Superior Court of Justice

The respondent father brought a motion to stay ten prior court orders dating back to 2013, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because he was not properly served in New York under the Hague Service Convention.

The court found that the Hague Service Convention applied, but that the respondent was properly served by FedEx as permitted by Ontario law and the Convention's postal channel provisions.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to grant a stay under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that the respondent failed the RJR-MacDonald test and that staying the orders would cause immense prejudice to the applicant mother, who was owed over $2.5 million in support arrears.

The applicant commercial tenant brought an urgent application to recover possession of leased premises after being locked out by the respondent landlord for non-payment of a security deposit.

The parties had orally agreed to an installment plan for the deposit, but the tenant missed the first payment.

The landlord issued a notice of default and terminated the lease shortly after.

The court found that while there was an oral agreement for installments, there was no agreement to waive the five-business-day notice period required by the lease for default of Additional Rent.

Therefore, the termination was premature and unlawful.

The court ordered the landlord to restore possession to the tenant, conditional on payment of the deposit and rent.

The plaintiff developer brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchasers for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The defendants failed to close the transaction after requesting multiple extensions and failing to secure financing.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, rejecting the defendants' arguments regarding alleged misrepresentations and property valuation.

The plaintiff was awarded $381,971.72 in damages, representing the difference in resale price and carrying costs, plus $22,000 in costs.

The plaintiff sued his former lawyer for negligence, alleging that a 1999 settlement of his accident benefits and tort claims was improvident.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known within five years of the settlement that his income was inadequate to meet his needs, which would give rise to a plausible inference of liability.

The action was dismissed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, uttering death threats, mischief under $5,000, and breach of recognizance following an altercation with his girlfriend at a family gathering.

The complainant suffered a broken jaw after the accused punched her once in the face.

The accused raised self-defence, testifying that the heavily intoxicated complainant lunged at him with a large pair of scissors.

The court found the accused's and his witnesses' evidence more reliable than the complainant's.

The court held that the Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, as the accused reasonably believed he was in imminent danger and his response was reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The defendants brought a motion to amend their statement of defence in an action concerning the removal of a boundary tree during construction.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the amendments, arguing they constituted a withdrawal of admissions regarding the tree's location, would cause non-compensable prejudice due to an expired limitation period, and included untenable defences.

The court allowed most of the amendments, finding the original statements about the tree's location were mis-pleadings rather than intentional admissions, and that the plaintiff would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

However, the court refused leave to add paragraphs alleging defamation and bad faith, finding them vexatious and lacking sufficient particulars.

At a case conference for a certified class action claiming $1.5 billion for understated fuel consumption, both parties had brought summary judgment motions.

Given the complexity of the case, which involves nearly two dozen expert witnesses and significant technical data, the court endorsed the parties' proposal to proceed with a 4-week hybrid trial rather than a 'trial in a box' summary judgment motion.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving multiple intrafamilial sexual offence allegations, the court assessed the evidence of child complainants and an adult complainant describing abuse said to have occurred during childhood.

Applying the principles governing assessment of children's evidence, the court accepted the evidence of two complainants on the core acts of sexual touching, despite inconsistencies on peripheral details and timing.

The court rejected another complainant's allegation because stark differences between two statements and the possibility of inadvertent tainting after family discussions created a reasonable doubt.

Findings of guilt were entered for sexual interference and sexual exploitation relating to one complainant, and for one count of sexual interference relating to another; the accused was acquitted on the remaining counts.

The appellant father appealed a trial judge's order placing one child in extended Society care and two children in the custody of their paternal aunt.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the test for care and custody under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and made evidentiary errors regarding treatment records, hearsay evidence, and case notes.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding errors or errors in principle in the trial judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to a consent variation regarding access.

The defendants brought a motion to have a 2015 action tried together with two earlier actions (the Loan Actions) which had already been ordered to be tried together.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the 2015 action did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Loan Actions, and there were no common questions of fact or law.

Furthermore, the court noted the defendants' unexplained delay in bringing the motion, which would have unnecessarily delayed the trial of the 2015 action currently scheduled to proceed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for breach of recognizance and resisting a peace officer, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in law by placing the onus on the defence to establish a section 8 Charter breach for a warrantless search.

The appeal judge concluded that the police violated the appellant's section 8 rights by seizing his wallet to obtain identification for a CPIC check during an investigative detention.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the identity evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals.

Following a family trial and subsequent reopened evidentiary process, the court determined the remaining issues of spousal support quantum, form of payment, and post-separation reimbursements between former spouses after a long-term marriage.

Applying the Divorce Act and the appellate framework governing lump sum support, the court held that support should be fixed near the mid-range of the SSAG and paid as a lump sum to achieve a clean break, avoid ongoing litigation, and reflect the parties' retired circumstances.

The court ordered lump sum spousal support of $175,000.

The court also accepted uncontradicted affidavit evidence and ordered reimbursement of $34,762.64 for utilities, HELOC carrying costs, and one-half of matrimonial home carrying costs paid post-separation.

The offender was convicted of two counts of assault and multiple firearm offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm while subject to three prohibition orders.

The court considered the offender's background as a Black Canadian refugee, an eight-year gap in his criminal record, and the harsh conditions of his presentence custody involving 290 days of lockdowns.

The court imposed a total sentence of 40 months, reduced by 28 months of presentence custody credit, leaving 12 months to serve, followed by 12 months of probation.

The accused, charged with serious drug offences, brought a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The court found that counsel was essential for a fair trial due to the complexity of the case, the accused's limited English, and the severe potential consequences.

Despite vague financial evidence, the court accepted that the accused, a gig economy worker, lacked the means to afford the substantial retainers required by private counsel.

The application was granted, and proceedings were stayed until funding is provided, subject to the accused contributing $5,000.

The respondent mother brought a motion for third-party production of the applicant father's complete employment file from the Canada Border Services Agency.

The father had brought a motion to change child support, claiming his income had decreased after resigning from the CBSA.

The mother sought the file to determine if he resigned to avoid termination for cause, which she argued would relate to intentional underemployment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the employment file was not relevant to explaining why the father left a higher-paying job for a lower-paying one.

The applicant condominium corporation brought a motion for a compliance order against a tenant and the unit owners, due to over 200 complaints and 60 police visits regarding the tenant's disruptive and threatening behaviour.

The tenant sought a stay pending the outcome of eviction applications before the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The court dismissed the stay request, noting the condominium corporation's independent statutory duty to enforce compliance, and granted the order requiring the tenant to cease the non-compliant behaviour, with leave for the applicant to seek eviction if the behaviour continues.

In a Motion to Change proceeding, the moving party sought to file a reply affidavit after the responding party delivered a 340-page affidavit shortly before the hearing.

The responding party objected, arguing the Family Law Rules do not explicitly authorize reply affidavits on Motions to Change.

The court held that while the Rules do not explicitly authorize a right of reply, it is common practice and necessary for fairness, especially given the responding party's late filing and the long delay caused by the pandemic.

The moving party was permitted to file a reply affidavit limited to new matters.

The young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder for killing his mother.

Both the Crown and defence agreed to a seven-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) youth sentence.

The only issue was the amount of credit for 688 days of pre-sentence custody.

The court granted one year of credit, leaving three years to serve in custody and three years under conditional supervision, noting the young person's significant neurodevelopmental needs and the requirement for long-term treatment and support.

The accused was arrested for murder and a search incident to arrest revealed controlled substances.

The murder charges were later withdrawn, but the drug charges proceeded.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude the drug evidence, arguing his s. 8 rights were violated by an unlawful arrest and his s. 10(b) rights were violated by a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

The court found the arrest was lawful, but the police seriously breached the accused's right to counsel by inexplicably delaying his access to a lawyer for almost three hours.

Given the seriousness of the breach and misleading testimony by a police officer, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant moved to stay a civil action brought by the plaintiff, her former spouse, which sought to lift a freezing order and preservation order previously granted in their ongoing family law proceeding.

The court granted the stay, finding that the civil action was an impermissible collateral attack and barred by issue estoppel, as the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate a final order made between the same parties in another forum.

The defendant's request for security for costs was dismissed as unnecessary given the stay.