William A. Stevenson

The appellant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and related offences.

His trial was delayed for 13 months, during which he was subject to bail conditions prohibiting him from driving.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the framework from R. v. Morin.

The Court found that the delay was not unreasonable given the inherent time requirements of the case, the actions of the accused, the institutional delay guidelines, and the minimal prejudice suffered.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'.

Her trial was held 14.5 months after her arrest, with the delay caused solely by limits on institutional resources.

The trial judge dismissed her motion for a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal and entered a stay, but the Court of Appeal restored the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was not unreasonable given the strain on institutional resources and the absence of any significant prejudice to the appellant.

The Court established guidelines for acceptable institutional delay in Provincial Courts.

The accused, a 14-year-old living in a group home, was charged with mischief, assault, and uttering threats after an altercation with an employee.

The youth court judge found the accused guilty on all counts, feeling bound by precedent despite believing the charges should not have been laid.

The Court of Appeal set aside the finding of guilt for uttering threats, holding that a youth court judge could dismiss a charge if it ought never to have been laid.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Young Offenders Act does not confer jurisdiction on a youth court judge to dismiss a charge simply because they disagree with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion to lay it.

The respondent, a permanent resident, was ordered deported after being convicted of an offence punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.

The Minister and Solicitor General filed a report indicating the respondent was likely to engage in organized crime, triggering an investigation by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

The Committee held a partially in camera hearing and recommended a certificate be issued, which barred the respondent from appealing his deportation on compassionate grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory deportation provisions did not violate sections 7, 12, or 15 of the Charter.

The Court further held that the removal of the compassionate appeal and the procedures followed by the Review Committee did not violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision upholding the respondent's acquittal for violating the Highway Safety Code by carrying an excess load.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal for the reasons set out by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, set aside the lower court judgments, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application to quash an order committing him to stand trial for unlawful confinement.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a judge presiding at a preliminary inquiry does not have jurisdiction to decide whether a provision of the Criminal Code violates the Charter.

The Court also found there was some evidence upon which the appellant could be committed for trial.

The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident and taken to a hospital.

A police officer made a demand for blood samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, but failed to include the assurances from section 254(4) that the samples would only be taken by or under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner and would not endanger the accused's life or health.

The accused refused the demand and was charged with failing to comply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a valid demand must incorporate these medical assurances.

Because the demand was invalid, the accused could not be convicted of refusing it, and the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision declaring that various instruments amalgamating the cities of Rouyn and Noranda were unconstitutional for failing to comply with s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the entire legislative process, including the ministerial orders and letters patent, was subject to the mandatory bilingualism requirements of s. 133.

The Court declared the instruments nullities but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow the National Assembly to remedy the defects.

The police installed an unauthorized electronic tracking device (a 'beeper') in the appellant's vehicle after a search warrant had expired.

They used the device to monitor his movements, which eventually led to evidence connecting him to the destruction of a communications tower.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the installation and monitoring constituted an unreasonable search in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the majority concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because it was real evidence, the police acted in good faith out of urgency to protect the public from a suspected serial killer, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code obscenity provisions after being charged in connection with the sale, possession, and display of sexually explicit videotapes, magazines, and sexual devices.

The Court held that s. 163(8) infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, but upheld the provision under s. 1 on the basis that its true objective was preventing harm to society, particularly harm associated with degrading or dehumanizing sexual material.

The Court reformulated the obscenity analysis around harm, community tolerance, degradation or dehumanization, and internal necessities or artistic merit.

Because the courts below had applied materially different approaches, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed on all charges.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that a federal statutory provision conferring a professional title was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Marceau J.A. from the court below.

The Court held that the mere conferring and holding of a title is a neutral act unconstrained by the division of powers, provided it is not directly linked to the regulation of the profession.

The respondent was offered a public service position subject to obtaining a security clearance.

CSIS advised against granting the clearance, and the Deputy Minister denied it.

The respondent complained to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which recommended granting the clearance.

The Deputy Minister refused to follow the recommendation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'recommendations' in section 52(2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act should be given its ordinary meaning of offering advice, and does not constitute a binding decision.

The Deputy Minister retains the ultimate authority and responsibility to grant or deny security clearances.

The appellant, a commissioned officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, was charged with being absent without leave after failing to report to a new posting.

She argued that she honestly believed she had resigned from the Armed Forces and therefore lacked the requisite mens rea.

She also challenged the constitutionality of the General Court Martial under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the structure of the General Court Martial infringed s. 11(d) of the Charter, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Généreux.

The Court also noted that an honest mistake about the legal consequences of one's actions does not constitute a defence to the charge.

The appellant, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, challenged convictions entered by a General Court Martial on the basis that the military tribunal lacked the independence required by s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court held that s. 11 applies to General Court Martial proceedings and that a separate military justice system is constitutionally permissible, but found that the tribunal's structure at the time lacked sufficient security of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.

The court further held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The appellant's ss. 7 and 15 arguments failed, and evidence obtained through a constitutionally defective search was nevertheless admissible under s. 24(2).

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that reversed in part a Superior Court judgment dismissing a claim for a compensatory allowance regarding a jointly purchased family residence paid for by the husband.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Superior Court's judgment, finding no reason to vary the trial judge's finding and agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The accused was acquitted at trial of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a fatal collision at an intersection.

The trial judge found the accused negligent but lacking the necessary criminal element.

The Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider all relevant evidence and the totality of the driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's assessment of the facts and evidence did not constitute an error of law, and the Court of Appeal improperly interfered with factual findings.

A public interest group sought standing to challenge the constitutionality of amendments to the Immigration Act, 1976, which altered the refugee determination process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the group raised serious issues of invalidity and had a genuine interest, it failed the third branch of the public interest standing test.

The Court found that individual refugee claimants directly affected by the legislation could and were already challenging the provisions, meaning there was another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal to strike the claim was allowed.

Following the 1985 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights decision, a dispute arose regarding which instruments had to be translated to comply with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 23 applies to orders in council of a legislative nature, determined by their form, content, and effect.

The Court also held that documents incorporated by reference in legislation must be translated if the primary instrument is legislative, the incorporation is true, and the document was generated by the government, unless there is a bona fide reason for incorporation without translation.

The period of temporary validity for unilingual Acts was extended.

The appellant was convicted of causing a disturbance after shouting obscenities at a neighbour from his veranda.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court held that the conduct itself constituted a disturbance, and the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that a 'disturbance' under the Criminal Code requires an externally manifested disturbance of the public peace, not merely emotional upset or annoyance.

Criminal appeal from an order setting aside an acquittal and directing a new trial after the trial judge limited both sides to four peremptory challenges and denied the Crown any stand bys.

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that the Crown's substantially greater ability to shape the jury through stand bys and peremptory challenges created a reasonable apprehension of partiality and infringed the accused's right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The Court also held that statements made after counsel had been retained were properly excluded because the police response to the accused's inquiry about contact from his father was misleading in the circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.