued that police improperly steered her toward duty counsel rather than allowing her to consult with private counsel of her choice, and that police failed to confirm her satisfaction with duty counsel before conducting breath tests.

The court rejected the Charter challenge, finding that the defendant understood her rights, failed to assert a preference for private counsel, and bore responsibility for diligently exercising her right to counsel.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement following an incident on December 6, 2018, in which he held a knife to his mother's body while confining her in her bedroom.

The accused testified that he was following God's instructions to kill his mother, whom he believed God assured would not be harmed.

A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed the accused with schizophrenia and opined that at the time of the offences, the accused was experiencing psychotic symptoms including command auditory hallucinations and delusions that rendered him incapable of rationally perceiving the nature and quality of his actions and unable to make a rational choice regarding his conduct.

The court found that the accused's religious delusions and hallucinations were symptoms of a major mental disorder and that the accused lacked the capacity to know his acts were morally wrong.

The court found the accused not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80 care or control following a 911 call reporting an erratically driven black BMW on Highway 401.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a).

The court found no detention occurred during the initial police encounter, no Charter breaches, and that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable and incredible, finding he was the driver of the vehicle based on witness observations, admissions, and circumstantial evidence.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime following his arrest on August 31, 2016.

York Regional Police conducted surveillance of a vehicle involved in a series of shoplifting incidents, which led to the observation of a suspected drug transaction between the accused and another individual.

The accused was arrested and found in possession of approximately 26 grams of cocaine and $5,615 in cash.

The defence raised Charter arguments regarding the lawfulness of the arrest, the manner of search, and the late filing of the Report to a Justice.

The trial judge rejected the defence arguments and found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a traffic stop where the officer detected an odour of alcohol.

The defence raised multiple Charter breaches including sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no section 7 breach regarding lost in-car video evidence, no section 8 breach regarding the timing of the ASD demand, and no section 9 breach regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found a brief section 10(b) breach (8 minutes) regarding the failure to provide right to counsel advice immediately upon detention for investigation, but the accused was offered the opportunity to contact duty counsel at the roadside and did speak with duty counsel at the station before approved instrument testing.

The court applied the section 24(2) analysis and admitted the breath test evidence, finding all Grant factors favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellants appealed their convictions for driving a commercial motor vehicle with major brake defects.

The driver was charged under section 107 of the Highway Traffic Act, and the company was charged with operating a vehicle with push rod stroke exceeding prescribed limits under HTA Regulation 587.

The appellants challenged the convictions on four grounds: failure to distinguish between owner, operator, and driver; failure to consider due diligence; failure to establish the owner-operator's knowledge of defects; and failure to establish that brake testing was conducted in accordance with regulations.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the Crown proved the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellants failed to establish a factual basis for the due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to slow down and proceed with caution for an emergency vehicle contrary to section 159(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the appellant testified that he slowed to approximately 40 kilometres per hour upon seeing the emergency vehicle lights, while the officer testified the vehicle did not slow down as it approached the RIDE checkpoint.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty, accepting that slowing to 40 kilometres per hour was insufficient to meet the statutory obligation to slow down and proceed with caution.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding the conviction was reasonable and well-supported by the evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to four serious offences: making child pornography, possessing child pornography, sexual assault, and counselling a person under 16 to touch her with an object.

The offences involved her very young son and were discovered through international cooperation between American and Canadian authorities.

The Crown sought a long-term offender designation and a sentence of six to eight years.

The defence sought a five-year sentence with no long-term offender order.

The court imposed a six-year sentence (apportioned as 3.5 years for sexual assault concurrent with 3.5 years for invitation to sexual touching, 2.5 years consecutive for making child pornography, and 2 years concurrent for possession of child pornography) and declined to impose a long-term offender designation, finding the accused posed a low risk of reoffending based on psychiatric evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking heroin.

The Crown sought an 18-month custodial sentence, while defence counsel argued for a 12-month sentence with time served credit.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence with enhanced pre-trial custody credit of 56 days beyond the statutory 1.5:1 ratio, recognizing the accused's chronic pain condition, his use of heroin for pain management, the harsh conditions of pre-trial detention including inadequate pain management, and the brief, unsophisticated nature of the trafficking offences.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the accused following his conviction for sexual assault and two counts of threatening death.

The accused, aged 48 with over 50 prior convictions and a history as a long-term offender, committed a sexual assault on an elderly shelter resident and made death threats to police officers.

A forensic psychiatrist assessed the accused as presenting high to very high risk for violent and sexual recidivism with intractable mental disorders including anti-social personality disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and substance abuse disorder.

The accused consented to the dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court accepted the consent and imposed detention in a penitentiary for an indefinite period.