Justice Danto-Clancy

Sentencing for multiple offences arising from a sustained episode of intimate partner violence involving repeated assaults, choking, threats to kill, forcible confinement, and mischief.

The court treated the intimate partner context, repeated strangulation, prolonged controlling conduct across multiple locations, and significant harm to the victim and her family, including children exposed to the violence, as serious aggravating factors.

Although the offender was a first offender with employment, family support, counselling efforts, and some evidence of remorse, the court held that a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the principles in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

A mid-to-high reformatory sentence of 15 months' custody followed by three years' probation, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders, was imposed.

The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking (290 grams), possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two to two and one-half years, emphasizing general and specific deterrence given the significant drug trafficking problem in the region.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day with credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 729 days (two years less a day) with a Summers credit of 443 days for pre-sentence custody and a Duncan credit of 100 days for harsh conditions (lockdowns and triple bunking), resulting in an effective sentence of 186 days in custody.

Concurrent sentences were imposed for the other offences.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA sample order, and forfeiture of drugs and proceeds.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on a twenty-count information arising from an alleged intimate partner violence episode over a single evening and early morning, the court applied the W(D.) framework and the reasonable doubt standard to sharply conflicting testimony.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence where it was corroborated by independent eyewitness testimony, surveillance videos, audio recordings, and injury photographs, and rejected much of the accused’s evidence as evasive, inconsistent, and untruthful.

The Crown proved multiple counts of assault, assault by choking, uttering threats, forcible seizure, and mischief, including incidents in a park, a parking garage, an Uber ride, a bar, and at a residence.

Several counts, including some threat, assault, and theft allegations, were dismissed where the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, Brian Kelneric, was charged with multiple drug and proceeds of crime offences.

The trial focused on establishing possession of cocaine, oxycodone, and cash found in an apartment and a rental vehicle, based on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied principles from R. v. Villaroman regarding circumstantial evidence and R. v. Morelli regarding constructive possession.

The judge found that the only rational inference from the accused's hiding from police, the proximity of drugs and paraphernalia, and his connection to a vehicle containing drugs and cash, was his knowledge and control of the items.

The accused was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to call reply evidence.

The appellant contended this constituted an improper splitting of the Crown's case, related to a collateral issue, and was used improperly to assess credibility.

The reply evidence concerned an officer's attempt to contact the appellant at her apartment, which countered the appellant's alibi defence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the reply evidence was properly admitted as it directly responded to the alibi defence and was not an improper splitting of the Crown's case or related to a collateral issue.

The accused, Brian Kelneric, brought an application seeking permission to attend his trial remotely due to asserted financial hardship.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, primarily on the basis that section 715.233 of the Criminal Code requires the consent of both the prosecutor and the accused for an accused to appear by videoconference at a trial for an indictable offence, and the Crown had withheld consent.

Alternatively, the court found that even if it had discretion, the evidence provided regarding the accused's financial hardship was insufficient, lacking specific details and corroboration beyond a lawyer's general assertion.

The court emphasized the seriousness of the charges and the accused's long-standing knowledge of the trial date.

This was a pretrial application by the accused, Brian Kelneric, to exclude evidence obtained during his arrest and subsequent searches, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

Kelneric was charged with five offences, including unlawful dwelling and drug trafficking.

The court found that Kelneric did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where he was found hiding, thus the searches of his person and the apartment were lawful, including a plain view search and a search conducted with the tenant's consent.

The court also determined that even if some evidence were excised, sufficient grounds remained for the search warrant of his rental vehicle.

While a technical breach of his section 10(b) right to counsel occurred when an officer questioned him after he requested a lawyer, no information was obtained, and the delay in facilitating counsel was primarily due to Kelneric's request for medical attention.

Applying the Grant factors, the court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence, finding that society's interest in the adjudication on the merits outweighed any negligible impact on the accused's Charter rights.