Alexandra Hoy

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by wounding but acquitted of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where she struck her sister-in-law in the face with a glass during an escalated argument.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdicts were logically inconsistent as a matter of law, since both charges arose from the same conduct and the only contested issue was whether the blow was reflexive or intentional.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for aggravated assault, and entered an acquittal.

An appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 24, 2017.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for robbery in 2010, challenged the Board's decision to impose a detention disposition rather than a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued that a conditional discharge with treatment conditions could manage his risk as effectively as detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition, finding that the Board correctly applied the legal test and that its conclusion was reasonable given the appellant's recent deterioration, non-compliance with conditions, medication non-adherence, and the limitations of the Mental Health Act in managing his risk.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and acquitted of making child pornography available under s. 163.1(3).

The appellant appealed his conviction on Charter grounds, arguing that the search of his residence and computer violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the search was unlawful but argued the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Crown also appealed the acquittal on the making available count, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the mens rea requirement.

The court dismissed the appellant's conviction appeal and allowed the Crown's appeal, ordering a new trial on the making available count.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but sought leave to introduce fresh evidence and to appeal his sentence on the grounds that it was imposed without consideration of collateral immigration consequences that arose from amendments to federal immigration legislation introduced after sentencing.

The Crown conceded that had these consequences been known at sentencing, they would have affected the result.

The court granted the fresh evidence application, granted leave to appeal sentence, and allowed the appeal, imposing a suspended sentence with credit for six months less one day of pre-sentence custody and two years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and hydromorphone found in a safe in the basement room he had rented.

The trial judge found that the appellant had knowledge of and control over the drugs based on circumstantial evidence, including that the appellant was the last and only person to occupy the area where the drugs were found, the landlord's credible testimony that no one else had entered the home during the relevant period, and the discovery of a key to the safe on the appellant's person.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge did not err in his approach to circumstantial evidence and that his conclusion was logically based on the evidence and free of error.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault by Justice G. King of the Superior Court of Justice on May 4, 2015.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the trial judge committed reversible error in his application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal agreed with this concession and found reversible error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the sexual assault charge.

The appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault, assault, and break and enter to commit an indictable offence against two former domestic partners.

The trial judge found both complainants credible and reliable, concluding that neither consented to certain sexual acts including penetration with the appellant's fist.

The appellant did not testify but argued the complainants had unconsciously convinced themselves of non-consent.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions based on material inconsistencies in one complainant's evidence and the admissibility of cross-count similar fact evidence, and challenged the sentence on totality grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation.

The central issue was whether police lawfully detained the appellant and his luggage for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes pending the arrival of a drug-sniffer dog, based on a confidential informant's tip.

The trial judge found the detention reasonable; the Court of Appeal found it violated the appellant's Charter rights under section 9 but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant also appealed his 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating him as a repeat offender and failing to apply sentencing principles for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made an error but upheld the sentence.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the standard of review applicable to insurance arbitral decisions resolving priority disputes under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The first appeal involved a claimant listed as an excluded driver on his parents' policy who was injured as a passenger in another vehicle.

The second involved a claimant similarly listed as an excluded driver who was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

The central issue was whether excluded drivers could qualify as "insured persons" under the SABS definition and thus trigger priority coverage under their parents' policies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for such arbitral decisions is reasonableness, not correctness, and that arbitrators' interpretations of the SABS and insurance policies within their specialized expertise warrant deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault on three grounds: that the trial judge improperly drew an adverse inference from the failure to call a material witness; that the trial judge failed to adequately consider frailties in eyewitness identification evidence; and that there was no evidentiary basis to reject the appellant's account of an earlier incident.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge did not draw an improper adverse inference, adequately addressed eyewitness frailties, and was amply supported by the record in rejecting the appellant's version of events.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and appropriate given the severity of injuries.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (x4) and possession of property obtained by crime, receiving a global sentence of five years and eight months.

He appealed on grounds relating to the validity of the search warrant executed at his residence, which yielded 800 grams of cocaine, 505 oxycodone pills, drug paraphernalia, and $32,880 in cash.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter s. 8 application, finding the warrant was properly issued based on a credible confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, rejecting all four grounds of appeal.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his conviction appeal to pursue orders for production of records not produced at trial and to advance a ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment and authorized limited counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code to investigate the ineffective assistance of counsel ground and the records sought.

The Court noted that Legal Aid Ontario had previously denied funding for a conviction appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel in 2014.

The Court determined it was inadvisable to hear the sentence appeal before the conviction appeal and ordered that the sentence appeal remain in the regular appeal stream and not be rescheduled until the conviction appeal was disposed of.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice.

The respondent was accused of pushing the complainant down exterior stairs at a bar.

The trial judge found that the Crown had not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence from security camera footage that did not capture the critical moment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the test for directed verdict by weighing inferences rather than determining whether any evidence existed upon which a reasonable jury could convict.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated September 21, 2016, which ordered his continued detention at the maximum security facility at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appeal was allowed due to a miscarriage of justice arising from a misunderstanding at the Board hearing.

The Board mistakenly believed that counsel for the appellant (Alvin Pollard) had consented to the Hospital and Crown's recommendation for continued detention, when in fact Mr. Pollard understood himself to be amicus and did not appreciate the significance of the Board's questions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the disposition and referred the matter back to the Board for a new hearing, with directions that Mr. Pollard shall not serve as either amicus or counsel in respect of the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of drug-related offences following a search of his residence that yielded cocaine, marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and cash.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of the search warrant on Charter grounds.

The trial judge upheld the warrant based on the Debot criteria, finding the confidential informant's information compelling and credible, with moderate corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's arguments that the trial judge misstated the legal test and misapplied the Debot factors.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's order striking its third party claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Crown's third party claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

However, the respondent plaintiff amended his pleading to include language that would render the Crown's third party claim subject to being struck.

As a result, while the appeal was allowed, the practical outcome remained that the Crown's third party claim was struck.

The court awarded costs in accordance with the motion judge's decision, with each party bearing their own costs of the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife at his second trial, following a hung jury at his first trial.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge erred in law by refusing to remove trial counsel from the record when counsel sought removal on grounds of ethical concerns and breakdown of the client-solicitor relationship.

The trial judge's refusal to grant the removal application created an appearance of unfairness and constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring a new trial.

The court also addressed several other grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of third-party suspect evidence, demeanour evidence, police officer opinion evidence, and hearsay statements, providing guidance for the retrial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an acrimonious divorce and custody/access dispute with his ex-wife.

The appellant alleged the trial judge demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias through improper intervention, unequal scrutiny of evidence, and imposing a sentence significantly exceeding Crown submissions.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in imposing a sentence substantially longer than Crown submissions without prior notice and opportunity for further submissions.

The sentence was reduced from 18 months to 12 months imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The appellant contended that the application judge erred in his Morin analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the delay was reasonable under the Morin framework.

The delay arose from the Crown's decision to join co-accused, and even on the appellant's argument, the excess delay was only one month.

The court found no prejudice to the appellant's liberty interest or ability to make full answer and defence, and noted the serious nature of the fraud and societal interest in bringing the case to trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault following a violent altercation on a restaurant patio.

He appealed on two grounds, claiming the Crown's closing address was improper and that the trial judge's instruction on self-defence was erroneous.

The Crown's closing address did not misstate the legal test for self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, and any inappropriate comments were adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The trial judge's instruction on self-defence was thorough and proper, correctly identifying the three key elements of the defence without improperly adding proportionality as an additional requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.