Scott Latimer

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court found that the Crown engaged in improper conduct during cross-examination and closing address, including eroding the appellant's right to silence by suggesting he should have provided information to police earlier, and mischaracterizing forensic evidence.

The trial judge failed to provide correcting jury instructions to address these issues.

The court found that the cumulative effect of these problems resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for theft, robbery, uttering threats, breach of recognizance, and choking to overcome resistance, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of 30 months imprisonment less two months pre-trial custody credit.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on eyewitness testimony and the complainant's evidence regarding an altercation in which the appellant kicked and punched the complainant, demanded his wallet, and threatened to "rip his throat out." The appellant's self-defence claim was rejected.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence, finding no palpable or overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

The appellant was convicted of child abduction contrary to section 282 of the Criminal Code after taking her seven-year-old daughter to China in December 2010 without the knowledge or consent of the child's father and refusing to disclose the child's whereabouts upon return to Canada.

The trial judge imposed a seven-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, raising 14 grounds of appeal including allegations of illegality, perjury, and judicial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial was conducted fairly and the evidence overwhelmingly established guilt.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part regarding pre-sentence custody credit, which was recalculated at a 1.5:1 ratio rather than 1:1, resulting in a reduction of the sentence by 14 months.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 27, 2016.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board should have made further inquiries regarding the cause of the appellant's psychosis (whether from liver disease or bipolar disorder), and second, that the Board erred in rejecting conditions regarding community access and an approved person.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding no error in the Board's acceptance of the joint position that the appellant remained a significant risk to public safety and no error in the Board's decision to impose more limited community access conditions at that time.

The accused was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder after stabbing an unarmed victim at a party.

Prior to sentencing, the defence requested an inquiry into a post-verdict comment made by a juror to the victim's family.

The court declined to hold an inquiry, finding it would violate jury secrecy and that the comment did not suggest any impropriety.

On sentencing, the Crown sought 12 years of parole ineligibility while the defence sought 10 years.

After weighing the aggravating factors of the senseless, unprovoked killing against the mitigating factors of the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, and remorse, the court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility fixed at 11 years.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death and his sentence of five years' imprisonment and a fifteen-year driving prohibition.

The appellant had fallen asleep at the wheel, drifted into oncoming traffic, and caused a fatal head-on collision after falsifying his driving logs to avoid rest obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of the offence and the distinction from dangerous driving causing death.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's deliberate disregard for safety rules and the need for specific deterrence.

The appellant appealed her convictions for aggravated assault, uttering a death threat, possession of a weapon, and breach of probation, and sought to re-open her sentence appeal.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of Prisoner Detain Sheets to challenge the trial judge's credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result and that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error.

The sentence appeal was allowed to increase the pre-sentence custody credit to 1.5:1.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping and robbery, arguing that the trial judge's questions to a defence witness created an apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly followed the established protocol by waiting until the conclusion of the witness's testimony to ask clarifying questions on a narrow issue and allowing further re-examination.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for numerous gun-related offences arising from a seizure of firearms and explosives.

He argued the trial judge erred by not staying the charges due to Charter breaches, including a 15-day detention without a bail hearing and the destruction of seized explosives.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Babos test, agreeing that exclusion of evidence and sentence remission were adequate remedies.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's status as a former RCMP officer against his deliberate defiance of court orders.

The appellants, two bar managers, appealed their convictions and sentences for aggravated assault after punching a customer who had been ejected from the bar.

The victim suffered devastating head injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge reasonably identified the second assailant from video evidence and properly concluded the appellants acted in concert, making it unnecessary to determine which blow caused the injury.

The sentences of three and three-and-a-half years were upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault against his spouse.

Fresh evidence was admitted on appeal, including a forensic computer analysis showing that a key audio recording relied upon at trial had been altered and was not an original recording from the device as claimed.

Additional police occurrence report evidence contradicted the complainant’s claim that she reported an assault at the time police attended the residence.

The appellate court found the complainant had manipulated evidence and provided false testimony, undermining her credibility and the reliability of the trial verdict.

Given the absence of a reasonable prospect of conviction, the court quashed the conviction and entered an acquittal rather than ordering a new trial.

The Crown appealed a trial decision that excluded computer evidence obtained under a search warrant in a child pornography investigation and resulted in an acquittal.

The trial judge had found multiple breaches of s. 8 of the Charter, including reliance on unverified NCMEC CyberTipline reports, failure to include disclaimers in the Information to Obtain, uncertainty regarding PhotoDNA use, and staleness of evidence due to delay.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring verification for accuracy rather than assessing whether the information provided a credibly based probability sufficient for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The court found that NCMEC reports and Microsoft-generated data could constitute reliable hearsay supporting reasonable and probable grounds and that the time delay and investigative uncertainties did not negate the probability that computer artifacts or account evidence would remain.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with luring a child by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment.

The court conducted a Charter challenge to the constitutionality of subsections (3) and (4) of section 172.1, finding subsection (3) unconstitutional but subsection (4) constitutionally valid.

The accused was convicted based on his failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the online interlocutor, who was actually an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The court then addressed the accused's Charter challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, finding it grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the offence and the offender's personal characteristics.

Following a jury conviction for manslaughter by reason of failing to provide the necessaries of life, the court sentenced both parents for the death of their young child.

The sentencing judge found the respondents equally culpable because they ignored medical advice and obvious warning signs over an extended period, resulting in chronic malnutrition that materially contributed to death alongside an asthma attack.

Applying the sentencing fact-finding framework for jury verdict cases, the court distinguished more egregious child-death authorities involving deliberate abandonment or overt deprivation, but held that denunciation and deterrence had to predominate under the Criminal Code because the offence was committed against a vulnerable child.

A fit sentence was 30 months for each offender, subject to presentence and bail credit, with probation imposed on one respondent and ancillary DNA and weapons prohibition orders made.

The applicant moved to quash an amended preferred indictment adding a sexual assault count extending beyond the complainant's eighteenth birthday, and sought a stay for abuse of process.

The court held that evidence at the preliminary inquiry, particularly cross-examination about the pool incident chronology, could support a finding that the alleged assault occurred when the complainant was an adult, thereby permitting the added count under s. 574(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

While the defence established some potential prejudice because questioning had proceeded on the premise that only underage conduct was in issue, the court found no improper Crown motive and no basis for the exceptional remedy of a stay.

The availability of further cross-examination and a renewed third party records application adequately addressed any prejudice.

On a summary conviction sentence appeal arising from a road rage assault, the appellant challenged a no-weapons probation condition and a five-year firearms prohibition imposed after a conditional discharge.

The court admitted fresh evidence concerning the appellant’s competitive shooting activities, firearm ownership, training, and post-sentence completion of anger management, applying the Palmer framework flexibly in the interests of justice.

The court held the sentencing judge applied the proper public safety test under s. 110 of the Criminal Code and that both the probation term and firearms prohibition remained reasonable despite the fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, except that the appellant was given 30 days to lawfully transfer or surrender firearms and ammunition.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault against his former domestic partner.

This was the second assault conviction involving the same victim, with a prior conviction in 2007.

The court imposed a sentence of 22 days imprisonment on an intermittent basis, with credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 24 months probation with conditions including no contact with the victim, a 500-metre exclusion zone, weapons prohibition, and mandatory participation in alcohol assessment and counselling programs.

The court rejected both a suspended sentence and a conditional sentence, finding that specific deterrence and denunciation of domestic violence required a custodial sentence.

A media applicant sought to vary a publication ban imposed during a criminal trial so that the offenders' and victim's names could be published while continuing to protect the identities of surviving children.

Applying the Dagenais-Mentuck framework, the court held that a broader ban shielding the adult offenders' identities was not necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or the relevant public interest in protecting vulnerable children.

The court distinguished authority concerning anonymity for child cyberbullying victims and emphasized the significant deleterious impact on the open court principle of withholding the names of adult offenders in a homicide case.

The publication ban was varied to prohibit only publication of the names of surviving children of the offenders.

The accused was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment.

The accused posted a personal advertisement on Craigslist seeking a "daddy/daughter" role-play partner and engaged in sexual communications with a person he believed to be a 14-year-old girl named Mia.

The person was actually an adult police officer conducting an undercover investigation.

The accused claimed he believed he was communicating with an adult engaged in consensual role-play.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that while there was a reasonable doubt as to his subjective belief regarding the age of the person, he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person with whom he was communicating.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police obtaining his cell phone subscriber information from a telecommunications provider without a warrant.

The applicant argued that the disclosure of cell phone subscriber information was analogous to internet subscriber information and should require judicial authorization under the principles established in R v. Spencer.

The court rejected this argument, finding that cell phone subscriber information does not attract the same reasonable expectation of privacy as internet subscriber information, and therefore no breach of section 8 Charter rights occurred.