William A. Stevenson

The appellant was originally charged with sexual assault for acts committed before the offence of sexual assault was enacted.

After a preliminary inquiry and committal for trial, the error was discovered.

The Crown immediately preferred a new indictment for indecent assault, which was the correct charge at the time of the offences.

The appellant argued the new indictment required the Attorney General's personal consent under s. 577 of the Criminal Code because the preliminary inquiry on the non-existent charge was a nullity.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the error in the original indictment was voidable, not void, and the preliminary inquiry provided a valid foundation for the new indictment under s. 574(1).

The accused was involved in a single-vehicle accident and taken to the hospital.

More than two hours after the accident, a police officer formed the belief that the accused was impaired and demanded a blood sample, which the accused refused.

The trial judge and the Court of Appeal acquitted the accused on the basis that the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code must be made within two hours of the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that section 254(3) only requires the police officer to form the belief within two hours of the offence, and the demand itself must follow forthwith or as soon as practicable, even if outside the two-hour limit.

The Competition Tribunal issued an order requiring Chrysler Canada Ltd. to resume supplying automotive parts to a customer.

When the Director of Investigation and Research believed Chrysler was not complying, a motion was filed for Chrysler to show cause why it should not be held in contempt.

Chrysler objected to the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Competition Tribunal, as an inferior court of record, has jurisdiction over civil contempt for breaches of its orders under Part VIII of the Competition Act, and that this jurisdiction does not violate section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The federal government enacted the Goods and Services Tax (GST).

The province of Alberta challenged the constitutionality of the GST Act, arguing it infringed on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, amounted to taxation of provincial property, and unconstitutionally appropriated provincial funds by requiring the province to collect and remit the tax.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the GST Act was a valid exercise of the federal taxation power under s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that the collection and remittance obligations were necessarily incidental to the federal scheme and did not violate intergovernmental immunity or entitle suppliers to compensation for collection costs.

The respondent defaulted on a loan secured by a hypothec on three lots.

Before the sheriff's sale, the respondent waived its right to a discharge under the Civil Code of Lower Canada in exchange for the appellants agreeing to sell the lots in two stages.

After the first sale of two lots, the appellants bought the third lot at a second sale.

The respondent sued for a discharge based on the first sale's value and sought to vacate the second sale.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the discharge provisions are of public order and the premature waiver was null, the respondent failed to follow the proper procedure to claim its discharge before the second sale occurred.

The Court also found no grounds to vacate the second sale, and the issue was res judicata.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent's action dismissed.

The appellant bank, as assignee of a bankrupt subcontractor's accounts receivable, brought a delictual action against the respondent owner (Hydro-Québec) for failing to disclose geotechnical reports that revealed poor soil conditions and errors in the original design.

The trial judge allowed the action, finding the owner acted fraudulently by hiding the information, which led to the subcontractor's financial ruin.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's findings of fact without demonstrating a palpable and overriding error.

The Court affirmed that a contracting party can be delictually liable to a third party (the subcontractor) for failing to act reasonably, which includes a duty to inform in the context of a large construction project where the owner possesses superior expertise and knowledge of design errors.

The appellant, a young woman addicted to prescription painkillers, sought drugs from the respondent, an elderly physician.

The respondent discovered her addiction and demanded sexual favours in exchange for prescribing the drugs.

The appellant acquiesced out of desperation.

She later sued for battery, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the power imbalance and exploitative nature of the relationship vitiated the appellant's consent to the sexual contact.

The Court awarded aggravated and punitive damages, finding the doctor's conduct reprehensible and a breach of his professional and fiduciary duties.

The appellant and respondent divorced after a 29-year marriage.

The respondent was awarded indefinite spousal maintenance and a share of the appellant's pension based only on his contributions.

When the appellant was forced into early retirement, his sole income became his pension.

He applied to vary the maintenance order, arguing that paying support from his pension constituted 'double dipping' since it had already been divided as property.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no double recovery because the original pension division was a rough estimate that did not account for the employer's contributions or future value.

The Court upheld the chambers judge's decision to reduce, rather than terminate, the support payments.

The appellant physician refused to provide her patient, the respondent, with copies of medical reports and records received from other physicians, claiming they were the property of those physicians.

The patient applied for an order directing the physician to provide a copy of her entire medical file.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the physical medical records belong to the physician, the physician-patient relationship is fiduciary in nature.

This gives the patient a trust-like beneficial interest in the information contained in the records.

Therefore, in the absence of legislation, a patient is entitled to examine and copy all information in their medical records that the physician considered in administering advice or treatment, subject to the court's superintending jurisdiction if access would cause harm.

The appellant, a financial investment advisor, sold real estate units to his clients and received undisclosed commissions from the developer.

He was convicted of corruptly accepting a reward under s. 426(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued that the offence required proof of a "corrupt bargain" between the giver and the taker.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the word "corruptly" in the context of secret commissions means secretly or without adequate and timely disclosure, and does not require a corrupt bargain with the giver.

The accused was acquitted of first-degree murder at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that defence counsel incorrectly summarized evidence concerning access to the accused's car in his address to the jury, and the trial judge failed to correct these errors.

The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the Crown had met the burden of showing that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same had the evidence been correctly summarized.

A marine negligence appeal concerning recovery of contractual relational economic loss after a tug and barge damaged a railway bridge owned by the Crown but used by the respondent under contract.

The majority held that pure economic loss is prima facie recoverable where negligence, foreseeability, and sufficient proximity are established, subject to residual policy limits.

On the facts, the respondent's operations were so closely integrated with the damaged bridge that recovery was justified within a limited joint or common venture category and did not create indeterminate liability.

The dissent would have maintained the bright-line exclusionary rule for contractual relational economic loss absent a proprietary or possessory interest or other compelling policy basis.

The appellants appealed as of right from a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that quashed stays of proceedings ordered by the Superior Court on grounds of unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that in the exceptional circumstances of the case, it was open to the prosecution to exercise its discretion to declare a stay of proceedings by way of nolle prosequi, and there were no grounds for the stay of proceedings ordered by the Superior Court judge.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, Appeal Division, which upheld the accused's acquittal on charges of indecent assault and sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Appeal Division that the trial judge made no error of law regarding the standard of proof, the consideration of evidence, or the credibility of a child witness.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which had set aside his acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the appellant's conversation with a police constable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the appellant's right to silence under section 7 of the Charter was not violated and that the excluded evidence might have reasonably affected the verdict.

The appellant, an Indian residing on a reserve, received regular and enhanced unemployment insurance benefits based on qualifying employment located on the reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed these benefits as taxable income.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the situs of the benefits should be determined by evaluating various connecting factors in light of the purpose of the Indian Act tax exemption.

Because the qualifying employment was located on the reserve, the benefits were also situated on the reserve and thus exempt from taxation under section 87 of the Indian Act.

The respondent appealed a refusal for reimbursement of medical equipment to the Commission des affaires sociales.

Two commissioners heard the appeal and drafted a favourable decision, but the Commission's president reviewed it and disagreed.

A compulsory plenary meeting was held, leading one commissioner to change her mind, and the president then decided the matter against the respondent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission's institutionalized consultation process violated the rules of natural justice by creating systemic pressure and an appearance of bias, and dismissed the Commission's appeal.

The appellant corporation was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a fatal industrial accident.

Due to a lack of court facilities, the trial was delayed for 19 months.

The appellant moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing its right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a corporate accused can rely on s. 11(b), it cannot rely on the presumption of prejudice that applies to individual accused.

Since the appellant did not establish actual prejudice to its ability to make full answer and defence, the delay was not unreasonable and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had struck down a reverse onus provision in the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its recent decision in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. The Court held that while the requirement for the accused to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities restricts the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is a justifiable limit under s. 1.

The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal to dispose of the remaining grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal on a charge of possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the narcotic was found in violation of the appellant's Charter rights, admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under the principles enunciated in R. v. Collins.