Alexandra Hoy

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The respondent consented to the appeal being allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the weapons prohibition order from five years to ten years pursuant to section 109(2)(a) of the Criminal Code and imposed a lifetime prohibition order pursuant to section 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a civil contempt sentence imposed by the motion judge for multiple failures to comply with court orders.

The motion judge had imposed six consecutive sentences totaling 21 months.

On a motion to vary, the motion judge reduced the global sentence to 14 months after finding the appellant had purged contempt in part and made good faith settlement payments.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reconsidering whether sentences should be concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle but, considering further good faith payments made since the motion judge's decision, reduced the global sentence to 12 months.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for drug trafficking and his sentence of 12 months imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence fully justified the conclusion that crack cocaine in the possession of a third party came from the appellant through an intermediary.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider that this was a one-off transaction for a minimal amount of crack cocaine with no profit motive, and by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's rehabilitation efforts and significant immigration consequences.

The sentence was reduced to 160 days, which the appellant had already served through pre-sentence custody.

This is an appeal of a motion judge's decision to strike the Crown's third party claims against 15 non-government, non-profit organizations that operated youth detention centres under contract with the Crown.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter rights arising from the use of solitary confinement in youth detention centres.

The plaintiff limited his claim to damages attributable to the Crown's proportionate degree of fault.

The motion judge struck the Crown's third party claims, relying on the principle from Taylor v. Canada (Health Canada) that when a plaintiff limits damages to a defendant's proportionate fault, the defendant cannot pursue contribution and indemnity claims.

The Crown appealed, arguing it was not plain and obvious that third party claims had no reasonable prospect of success, particularly regarding vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

The appellant was convicted at trial of sexual interference and sexual assault arising from an incident in a laundry room involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of charges relating to a separate hotel incident but found him guilty of the laundry room charges.

The trial judge's conviction was based primarily on his finding that the appellant's failure to report the complainant's inappropriate sexual comments to her mother, cease contact with her, or tell her such comments were inappropriate demonstrated the falsity of his denial of sexual misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider the appellant's explanation that he did not report the conversation to the complainant's mother because he feared it would cause a "big commotion" and potentially lead to self-harm by the complainant, given her documented mental health issues.

The Court held this failure to address a plausible explanation constituted a miscarriage of justice and allowed the appeal.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

The appellant appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board dated January 5, 2017, which ordered his detention at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care – Provincial Forensic Division.

The appellant did not challenge the Board's finding that he posed a significant threat to public safety but argued that his transfer from CAMH to Waypoint was not necessary and appropriate for managing that risk.

He contended that the Board failed to consider the context of his behaviour and that the announcement of his transfer triggered his deterioration.

He also argued the Board did not give sufficient weight to the disruption of his therapeutic and familial relationships.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and amply supported by evidence.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario in a child protection matter.

The appellant, a foster-to-adopt mother, sought costs against the respondent child protection agency (Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell) for both the appeal before the Court of Appeal and the prior appeal before the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that exceptional circumstances existed because the agency had acted unfairly in appealing the motion judge's decision granting her status in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs, finding that the agency's decision to appeal did not warrant a costs award, particularly as the court's decision provided guidance on relevant factors for adding parties in child protection proceedings.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision dated June 30, 2017.

The appellants (Iranian government entities) appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most appeals but allowed appeals in actions commenced by certain respondents, striking those actions.

The court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the appellants' argument that no costs should be awarded due to novel issues and declining to award substantial indemnity costs or costs to respondents whose actions were struck.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning a dispute between a former unmarried couple over property rights in development properties.

The trial judge found that a property development agreement (PDA) existed between the parties despite a cohabitation agreement containing broad waivers of property rights.

The trial judge set aside the cohabitation agreement as it applied to the development properties under section 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act, finding that neither party understood the consequences of the agreement regarding their property development venture.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $3,325,000 plus interest and costs.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: the trial judge erred in setting aside the agreement only as to development properties; in not setting aside the entire agreement including the spousal support waiver; and in calculating the amount owing under the PDA.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a rectification order granted by the Superior Court of Justice that allowed Slate Management Corporation to restructure a single-step amalgamation of three subsidiaries into a two-step amalgamation to obtain a tax bump under the Income Tax Act.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal moot based on the principle established in Norcan Oils Ltd. v. Fogler, as the plan of arrangement had been implemented and third parties had relied on the financial consequences of the rectification order.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal and quashed it, awarding costs to Slate.

The appellant appealed the order of the Superior Court of Justice striking his statement of claim without leave to amend.

The lower court judge found that the statement of claim did not adhere to the rules of pleading and was frivolous and vexatious, and that the claim was fatally flawed such that it could not be remedied by granting leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the commencement of a limitation period for a long-term disability benefits claim.

The respondent claimant's benefits were terminated on November 1, 2007, at which point he had a fully ripened cause of action.

The respondent retained litigation counsel in early January 2008 but did not commence proceedings within the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the limitation period commenced on November 1, 2007, when the claim became fully ripened, and that the motion judge erred in applying an evaluative gloss to the word "appropriate" in the limitation statute.

The appeal was allowed, the action was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

On appeal from a summary judgment decision, the husband challenged the characterization of over $1.3 million in investments derived from his parents' advances during a 37-year marriage.

The central issue was whether the funds constituted gifts to the parties or were held in resulting trust for the parents or as loans.

The motion judge found the presumption of resulting trust had been rebutted and characterized the advances as gifts to both parties.

The husband also challenged the suitability of summary judgment, the striking of portions of his affidavit, the treatment of dissipated assets, and the charge placed on the matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision on all grounds.

The appellant, a wastewater user, challenged the respondent municipality's practice of charging wastewater processing fees based on water consumption rather than actual wastewater discharge.

The appellant alleged this violated s. 394(1)(c) of the Municipal Act and constituted unjust enrichment and negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no violation of s. 394(1)(c) and that the municipality's decision was a policy decision immune from civil action under s. 450 of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the municipality imposed a fee based on the use of the service it provided, not in violation of the statutory prohibition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences arising from incidents alleged to have occurred 33 years prior, when the appellant was 14 years old and babysat the complainant, who was nearly 6 years old at the time.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence over the appellant's denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the principle from R. v. J.J.R.D. by failing to provide a "considered and reasoned" analysis of the complainant's evidence.

Although the trial judge identified the need for confirmatory evidence, he failed to identify any independent evidence supporting the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting the joint submission on sentence.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his spouse on the third day of trial.

The Crown and defence had agreed that a sentence of seven years was appropriate.

The trial judge rejected the joint submission as contrary to the public interest and imposed a sentence of 10 years' incarceration instead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the joint submission was so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (approximately 110 grams) and possession of proceeds of crime ($650), as well as his sentence of two years' less a day imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The main issue was whether the trial judge erred in relying on lay opinion evidence from a police officer to establish that untested substances found in a motel room were cocaine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence—including surveillance evidence, the presence of tested cocaine on co-occupants, the experienced officer's lay opinion, drug-related paraphernalia, and cash—it was open to the trial judge to conclude the substances were cocaine and that the appellant was in possession of them.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as fit.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to intimidate contrary to section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and two counts of breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant on all counts.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's purpose in attempting to intimidate the complainant was to compel the complainant to abstain from proceeding in public without fear.

The trial judge's findings that the appellant's actions did not make the complainant fearful and the prior friendly relationship between the parties supported an alternative inference that the appellant's purpose was merely to vex, disquiet, or annoy the complainant.

The court also questioned whether "proceeding in public without fear" constitutes a lawful right within the meaning of section 423(1)(b), but declined to address this issue of statutory interpretation as the appeal was disposed of on other grounds.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 13 years' incarceration imposed by the trial judge.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence that exceeded the Crown's position by two years without providing the parties an opportunity to make further submissions.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted an error in principle.

However, the court determined that the sentence imposed was entirely fit given the circumstances of the offence and the offender.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 13-year sentence.