Vanessa V. Christie

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the disclosure of police records.

The Ministry argued the records were exempt under s. 19(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because copies of the records were contained in the Crown brief.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that s. 19(b) does not exempt records in the possession of the police that were created during an investigation merely because copies later became part of the Crown brief.

The applicant, a dual citizen of Canada and Germany, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision refusing to accept further submissions regarding a 2004 surrender order for his extradition to Germany to face fiscal offences.

The applicant argued the Minister failed to consider his discretion to refuse extradition of a Canadian national under the extradition treaty, alleged bias, and claimed a lack of adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the former Minister had implicitly considered and rejected the reciprocity arguments, there was no evidence of bias, and the reasons provided were adequate.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter motion for unreasonable delay and in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11 to 12 months of institutional delay did not violate section 11(b), noting that the Morin guideline is not a strict statute of limitations.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's reliance on eyewitness identification, finding the verdict was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision quashing their committal to stand trial for manslaughter and instead committing them to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences from the evidence in favour of the defence.

The reviewing judge correctly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence to determine the appropriate remedy.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision refusing to rescind an order surrendering him to Germany for trial.

The applicant argued that comments made to the media by a German prosecutor and judicial spokesperson demonstrated he would not receive a fair trial, violating his rights under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister did not err in concluding that the German justice system could be trusted to address any potential prejudice and ensure a fair trial.

The applicant sought bail pending the determination of his judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a surrender order in extradition proceedings.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing the judicial review was frivolous and citing the public interest in enforcing the surrender order after seven and a half years of delay, and alternatively sought to expedite the hearing.

The court granted bail, finding the judicial review raised new issues and the applicant's detention was not necessary in the public interest.

However, the court also granted the Crown's motion to expedite the judicial review hearing to mitigate prejudice to the extradition partner.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellants under the 'record of the case' method.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the evidentiary provisions of the Extradition Act, arguing they violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing committal on unreliable evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are constitutional because section 29(1) of the Act grants the extradition judge the discretion to refuse committal if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or unavailable for trial.

The appeals were dismissed and the committals for extradition were upheld.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to Germany and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

Germany sought the appellant's extradition on charges of tax evasion, fraud, forgery, and bribery related to secret commissions earned from international arms and aircraft sales.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to justify committal and holding that the double criminality rule was satisfied for the tax offences.

The Court also dismissed the application for judicial review, concluding that the Minister did not err in interpreting the extradition treaty, assessing the evidence, or finding that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive.

The appellant, charged with first degree murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The bail judge had ordered detention based solely on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c).

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge overstated the strength of the Crown's case and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. Hall.

The Court concluded that the appellant's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, set aside the detention order, and granted bail.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court refusing an extension of time to appeal his conviction.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge dismissed the application because the appellant failed to demonstrate a timely intention to appeal or provide an adequate explanation for the six-month delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in this decision, noting the appellant's affidavit lacked specific evidence of an intention to appeal within the 30-day period or an adequate explanation for the delay.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that he failed to meet the standards of business conduct expected of a CEO and imposing sanctions under s. 127 of the Securities Act.

The Commission found the appellant had primary responsibility for a stock subscription program that lacked commercial justification and failed to take steps to contain the situation when problems emerged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the Commission's conclusions were reasonable and supported by evidence.

On consent, the appeal regarding sanctions was allowed and remitted to the Commission for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction.

The trial judge found that the arresting officer had an honest but mistaken belief that the roadside screening device was properly calibrated, failing to appreciate the significance of an inaccurate calibration date.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal court judge did not err in upholding this finding, as the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable and the inaccurate date did not establish that the device had not been recalibrated on a timely basis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their committal for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

They challenged the constitutionality of sections 32 and 33 of the Extradition Act, which allow the requesting state to rely on an unsworn record of the case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding it was bound by its previous decision in Yang.

The Court also upheld the Minister's decision to surrender the appellants, rejecting arguments that the prosecution should occur in Canada, that the potential for life imprisonment violated fundamental justice, and that the Minister should have sought assurances for pre-trial custody credit.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns that the applicants might gain access to their surviving child and that their proposed sureties would not enforce a no-contact order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's concerns but concluded that detention was not the only way to protect the surviving child, who was in the custody of the Children's Aid Society.

The Court found that a strict no-contact condition, along with undertakings from family members, would adequately protect the child.

The Court held that detention was not necessary on the secondary ground and directed further submissions on release terms.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a decision denying them bail.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns for the safety of the applicants' surviving child.

The Court of Appeal found that the surviving child, currently in the custody of the Children's Aid Society, could be adequately protected through strict release conditions prohibiting any contact.

The court concluded that detention was not necessary on the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicants' release subject to conditions.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, was ordered surrendered for extradition to the United States.

After his appeals were exhausted, he requested the Minister of Justice amend the surrender order to require assurances that he would receive enhanced credit for his five years of pre-trial custody in Canada.

The Minister refused.

The applicant sought judicial review of this refusal.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to review the Minister's refusal to amend the order.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding that because Canadian law does not guarantee enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, the absence of such a guarantee in the United States does not violate section 7 of the Charter.