Administrative Law

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application to quash the suspension of his driver's licence.

The suspension was imposed under section 41(1)(d) of the Highway Traffic Act following the appellant's guilty plea to impaired driving in New York State, pursuant to a reciprocal agreement between Ontario and New York.

The central issue was whether the guilty plea and conditional discharge in New York constituted a conviction under Ontario law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the application judge correctly interpreted the statutory provision and properly disposed of all issues raised, including natural justice and Charter arguments.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the absence of a transcript of the oral hearing prejudiced his appeal rights.

The court dismissed Remington Georgetown Inc.'s application to set aside an arbitration award under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The applicant, a residential developer, challenged the arbitrator’s decision on four grounds: excess of jurisdiction, procedural unfairness, bias, and failure to provide reasons.

The court found no merit in any of the grounds, holding that the arbitrator acted within her jurisdiction, provided adequate reasons, and that the applicant’s complaints were attempts to appeal the merits of the decision, which is not permitted under the Act or the arbitration agreement.

The court also addressed the admissibility of affidavit evidence and provided directions for costs submissions.

The moving party, Ms. Guillaume, brought a motion to set aside an order of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that dismissed her motion for leave to appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned a judicial review of a decision by the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal and care costs of 41 cats.

Ms. Guillaume failed to file acceptable motion materials despite extensions and notices, and provided no explanation for the delay.

The court dismissed her motion, finding no merit in the proposed appeal and concluding that the justice of the case did not favour setting aside the dismissal order.

This motion concerned the interpretation of the Wage Earner Protection Program Act (WEPPA) regarding Service Canada's subrogation rights to recover payments made to employees from an insolvent employer's distribution.

Metroland Media Group Ltd. made a proposal to its creditors, entitling unsecured creditors to a 17% distribution.

Service Canada had approved payments to former non-unionized employees under WEPPA for unpaid severance pay.

The issue was whether Service Canada was entitled to recover these payments on a dollar-for-dollar basis from the employees' distribution or only a pro-rata share (17 cents on the dollar) as an unsecured creditor.

The court held that Service Canada is entitled to a dollar-for-dollar recovery, up to the amount of the WEPP payment, from the employee's distribution before the employee receives any balance.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the appellant incapable of making treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medications and a Community Treatment Plan.

The appellant challenged the Board's findings on three grounds: error in appreciating foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions, misapprehension of evidence, and error in finding likelihood of substantial mental deterioration without treatment.

The court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant's inability to recognize the severe psychotic symptoms of her condition prevented her from appreciating the consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence and confirmed the Board's assessment of the likelihood of deterioration based on the Mental Health Act criteria, dismissing the appeal on all grounds.

The appellant, Wendy Sin Ming Ho, appealed the dismissal of her action against the Crown and four tribunals.

She alleged psychological harm from harassment and threats at an Ontario hospital (1999-2000) and subsequent failures by various tribunals to provide redress.

The motion judge dismissed her amended pleading, finding no vicarious liability for the Crown regarding hospital employment issues or quasi-judicial decisions, no Charter breaches, and no basis for a civil court to compel a criminal investigation by the RCMP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error, no viable cause of action against the Crown, and that fresh evidence did not assist her claim.

The appeal and a motion to file fresh evidence were dismissed.

The self-represented appellant, Mr. Asghar, brought a motion for panel review of a chambers judge's order that dismissed his interim motion.

The interim motion sought production of 911 recordings and police video/audio, permission for electronic filing, and an extension of time to perfect his appeals.

The underlying appeals were from orders dismissing his actions as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The panel dismissed the request for production, finding no basis to interfere with the chambers judge's discretionary decision, but granted a 30-day extension to perfect the appeals.

This is an appeal concerning the disposition of statistical reports and records arising from the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) and the Independent Assessment Process (IAP).

The National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation (NCTR) appealed a lower court order that dismissed a request to generate and archive "proposed Static Reports" and excluded certain "Non-Claim Records." The Court of Appeal found that the Supervising Judge erred in dismissing the request for proposed Static Reports due to insufficient evidentiary foundation regarding confidentiality risks, reliability, and utility for truth and reconciliation.

The court remitted this issue for rehearing and ordered a stay on the destruction of the SADRE database.

The appeal regarding the exclusion of specific Non-Claim Records was dismissed, as the Supervising Judge properly balanced privacy and historical preservation interests.

Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court decision that denied TCHC access to a young person's (R.V.) criminal justice records.

TCHC intended to use these records to commence eviction proceedings against R.V. and his family at the Landlord and Tenant Board on grounds of "illegality" and "community safety." The Youth Court had denied access, prioritizing R.V.'s privacy, rehabilitation, and reintegration under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

By the time the certiorari application reached the Superior Court, R.V. had withdrawn from the proceedings, and TCHC had decided not to pursue eviction, rendering the matter moot.

The Superior Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding no persisting adversarial context, no significant public interest that would justify hearing a hypothetical case, and that the issue of "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" under s.119 of the YCJA was fact-driven and best left to the Youth Court's expertise.

A child welfare agency brought a protection application seeking to have two children declared in need of protection based on allegations of physical harm, sexual abuse, and failure to provide treatment.

The respondent father brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal.

The court found that the agency failed to meet the mandatory five-day deadline under s. 88 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to bring the matter before the court following apprehension, resulting in loss of jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the court found insufficient evidence to support any of the three grounds alleged by the agency.

The motion was granted and the children were ordered returned to the respondent father.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a finding of his incapacity to make decisions regarding treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board misinterpreted the capacity test under s. 4 of the Health Care Consent Act, failed to consider a breakdown in the patient-physician relationship, and misapprehended evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on ample evidence, and correctly applied the legal test for capacity, including the requirement for corroboration of the physician's evidence.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his statement of claim against the Crown without leave to amend.

The claim arose from the appellant's failed attempt to initiate a private prosecution and alleged that Crown employees instructed a court reporter to provide a false transcript and refused to assist with complaints about the transcript.

The motion judge struck the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the test under Rule 21 and that the appellant was attempting to re-litigate issues that should have been addressed in his abandoned appeal.

The respondent was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers on May 24, 2009, near Douglas Creek Estates in Caledonia while carrying a Canadian flag to participate in a flag-raising rally.

The trial judge found the arrest was unlawful and awarded damages for false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and breach of Charter rights.

On appeal, the majority (Nordheimer and Cronk JJ.A.) found the arrest was lawful as a preventive measure to avoid an imminent breach of the peace, but remitted the case for a new trial on the issue of excessive force.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, finding the arrest was unlawful and that the trial judge's findings should not be disturbed.

The self-represented plaintiff, Paul Taylor, sued the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board (WSIB) and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) for approximately $17 million, alleging bad faith, breaches of the Human Rights Code and the Charter of Rights, and various torts related to the handling of his workplace injury benefits claim.

The WSIAT brought a motion to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, or to strike the pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the WSIAT lacked legal capacity to be sued, the action constituted an abuse of process by attempting to re-litigate issues already decided by the Tribunal, the claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action (including for assault and misfeasance of public office), and the claims were statute-barred.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied, and the statement of claim was struck in its entirety.

Elizabeth Dias initiated two actions in Hamilton Superior Court against the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board/Tribunal and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, similar to previous actions dismissed in Toronto as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Hamilton actions were referred to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) for potential dismissal on the same grounds.

Despite being given an opportunity to provide submissions, Dias failed to address the frivolous or vexatious nature of the claims or the lack of jurisdiction against the defendants.

The court adopted prior reasoning that no claim could be made against WSIB or LCBO for unsuccessful workers' compensation claims or workplace injuries, as remedies lie exclusively with WSIB.

The court found the Hamilton actions to be attempts to re-litigate or collaterally attack previous decisions and dismissed them with costs, finding them frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Mr. Paspalovski appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Agrawal.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the Board erred in applying the test for incapacity, whether it misapprehended the evidence, and whether the CTO was invalid due to the 72-hour rule for Community Treatment Plans (CTPs).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test for capacity, did not make a palpable and overriding error in assessing evidence, and that the 72-hour rule in the Mental Health Act does not require all parties to sign the CTP within that timeframe, only that the physician be satisfied the criteria are met and treatment is available.

The applicant, Darren John Pundyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal order made by a preliminary inquiry judge, which required him to stand trial on charges of robbery with a handgun, possession of a break-in instrument, possession of a weapon for an indictable offence, and disguise with intent.

Pundyk argued that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by committing him despite an alleged absence of evidence on the essential element of identity.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the "some evidence" test for committal based on circumstantial evidence.

The court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer the applicant's identity as one of the robbers, and therefore, the preliminary inquiry judge did not act without jurisdiction.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing an error of law regarding the quantum of rent.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, asserting the Board member made findings of fact, not law, which are not reviewable on appeal.

The court, applying principles distinguishing questions of law from fact, determined that the Board's decision on the agreed rental amount was a factual finding.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction as it did not raise an extricable question of law.

The applicant sought a reference hearing under section 74 of the Firearms Act to challenge the Chief Firearms Officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the applicant's membership in the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, deemed a criminal organization.

The applicant had no criminal record, no mental health issues, and no history of violence.

The court upheld the refusal, finding that membership in a criminal organization constitutes a legitimate public safety concern under section 5(1) of the Firearms Act, even absent specific enumeration in section 5(2).

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought a warrant to apprehend and return a child in care pursuant to subsection 41(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child, age 13, had run away from foster care for the third time since July 2014.

The respondent mother supported the application.

The court determined that a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice has authority to issue such a warrant when acting as a justice of the peace under section 5 of the Justices of the Peace Act.

The evidence met the statutory test: the child was under 16, had left care without consent, and there were reasonable and probable grounds that no other course of action would adequately protect the child.

The warrant was granted.