Superior Court of Justice

In a civil jury action arising from a slip-and-fall, the court addressed trial management after an exit pre-trial and a subsequent trial management conference.

The court found the responding party unprepared to narrow issues, including blanket denials of requests to admit and no meaningful engagement on a joint document brief.

The endorsement emphasizes that late-stage trial preparation wastes party and court resources and contributes to systemic delay.

The court directed a further exit pretrial before the May 2026 blitz sitting, required counsel to provide the endorsement to clients, and set a timetable for written costs submissions.

The accused was charged with three counts of aggravated assault following a stabbing incident in Bellevue Square Park.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The Crown relied on eyewitness identification evidence from the victims and a bystander, including photo line-up identifications made nine months after the incident.

The court found the identification evidence unreliable due to the chaotic circumstances of the attack, inconsistencies in the witnesses' accounts, and the risk that their memories were tainted by police press releases and conversations with others.

The Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted.

The plaintiff, a self-represented former worker for the defendants, filed a 64-page Statement of Claim alleging constructive dismissal, harassment, and misclassification.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claim for failing to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim lacked paragraph numbers, failed to specify damages amounts for each head of relief, pleaded evidence rather than material facts, and contained unnecessary repetition and superfluous schedules.

The court struck the claim in its entirety with leave to amend within 30 days and awarded the defendants $25,000 in costs.

In a civil costs decision following settlement of the main action, one defendant sought partial indemnity costs against the co-defendant for both the action and a crossclaim.

The court treated the hearing as a motion for costs and applied the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found the responding defendant's litigation position and delayed acceptance of the offer to settle caused unnecessary continuation of the proceeding and additional preparation costs.

While not granting the full amount requested, the court awarded an all-inclusive costs amount reflecting proportionality and the parties' relative success.

In a family law costs decision following a focused hearing on common-law cohabitation, the court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court reviewed governing costs principles, including presumptive entitlement for success at a step, fairness and reasonableness, access to justice, and the relevance of litigation conduct and financial circumstances to quantum.

Although the successful party sought full indemnity costs for broader steps in the proceeding, the court confined the award to the focused hearing and found full indemnity unwarranted on the record.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at 60% of the focused-hearing amount, totaling $8,014.64 inclusive of HST, payable in any event of the cause.

The defendant college brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the self-represented plaintiffs' statement of claim, which sought damages arising from the denial of religious exemptions to a COVID-19 vaccine mandate.

The defendant argued the claim was statute-barred, disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and was frivolous and vexatious.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the entire claim, finding that the limitation period issue required fact-finding on discoverability that was inappropriate for a Rule 21 motion, and that the claim contained a germ of a cause of action.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of claim and struck one paragraph as scandalous and vexatious.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of sexual assault by a religious leader against a congregant, the case turned almost entirely on credibility and reliability.

The court found the complainant generally responsive and convincing, but concluded that significant implausibilities and exaggeration in her account of the wedding ceremony undermined the reliability of her evidence on a central event.

The accused's evidence was not perfect, but the Crown did not expose material inconsistencies sufficient to reject his denials.

Applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard from Lifchus, the court held the complainant's evidence did not attain the necessary degree of certainty and acquitted on all counts.

The Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from an RCMP analyst comparing camouflage clothing seized from the accused's residence with clothing worn by a masked individual in a terrorist propaganda video.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the comparison evidence.

The court excluded the comparison evidence, finding it was not necessary as the trier of fact could make the comparison without expert assistance.

The court also found the proposed expert was not duly qualified to opine on camouflage patterns due to limited and dated training, and noted concerns regarding confirmation bias and reliability.

The bankrupt brought a repeatedly shifting motion seeking directions, stays, disclosure, and litigation “guardrails” concerning estate litigation being prosecuted or assigned by the trustee in bankruptcy.

The court held that the bankrupt lacked standing under s. 37 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because he was not an aggrieved person, and also failed to qualify under s. 119(2) because he was not an interested person and had adduced no evidence of fraud or bad faith by inspectors.

The court further rejected the factual premise of the alleged conflict, finding no evidence of BIA “relatedness” and no basis to interfere with the trustee’s conduct of the Whitehorse Action or with case management orders made by a Superior Court judge.

The motion was dismissed with prejudice.

Because the bankrupt filed improper, late, AI-generated materials containing hallucinated or unreliable citations and made unfounded allegations against the trustee and inspectors, the trustee was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $12,366.72.

In a CCAA proceeding, the court determined the entitlement to $337,390.62 held in escrow.

Prior to insolvency, the debtor (Earth Boring) and a creditor (Tulloch) entered into an escrow agreement pending judicial review of a construction adjudication order in favour of the creditor.

Two days before the judicial review was dismissed, the debtor commenced insolvency proceedings.

The court held that the escrow agreement did not create a trust.

Applying section 70(1) of the BIA, the court concluded that because the judgment was not fully executed prior to insolvency, the funds remained the property of the debtor's estate and were ordered released to the debtor's successor entity.

The applicant was previously successful in an application to cancel a matrimonial home designation registered by the respondent, which had interfered with her mortgage renewal.

The parties made written submissions on costs.

The court found that the applicant made a reasonable offer to settle and obtained an order as favourable as her offer, triggering the costs consequences under Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that costs should await the outcome of his application to set aside the separation agreement.

Costs were fixed at $18,500 plus disbursements, payable forthwith.

At an unopposed trial arising from deficient residential renovation work, the court considered the effect of unanswered requests to admit and struck the statement of defence.

The court accepted deemed admissions to establish liability for breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation, while declining to decide oppression-remedy standing because it was unnecessary to the monetary result.

The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for proven damages of $1,046,438.14.

The court rejected the request for contractual 12% compound pre- and post-judgment interest and applied Courts of Justice Act interest rates.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent husband's Answer regarding financial claims due to his failure to comply with multiple court orders, including support and disclosure orders.

The respondent husband brought a cross-motion, supported by the applicant but opposed by the respondent wife from his concurrent marriage, seeking the release of funds held in trust from the sale of a property to satisfy his support arrears and future obligations.

The court granted the release of funds, finding it would not prejudice the respondent wife's civil claims for misappropriation.

The court declined to strike the husband's Answer at this time, instead ordering him to provide the outstanding financial disclosure within 30 days, failing which the applicant could renew her motion.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal entered after the trial judge denied the Crown's request for an adjournment.

The adjournment was sought on the first and second days of trial due to the sudden and serious illness of the assigned trial Crown.

The trial judge forced the matter on, leading the Crown to call no evidence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly weigh the relevant factors, including the public interest in a trial on the merits and the lack of fault by the Crown.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

In a contentious estates proceeding, the court determined costs following an earlier dismissal of the moving party's request for payout of sale proceeds held in trust.

Both sides sought partial indemnity costs and each claimed success, but the court found divided success and held that neither side was completely successful.

Applying Rule 57.01 principles, the court found the amounts sought were excessive in light of proportionality and mixed results.

The court also found litigation conduct by both sides increased costs, while assigning primary responsibility for failing to add the estate party to the estate trustee.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 payable by one responding party to the moving party.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded firearm, breach of a prohibition order, and possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences occurred while the offender was on parole for a previous firearms offence.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the offender's prior record and the presence of fentanyl, alongside mitigating factors such as his youth, rehabilitative prospects, and harsh presentence custody conditions.

Applying the principles of totality and restraint, the court imposed a global sentence of 8 years' imprisonment, less credit for presentence custody.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault with a weapon and mischief to property.

He argued that the trial judge unfairly limited cross-examination, misapprehended medical evidence, and erred in applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were proper trial management, no medical evidence was actually filed at trial, and the W.(D.) analysis was correctly applied to reach a reasonable verdict.

The defendants, a father and his common-law partner, brought motions to set aside an ex parte order granting the plaintiff son leave to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against their property, and to discharge the CPL.

The father also sought leave to register a CPL against a property he had previously transferred to the son.

The court set aside the ex parte order and discharged the CPL on the defendants' property, finding the son failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts and had no triable claim to an interest in the land.

The court granted the father leave to register a CPL against the son's property, finding a triable issue of a resulting trust arising from the gratuitous transfer.

The appellant insurer appealed a preliminary arbitral ruling in a statutory accident benefits priority dispute under s. 268 of the Insurance Act and O. Reg. 283/95.

The central issue was whether the 90-day notice requirement in s. 3 was automatically suspended by O. Reg. 73/20 during the COVID-19 emergency period.

The court held, on a purposive interpretation of the emergency regulation, that the notice requirement functioned as a limitation period for that temporary regime and was therefore automatically stayed.

The arbitral dismissal of the priority claim was set aside on that basis, while the court noted that if this interpretation were wrong, deference would support the arbitrator's discretionary findings under s. 2.

The offender, a 23-year-old international student with a G2 licence, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after striking and killing an off-duty police officer.

The court considered the offender's G2 licence status, which prohibited driving with any alcohol in his system, as a statutory aggravating factor under s. 320.22(g) of the Criminal Code.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for impaired driving offences, the court sentenced the offender to 6 years in the penitentiary, less pre-trial custody credits, and imposed a 10-year driving prohibition.