72 total
Statements to police excluded in part due to oppressive interrogation tactics and right to counsel breaches.
The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter after a 14-month-old child in her care died.
The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to police officers.
The court found the accused was detained by the first responding officer without being advised of her rights, rendering subsequent statements to that officer inadmissible.
Statements made during a videotaped interview and a walk-through with a detective were found voluntary and admissible, except for a phone call to her husband which breached her right to privacy in seeking counsel.
Statements made to a third officer after the child's death were excluded as involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics, including ignoring repeated assertions of the right to silence, denying adequate warmth, and exploiting the accused's emotional distress.
Breath test evidence excluded under Charter section 24(2) due to unexplained 90-minute police delay.
The defendant was charged with impaired driving (over 80).
The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken more than two hours after driving to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.
The court found that the police breached the defendant's Charter rights by failing to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.
The defendant was arrested at 3:57 a.m., the breath demand was made at 3:59 a.m., but the breath samples were not taken until 6:14 a.m. and 6:31 a.m., resulting in a 90-minute unexplained delay.
The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Child pornography offender received 18 months despite remorse and treatment prospects.
Sentencing decision for offences of possessing child pornography, accessing child pornography, and making child pornography available arising from online chats and a search revealing thousands of child pornography images and videos.
The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code, while also weighing the offender's youth, guilty plea, remorse, cooperation, and psychiatric evidence indicating a low risk of contact offending but risk of future internet-based recidivism.
Comparable authorities did not support the defence request for a 12-month custodial sentence.
A sentence of 18 months' jail and 3 years' probation was imposed, together with DNA, SOIRA, prohibition, non-communication, weapons, and forfeiture orders, while a broader prohibition on attending parks and pools was refused.
The court imposed a seven-day intermittent jail sentence and probation for mischief involving recording women without consent.
The defendant was found guilty of mischief for video recording women's buttocks at Woodbine Beach without consent and acquitted of voyeurism and criminal harassment.
At sentencing, the court imposed seven days intermittent incarceration and 24 months probation with conditions including non-attendance at Woodbine Beach and no contact with the victims.
The court rejected a conditional discharge despite mitigating factors, finding that the defendant's prior 2009 conditional discharge for identical conduct, combined with the significant impact on victims and the defendant's lack of insight, warranted a custodial sentence to protect the public interest and deter similar offences.
Leave to appeal denied; no air of reality to mistaken belief in consent where accused denied contact.
The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant while she was sleeping.
At trial, the appellant denied any sexual contact, but on appeal argued the trial judge erred by not considering the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.
The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge found no air of reality to this defence.
The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no clear error in the lower court's conclusion that a defence incompatible with the accused's own testimony lacked an air of reality.
Court imputes income using three‑year average after disclosure failures.
A spouse in a 30‑year common law relationship sought temporary spousal support following separation, alleging the respondent failed to make full financial disclosure and understated his income through a closely‑held corporation.
The respondent asserted a dramatic decline in business income and inability to pay support.
The court held that incomplete disclosure justified drawing an adverse inference and applying the Federal Child Support Guidelines methodology using the respondent’s three‑year average Line 150 income.
The court rejected the claimed current income and ordered temporary spousal support based on the historical income average, together with extensive disclosure obligations and valuation of the respondent’s business and income.
The accused was convicted of mischief but acquitted of voyeurism and criminal harassment for surreptitiously photographing women on a public beach.
The defendant was charged with three offences arising from incidents on Woodbine Beach in Toronto: voyeurism, mischief, and criminal harassment.
The Crown presented evidence of similar conduct in 2010 and 2013, involving surreptitious filming of women's buttocks using a concealed camera with zoom capability.
The court admitted similar fact evidence to establish identity.
The voyeurism charge was dismissed because the Crown failed to prove the essential element of "for a sexual purpose" beyond a reasonable doubt.
The criminal harassment charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence that the defendant's actions caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety and concerns regarding the "watching or besetting" element.
The mischief charge resulted in a conviction, as the court found the defendant willfully interfered with the lawful enjoyment of public property.
Delayed breath demand does not bar presumption of identity if evidence admitted.
The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.
The trial judge had found that the police failed to make the formal breath demand as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, constituting a s. 8 Charter breach, but admitted the certificate of analysis under s. 24(2).
On appeal, the appellant argued that the failure to make the demand promptly should disentitle the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity and that the certificate should have been excluded.
The court held that the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) remains available even if the demand was not made as soon as practicable, and that the proper remedy for any breach lies under the Charter exclusion analysis.
Applying the Grant framework, the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence was entitled to deference and disclosed no error.
Dangerous driving conviction upheld; circumstantial evidence sufficiently established identity of the driver.
The appellant appealed a summary conviction for dangerous driving under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in finding identity beyond a reasonable doubt and provided inadequate reasons.
The appellant contended the trial judge improperly relied on the contents of a telephone statement to establish identity and that the circumstantial evidence permitted other reasonable inferences.
The appeal court held there was sufficient independent evidence on a balance of probabilities to admit the statement and that, when combined with other circumstantial evidence, the only rational inference was that the appellant was the driver involved in the incident.
The court also found the trial judge’s reasoning was apparent from the record and adequate for appellate review.
New argument without a trial record cannot ground a summary conviction appeal.
On a summary conviction appeal from a conviction for refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand, the appellant argued for the first time that the arresting officer misstated the legal consequences of failing the approved screening device and that he therefore was not obliged to comply, or alternatively had a reasonable excuse under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.
The appeal court held that appellate courts generally do not entertain arguments not raised at trial, absent rare circumstances where the issue can be fully, effectively and fairly addressed on the existing record.
Here, the trial record contained no evidentiary or legal foundation for the new ground.
The appeal was dismissed.
Leave to appeal summary conviction for impaired driving refused as issue was fact-specific.
The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol level.
He argued that the trial judge erred in finding the roadside breath demand was made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.
The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that the proposed ground of appeal involved well-established legal principles and a fact-specific inquiry that did not raise a question of law alone of general importance.
Appeal from convictions for historical sexual offences dismissed; trial judge made no error assessing complainant's reliability.
The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of touching for a sexual purpose, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding delayed disclosure and alleged recovered memories.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully scrutinized the evidence, properly accounted for the historical nature of the offences, and made no palpable and overriding error in finding the complainant credible and reliable.