W. Danial Newton

The appellant, a permanent resident and recognized convention refugee, appealed his conviction for possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He argued his guilty plea was invalid due to ineffective assistance of duty counsel regarding immigration consequences and lack of intent due to intoxication.

The court found that duty counsel had advised the appellant to seek immigration advice and that the appellant had signed an acknowledgment of potential immigration consequences.

The court declined to find ineffective assistance of counsel due to lack of evidence on the standard of care.

It also rejected the argument that the plea was uninformed due to the appellant's own failure to seek advice, distinguishing it from cases where erroneous advice was given.

The court further dismissed the intoxication argument, finding the appellant admitted to possessing the weapon.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of sexual interference against his stepdaughter, with offences occurring when she was between 8 and 12 years old.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of six to eight years, while the defence proposed three to four years.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the offender to six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory and discretionary ancillary orders.

The accused, an Aboriginal woman, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing her common-law spouse during an alcohol-fueled altercation.

The court considered Gladue principles, the accused's history of trauma and substance abuse, and the aggravating factor of spousal violence.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, reduced to 657 days after pre-sentence custody credit, followed by three years of probation.

A trial of an issue was directed to determine the ownership of two skidders between the estate of the deceased and the respondent.

The respondent claimed ownership of one skidder as a gift and an interest in the other via a mechanics lien.

The court found the respondent had no interest in the first skidder due to a failure to register a lien, making it an estate asset.

However, the court accepted corroborated testimony from a beneficiary that the second skidder was gifted to the respondent prior to the deceased's death, satisfying section 13 of the Evidence Act.

The second skidder was declared the property of the respondent.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a previous order that struck his statement of claim as an abuse of process.

The court noted that the plaintiff had already appealed the previous order to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal for delay and found the action devoid of merit.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the order, finding it to be yet another attempt to circumvent a court order and an abuse of process.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

Following a judge-alone sexual assault trial, the central issue was whether the complainant consented to admitted sexual touching.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, scrutinized inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and considered deleted WhatsApp messages, a torn bra, missing glasses, and post-incident communications.

Although the complainant had deleted some messages and denied doing so, the court found the corroborative features of her account more consistent with a non-consensual assault than with the accused’s version.

The Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant Jade Antonson brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a subrogated claim by the plaintiff's insurer.

The insurer alleged that a fire, which destroyed the plaintiff's building occupied by the defendants as tenants, was caused by the negligence of the co-tenant Michael Joubert.

Antonson argued that the plaintiff could not prove Joubert caused the fire or that his actions were negligent.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that key facts were in dispute, necessitating a trial.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the fire's origin and the condition of an "ashtray" pail, which prevented a fair and just determination on the merits without a full trial.

The City of Thunder Bay moved for summary judgment to dismiss Ian Bodnar's claim, arguing it was res judicata or an abuse of process.

The claim sought a declaration regarding the validity and extent of a 1996 rural access road permit.

The City contended that the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had already decided this issue.

The court dismissed the City's motion, finding that the OMB explicitly stated it lacked jurisdiction to determine the permit's validity.

Therefore, the OMB's comments on the permit were obiter dictum and not fundamental to its decision, preventing the application of issue estoppel or abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a simplified rules action from Toronto to Thunder Bay.

The plaintiff's action claimed damages for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation arising from an arrest in Thunder Bay.

The court applied the holistic balancing test under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the events occurred in Thunder Bay, the community interest favoured Thunder Bay, and the convenience of parties and witnesses favoured Thunder Bay, the court granted the motion and ordered the transfer.

The plaintiff, Dennis Rego, was terminated by the defendant, Northern Air Solutions Inc., for alleged lack of cooperation in completing required winter operations training.

Following a summary judgment motion, a minitrial was held to determine if the failure to complete training constituted just cause for termination.

The court found that the employer had condoned the lack of training by allowing the plaintiff to continue flying and that, once warned, the plaintiff agreed to complete the training.

Therefore, dismissal was not warranted, and the employer failed to prove just cause.

Damages for breach of contract were awarded, but claims for overtime, aggravated, and punitive damages were dismissed.

This motion concerned a dispute over the temporary residence of four children following parental separation.

The Applicant mother sought to vary a temporary order to allow the children to move from Dorion to Sudbury, where she had recently relocated.

The Respondent father opposed this move and sought to keep the children in Dorion.

The court, considering the best interests of the children and the principle of maintaining the status quo, ordered that the children remain in the matrimonial home in Dorion, with parents rotating in and out on an alternative weekly schedule.

The decision emphasized the prematurity of a permanent relocation decision pending a report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The accused, Ricky Lionel Keewasin, was charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, and two counts of breach of recognizance involving a 13-year-old complainant, J.M. The trial focused on identity, as J.M.'s recollection was sparse due to intoxication.

The Crown relied on J.M.'s preliminary inquiry testimony, video surveillance, and DNA evidence (J.M.'s blood on the accused's sweatshirt).

The defence argued J.M.'s testimony was unreliable and the video quality insufficient for identification.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding the video and DNA evidence, combined with J.M.'s and her sister's testimony, sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also ruled J.M.'s initial statements to her cousin and police were not admissible as *res gestae*.

The accused was found guilty on all four charges.

The court dismissed both the plaintiff's claim for approximately $14,000 and the defendants' counterclaim for about $100,000.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $27,000 for a 3.5-day trial.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, ordered Wayne Nicholas Degagne and Degagne Multi-Electric to pay the plaintiff $10,000 plus GST in costs.

The court found the defendants to be the "biggest loser" due to the substantial counterclaim's dismissal, while Lea Macalino Degagne and 2225171 Ontario Corporation were deemed not proper parties for costs.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application regarding the maintenance of a private drive, the successful respondent sought costs of $14,161.93.

The respondent relied on an offer to settle that would have provided the applicants with more than they achieved at the hearing.

The applicants argued the offer was not sufficiently certain to trigger Rule 49.

The court found the offer was valid and should be considered.

Applying the principle of reasonableness, the court fixed costs payable by the applicants to the respondent at $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The accused applied to have the trial judge call Leoncia Roundhead as a witness in a jury trial for aggravated assault, arguing the Crown had an oblique motive for not calling her, that the defence was prejudiced by relying on her being called, and that the jury was led to believe she would testify.

The court denied the application, finding no oblique motive and that the Crown's opening did not create a firm expectation.

However, the court ordered several accommodations for the defence, including making the witness available for an interview, allowing cross-examination without meeting Canada Evidence Act s. 9 requirements if called by the defence, and permitting comment on the Crown's decision not to call her during closing arguments.

Following the intestate death of the deceased, his common-law spouse and children disputed the distribution of his estate.

The children claimed their share as beneficiaries, while the spouse argued the children had gifted their shares to her or, alternatively, that she was entitled to dependant support.

The court found that the children had made a valid inter vivos gift of the family home to the spouse, but not of the deceased's personal property or RRSPs.

The court also awarded the spouse dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act, fixed at 50% of the deceased's personal property, with the residue to be shared equally among the children.

A commercial tenant applied for a declaration that the landlord had wrongfully or excessively distrained its assets.

The court found that the landlord's actions, including changing locks, did not terminate the tenancy because the tenant maintained conditional access.

However, the court could not determine on the record whether rent was in arrears or if the distraint was excessive, as these issues required further evidence.

The application was therefore directed to proceed as an action for damages, with costs reserved.

The plaintiff, Kenora Flooring Centre Inc. (KF), sued for an unpaid balance on a flooring contract.

The defendants, Degagne Multi-Electric (DME) and others, counterclaimed for the cost of replacing all vinyl flooring due to alleged deficiencies.

The court found some deficiencies existed but dismissed the counterclaim because the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence of specific damages and sought an excessive remedy (wholesale replacement).

The plaintiff's claim for the unpaid balance was also dismissed as the court found the contract had not been fully fulfilled, and KF similarly failed to provide evidence of the costs to complete the outstanding work.

Following a motion regarding third and fourth party claims, the court determined costs.

The third party was unsuccessful in dismissing the defendants' third party claim, and the fourth parties were unsuccessful in striking the third party's fourth party claim.

The court found the third party's position regarding the third party claim to be improper and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendants.

Although the fourth parties were unsuccessful, the court awarded them partial costs due to the third party's misleading conduct in issuing the fourth party claim.

The third party was ordered to pay costs to both the defendants and the fourth parties.

The applicants, property owners on a lakefront, sought a declaration that a private road leading to their properties had become a municipal roadway through the doctrine of dedication and acceptance.

The municipality had performed casual winter maintenance on the road pursuant to historical agreements that explicitly stated the road remained private.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the road was on Crown land, was not dedicated to public use, and that the municipality's maintenance work did not constitute a clear and unequivocal intention to assume responsibility for the road.