S. Dosanjh

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault with a weapon and mischief to property.

He argued that the trial judge unfairly limited cross-examination, misapprehended medical evidence, and erred in applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were proper trial management, no medical evidence was actually filed at trial, and the W.(D.) analysis was correctly applied to reach a reasonable verdict.

The accused was tried on firearms charges arising after police responded to a possible gunshots call and pursued him when he fled during an attempted investigative interaction.

He argued that the initial police conduct amounted to arbitrary detention motivated by racial profiling and that he did not know a satchel he carried contained a loaded handgun.

The court applied the detention framework under s. 9 of the Charter and held there was no physical or psychological detention before flight, and that the later arrest was supported by reasonable grounds.

The court rejected the defence account as implausible and contrary to common sense, found knowing possession and control proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and entered convictions on the ammunition-possession and prohibition-order counts while conditionally staying the overlapping possession count under Kienapple.

On a motion for directions in a sexual assault prosecution, the accused sought a ruling that WhatsApp messages exchanged with the complainant were not records within s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the framework in R. v. J.J., the court held the messages were neither enumerated nor non-enumerated records because they did not contain intimate or highly personal information integral to the complainant’s physical, psychological, or emotional well-being.

The messages consisted largely of criticisms of the accused’s conduct and character during a deteriorating marriage, with no explicit sexual content and no information engaging the complainant’s personal dignity at the threshold required by the record screening regime.

The court therefore ruled that ss. 278.92 to 278.94 did not govern their admissibility, which would instead be determined during trial on a case-by-case basis.