Jane Sirdevan

In a contentious estates proceeding, the court determined costs following an earlier dismissal of the moving party's request for payout of sale proceeds held in trust.

Both sides sought partial indemnity costs and each claimed success, but the court found divided success and held that neither side was completely successful.

Applying Rule 57.01 principles, the court found the amounts sought were excessive in light of proportionality and mixed results.

The court also found litigation conduct by both sides increased costs, while assigning primary responsibility for failing to add the estate party to the estate trustee.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 payable by one responding party to the moving party.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of an elector’s application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act on the basis that several alleged contraventions were commenced outside the six‑week time limit in s. 9(1).

The court examined the legislative history and jurisprudence interpreting the provision and concluded that s. 9(1) functions as a temporal qualification for applicants rather than a conventional limitation period.

The relevant inquiry focuses on the applicant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to the alleged contravention, not on what a reasonably diligent person could have discovered from publicly available information.

The court held that the applicant’s uncontradicted evidence established that she commenced the application within six weeks of acquiring the requisite knowledge.

The moving parties failed to prove earlier knowledge that would render the application untimely.

The defendant lawyer moved for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence claim brought by a former criminal client.

The plaintiff alleged negligent representation during the early stages of his criminal trial, including forcing him to testify against his will and mishandling evidentiary issues.

The court held that most allegations required expert evidence on the standard of care, which the plaintiff had not provided.

However, the allegation that the lawyer compelled the client to testify engaged fundamental criminal law principles and could constitute an obvious breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

Because the parties' evidence directly conflicted on that issue, a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment awarding the respondent a financing fee of $249,547.49 under a contract.

The appellants argued the contract was ambiguous as to whether the fee was payable upon securing financing or only upon the closing of an acquisition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contractual language clear that fees were payable at two different points in time, including immediately upon raising capital, regardless of whether the transaction closed.