Civil Litigation - Defendant

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for criminal negligence causing death, alleging breaches of Charter sections 7, 11(d), and 11(b) due to pre-charge and post-charge delay.

The court found significant pre-charge delay (26 months and 23 days) and prejudice to the applicant, including the death of a material witness and the unfairness of sequential charges (provincial offence then criminal) arising from the same incident.

The court granted a stay of proceedings based on sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, finding an abuse of process.

The court also considered the s. 11(b) argument but would have dismissed it due to a re-calculation of defence delay, which would have brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

Minority shareholders appealed a trial judgment finding oppressive conduct by majority shareholders in a real estate development company.

The trial judge found that the majority had issued too many shares in response to cash calls when the minority shareholder refused to participate, thereby diluting the minority's ownership interest.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the shareholders' agreement and the calculation of share dilution, with minor adjustments to the valuation calculations.

The court also set aside punitive damages against one defendant due to inadequate notice in the pleadings, and dismissed the appellants' costs appeal.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant appealed a decision by Justice Douglas K. Gray dated April 14, 2016.

The Court of Appeal determined that this was not a case warranting substantial indemnity costs, as both parties had pursued and defended their positions vigorously.

The respondents claimed partial indemnity costs of $17,354.08, but the court awarded costs to the respondents in the reduced amount of $13,000, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

On appeal from a trial judgment finding the municipal defendants liable for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on a rural road during winter conditions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation and application of the Municipal Act, 2001 duty to clear roads of snow and ice.

The trial judge found the road in a state of non-repair and held the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct the condition.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied an unreasonably high standard of maintenance for a Class 4 rural road, erred in requiring the application of straight salt rather than sand/salt mixture, and excluded relevant evidence regarding financial costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, set aside the liability findings, and ordered a new trial on liability issues while upholding the damages assessment.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge who refused leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim by striking certain defences and counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to provide explicit reasons for denying leave to amend and that leave should only be denied in the clearest of cases.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the order to grant leave to amend.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of part of its application for relief arising from a fire at an adjoining semi-detached property.

The appellant sought recovery of losses caused by the fire and subsequent conduct of the respondent and its predecessor.

The key issue was whether the respondent, having purchased the damaged property several months after the fire, became liable for damages caused to the appellant's property prior to the respondent's acquisition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the respondent had no involvement in and could not be responsible for damages accrued before it acquired the property.

The court also reduced the respondent's costs award on appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion for an extension of time to serve a Third Party Claim on Rosa Cavallo nunc pro tunc and for validation of service based on the pleading coming to her attention.

The appellant had issued the Third Party Claim alleging that foliage on the Cavallos' property created a hazard to motorists.

Rosa had moved to Italy and her whereabouts were unknown.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the evidence regarding service attempts was unreliable hearsay and that the pleading had not come to Rosa's attention.

The motion judge also refused to dispense with personal service, noting the potential liability far exceeded the policy limits and the case was weak.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding the hearsay evidence and the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant sought to appeal a costs order made by Gibson J. of the Superior Court of Justice dated May 24, 2016.

The appellant did not seek leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the proposed appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary costs order.

Costs were fixed at $250 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes in favour of the respondent.

The applicant sought a fee waiver from a judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in respect of filing fees for a notice of appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The underlying proceeding involved an application by the Attorney General of Ontario under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 for forfeiture of seized funds.

The applicant claimed the funds were not proceeds of crime.

The judge dismissed the fee waiver request, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a lack of financial means to pay the appeal fees.

The applicant's fee waiver affidavit was inconsistent with evidence he had previously presented to the application judge regarding his prior employment, income, and financial assets.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his motion for default judgment against the respondent law firms.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found that the order appealed from was interlocutory in nature, as it did not finally determine any issue in the proceeding.

Accordingly, jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to each of the two moving parties.

The appellants sought an injunction against the respondent to prevent the operation of a restaurant at a neighbouring property.

The appellants contended that the property was not zoned for commercial use and that the City of Toronto had acted improperly in issuing a building permit.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the appellants' objection was based on confusion regarding the property's municipal address.

The legal address was zoned to permit restaurants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the application judge erred in allowing Toronto to appear as amicus curiae because Toronto had been an adverse party in previous proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was proper for the application judge to allow Toronto to make submissions and that there was no merit to the underlying zoning issue.

The appellants sought leave to amend their statement of defence to plead a limitations defence at a very late stage of litigation, after failing to comply with a consent order deadline.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the appellants had not demonstrated it was in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in characterizing the order as a consent order, in finding inadequate explanation for delay, and in considering prejudice beyond the two-month delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge properly applied the test and that the appellants failed to provide a compelling explanation for their non-compliance with the consent order.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 13, 2015.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge below articulated the correct legal principles and made findings of fact and mixed fact and law that were fully supported by the record.

The court was not persuaded by the appellant's arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs in the amount of $9,000, to be deducted from the appellant's entitlement to funds held in trust by respondent's counsel.

A twin-engine aircraft lost power in its left engine during a flight from Ontario to Delaware and crashed in New York State, killing the two pilots and one passenger.

The pilots' estates sued the companies that inspected and maintained the engine and the engine manufacturer.

The manufacturer moved for summary judgment arguing that the United States General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 barred the claims because the aircraft was delivered more than 18 years prior to the accident.

The motion judge found that Ontario law applied because the crux of the claims involved negligent misrepresentation in repair instructions received and relied upon in Ontario.

The manufacturer appealed.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing third party claims and cross‑claims arising from flood damage in a Toronto office tower allegedly caused by a plumbing failure and monitoring issues with a building automation system.

The responding parties alleged that the moving parties, as building owner or property manager, were liable in contribution and indemnity or owed independent duties in tort.

The court found the claims were premised on factual errors regarding corporate roles and ownership, and that the property manager was protected by a limitation of liability clause in the tenants’ leases that barred claims for contribution or indemnity.

The responding parties produced no evidence establishing a genuine issue for trial, and a proposed amendment to plead an independent tort was unsupported and limitation‑barred.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the claims against the moving parties and the motion to amend was refused.

Following a trial concerning alleged loans made by a parent to his daughter and her spouse, the plaintiff succeeded against the co-defendant spouse for two of three loans.

The court had found the spouse jointly liable for the majority of the claimed debt.

On the subsequent costs ruling, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after a Rule 49 offer to settle that produced a more favourable trial result.

While the court found the plaintiff largely successful and noted the defendant’s conduct had unnecessarily prolonged the trial, the claimed amounts were considered somewhat excessive.

The court fixed costs in the lump sum amount of $70,000 inclusive.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to cross‑examine opposing counsel on an affidavit filed in support of a proposed summary judgment motion.

The underlying action involved a slip and fall where the plaintiff had already agreed to dismiss the claim against certain defendants, leaving only the issue of costs in dispute.

The court held that a summary judgment motion was not appropriate where dismissal had already been agreed to and only costs remained.

Because the proposed cross‑examination related solely to costs issues outside the proper scope of the affidavit and motion, the requested examination was not warranted.

The motion was dismissed, with each party ordered to bear its own costs.

The appellant appealed a master's order requiring payment of outstanding costs as a condition of avoiding the striking of defences.

The appellant argued that a settlement payment by a co-defendant satisfied joint and several costs awards previously ordered against multiple defendants.

The court held the appeal was properly characterized as relating to costs and therefore required leave under the Courts of Justice Act.

Leave was refused, and the court agreed with the master's reasoning that settlement funds paid before a later costs award could not satisfy that subsequent order.

The appeal was dismissed.