Warren K. Winkler

The appellant purchased 88 lots from the respondent developer.

The parties disputed who was responsible for paying certain development charges to the municipality under their Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The motion judge found the respondent was not required to pay charges due after the registration of the Plan of Subdivision, interpreting 'prerequisite' temporally.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that interpreting the contract as a whole required 'prerequisite' to mean an obligation to pay, giving effect to a clause permitting payment after registration.

The plaintiffs appealed an order determining that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens for their claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation against their insurance brokers and insurers.

The claims arose from a lapsed umbrella liability policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the central core of the lawsuit concerned contracts and representations made in Quebec, and that the plaintiffs' presence in Ontario was insignificant.

The appellants sought costs for their unsuccessful appeal against the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, arguing the appeal was necessary to establish that the motion judge's observations were obiter.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting the law was already well-established, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The respondents claimed $120,000, but the court fixed costs at $75,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST, finding the claimed amount excessive for a one-day appeal.

The appellant, a former vice-chair and major shareholder of the respondent, entered into a retirement agreement and a settlement agreement that fixed the buyout price of his shares at US$5.21.

He later sued for negligent misrepresentation, alleging the respondent failed to disclose a recapitalization plan that ultimately valued the shares at US$10.06.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial because the appellant's share price was contractually crystallized, he suffered no damages, and the action was barred by a full and final release.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent raised a jurisdictional issue, arguing that the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court under section 10(1) of the Estates Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the respondents.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as an abuse of process and found no genuine issue for trial, as the underlying issue of forged guarantees had already been adjudicated in a previous action.

The appellant argued she was denied natural justice because the motion judge proceeded in her absence after she left the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, agreeing that the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the substantial indemnity costs awarded by the motion judge due to the serious allegations of dishonesty.

Following the dissolution of the law firm representing the plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding, the representative plaintiff chose to retain a new firm formed by some of the former partners.

The appellant, a firm formed by the former supervising partner, brought a motion to strike the notice of change of solicitors and replace the representative plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a representative plaintiff has the right to choose counsel, subject to court review based on competence, improper considerations, and prejudice to the class.

The court also stayed a competing class action commenced by the appellant as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff landlord appealed the dismissal of its action for damages for breach of a commercial lease.

The subtenant vacated the premises before the end of the sublease term, but rent was fully paid at the time.

The landlord immediately changed the locks and issued a notice of repudiation before the next rent payment was due.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the landlord fundamentally breached the lease by acting before any default occurred, entitling the tenant to treat the lease as at an end.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order regarding an arbitration agreement.

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not clearly show the arbitration agreement was incapable of performance.

The court varied the motion judge's order, referring the matter back to the Crown Heights Beth Din to proceed with the arbitration on a fixed timetable or clearly indicate its refusal to deal with the matter.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a joint property purchase was a binding contract that they had repudiated.

The appellants argued the respondent breached fiduciary duties by attempting to obtain a secret commission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the unsuccessful attempt to gain a secret commission did not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, especially since the issue was raised late in the trial.

The court also upheld the remedy of rescission.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment denying her spousal support following a 32-year marriage.

The trial judge found that after equalization, the appellant had a net worth of approximately $1.4 million and that the parties' ability to maintain their pre-divorce lifestyle had diminished due to the respondent's job loss, not the divorce.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Divorce Act and his conclusion that spousal support was not warranted given the appellant's assets, earning capacity, and remarriage.

The mother appealed a trial judgment that ordered equal parenting time between the parents.

She argued the trial judge failed to properly consider the status quo and the best interests of the children under section 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and properly addressed the statutory factors, noting that equal sharing was the goal from the outset.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision refusing to grant a stay of judgment pending the trial of the appellant's counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere as the motion judge appropriately applied the governing rules and leading cases to the facts.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action for negligent misrepresentation.

They alleged the respondents negligently misrepresented that a property severance had been obtained in 1996.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the representation was made, the appellant knew nothing had been registered.

Under the Planning Act, registration is required for a valid severance.

The court held that the appellants' loss was caused by their own error of law, for which the respondents could not be held accountable.

The moving parties brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which refused an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal.

The moving parties had claimed at trial that they intended only to provide a character reference for the main borrowers, but the trial judge rejected their evidence.

Their appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the single judge that there was no basis for granting an extension of time, as the proposed leave motion raised only issues of credibility and had no chance of success.

The motion was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a motion for summary judgment.

The infant appellant suffered from a serious medical condition, which the appellants alleged was caused by a motor vehicle accident involving the mother while she was pregnant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding causation, as the appellants failed to provide expert medical opinion establishing that the accident probably caused or contributed to the condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the application judge erred in dismissing his second bail application, which was based on an alleged material change in circumstances, including new evidence from the preliminary inquiry and a new release plan.

The reviewing judge found no error in the application judge's assessment that the Crown's case remained strong and the new release plan was inadequate.

The court also held that while Gladue principles apply to bail, the applicant failed to adduce evidence to support such an analysis.

The application for review was dismissed.

The respondent's first action was dismissed for delay.

The motion judge permitted the respondent to proceed with a second identical action, subject to paying the costs of the first action, relying on Rule 24.05(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the rule does not provide a right to commence a second identical action and that doing so constitutes an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision setting aside a final order based on Minutes of Settlement in a family law dispute.

The parties had negotiated a settlement, but there was a dispute over whether a binding agreement had been reached before the respondent entered a residential treatment program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the parties were not ad idem and that the June Minutes of Settlement were no longer open for acceptance when the appellant signed them in October.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding jurisdiction over its fraud claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the fraud claim was linked to Ontario because the alleged harm was suffered there through the receipt of invoices, and the business dealings were governed by a contract containing an Ontario forum selection and governing law clause.