SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: YANXUAN ZHU, Applicant
AND:
JI DA, Respondent
BEFORE: The Hon. Mr. Justice R.E. Charney
COUNSEL: L. Leslie Dizgun and Ciarán McGrath, Counsel for the Applicant
Harold Niman and Surinder Multani, Counsel for the Respondent
HEARD: In Writing
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
1On December 29, 2025, I granted the Applicant’s application to cancel the designation of matrimonial home registered on title by the Respondent, and ordered that the designation be deleted from the title of property. I held, at para. 19 of my Endorsement:
Until such time as the Respondent brings a successful application to set aside the Separation Agreement, the Agreement is presumptively valid, and the parties are bound by its terms. The Respondent cannot designate the Property as a matrimonial home under s. 20 of the FLA. He cannot resort to self-help by registering a designation, which has interfered with the Applicant’s ability to renew the mortgage on her home.
2At para. 20 of the Endorsement I denied the Respondent’s request to re-file the matrimonial home designation, stating:
Unless and until the Separation Agreement is set aside, both parties are bound by and must comply with its terms. The Respondent may not re-file the matrimonial home designation unless the Separation Agreement is set aside.
3The parties have now made costs submissions.
4The Applicant seeks costs on a substantial indemnity basis, in the amount of $23,581.18, or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis, in the amount of $15,720.79, plus disbursements of $559.40, all inclusive of HST.
5The Applicant points out that she made two offers to settle this motion.
6On December 17, 2025, the Applicant discovered that on April 23, 2025 – almost five years after signing the Separation Agreement, in which the Respondent relinquished any and all rights he had to the property - the Respondent had registered the matrimonial home designation on title to the property, without providing any notice to the Applicant.
7The registration of this designation interfered with the Applicant’s ability to renew the mortgage on her home. The mortgage renewal was set to close on December 29, 2025. Without the removal of the designation or the consent of the Respondent, the bank would not advance the mortgage funds.
8On December 18, 2025, the Applicant wrote to the Respondent seeking consent to the refinancing, without prejudice to either party’s position regarding the Separation Agreement.
9The Respondent did not respond until December 22, 2025, by which point the Applicant had incurred the costs associated with commencing the Application and preparing application materials. In his responding correspondence, the Respondent refused to consent to the refinancing.
10The Application materials were served on the Respondent on December 24, 2025.
11The Respondent offered to discharge the registration on the conditions that he be permitted to re-register it following the refinancing, that the Applicant assume sole responsibility for the mortgage payments (the Separation Agreement provides that the Respondent pays $2,500 per month to assist with mortgage payments) and, that the Application be withdrawn on a without costs basis.
12On December 26, 2025, the Applicant made a further offer on terms that included her undertaking not to sell or further encumber the Property, and requiring payment of $10,000 in partial satisfaction of the legal costs incurred to that date. The Respondent refused that offer.
13The Respondent argues that the costs sought by the Applicant arise from a discrete issue – the removal of the matrimonial home designation – and are grossly disproportionate to the time that should have been spent on the issue. He argues that the number of lawyers (3) acting for the Applicant and the number of hours spent was excessive. The Respondent’s costs for the motion were only $5,808 on a substantial indemnity basis.
14The Respondent argues that the Applicant’s costs should be $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis, but payable by the Respondent only if the impugned Separation Agreement is found to be valid. The Respondent advises that he commenced an application to set aside the Separation Agreement on January 26, 2026.
Analysis
15In my view, Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules applies to this motion. The Applicant made a reasonable offer to settle this dispute, and she obtained an Order that was as favourable as her offer to the Respondent. In contrast, the Respondent’s offer would have permitted him to re-register the designation following the refinancing, a remedy that was expressly rejected in my Endorsement.
16In my view, it was reasonable for the Applicant’s costs to be somewhat higher than the Respondent’s. The Applicant was forced to bring this application on an urgent basis in order to refinance her house.
17Further, there is no reason why the Applicant should not be entitled to her costs following the application in accordance with Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules. The Respondent was wrong to ignore the terms of the Separation Agreement when he registered the matrimonial designation on title. Even if he is ultimately successful in his belated application to set aside the terms of the Separation Agreement, he was wrong to register the matrimonial designation when he did, and this resulted in unnecessary litigation. Furthermore, his interests would have been protected had he accepted the Applicant’s settlement offer because that offer was made without prejudice to his challenging the Separation Agreement.
18That said, I accept that the Applicant’s costs are somewhat high for the single issue in the application. In addition, the Applicant is entitled to full recovery costs only from the date of the offer, and while most of the Applicant’s costs post-date the offer, some of the Applicant’s costs appear to predate the offer.
19Accordingly, costs are fixed at $18,500 plus disbursements of $559.40, all inclusive of HST, payable forthwith.
Justice R.E. Charney
Date: March 2, 2026