Superior Court of Justice

The applicant, an automotive manufacturer, sought an interim injunction to prevent the respondent supplier from ceasing delivery of component parts to its Windsor plant amid a pricing dispute.

The respondent challenged the court's jurisdiction, relying on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the applicant's standard terms requiring all suits to be brought in Michigan.

The court found the clause clear and applicable, and held that the applicant failed to show 'strong cause' to avoid its own standard terms.

The court declined jurisdiction and vacated the previously granted ex parte interim injunction.

The self-represented accused, facing sexual assault and related charges, brought a pre-trial motion seeking the translation of four English disclosure documents into French and an order excluding a modified PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the accused failed to demonstrate that the lack of translated documents caused actual prejudice to his ability to make full answer and defence.

The court also held that the Crown's modification of its PowerPoint presentation was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with no evidence of abuse of process or unfairness to the accused.

The plaintiff environmental remediation company sued the defendant property owner for $157,941.43 in unpaid invoices.

The defendant counterclaimed for $650,000, alleging the plaintiff over-remediated the property to a higher environmental standard than necessary.

The court found the property was highly contaminated due to a broken sewer pipe and lack of interceptor maintenance by the defendant's tenant.

The court accepted the plaintiff's evidence that the extensive remediation was required and dismissed the over-remediation counterclaim.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed, plus contractual interest of 26.7% per annum based on the parties' course of dealing.

The creditor successfully brought a motion under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to lift the automatic stay to pursue fraud claims against the bankrupt.

The bankrupt opposed the motion for four years using delay tactics before consenting on the eve of the hearing.

The court awarded the creditor costs on a substantial indemnity scale, finding the bankrupt's conduct improper and unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding.

The bankrupt was ordered to pay $25,665.52 in costs, which the court noted would survive any discharge.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, pleaded guilty to possession of commercial quantities of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factor of the quantity and danger of the drugs against the mitigating factors of the guilty plea, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitative prospects.

Applying the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and restraint, the court imposed a total sentence of nine years' imprisonment, reduced by 12 months for pre-trial custody and bail compliance, resulting in a net sentence of eight years.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant's claim for retroactive spousal support.

The parties separated in 2008 and signed a separation agreement in 2010, but the applicant did not commence his claim for spousal support until 2017.

The court found that the applicant's seven-year delay in seeking support, without a compelling reason, indicated an end to their financial interdependence.

Furthermore, the court found that the respondent did not have the capacity to pay spousal support given her debt load and income.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the application for spousal support was dismissed.

The applicants, investors and shareholders of the respondent mortgage investment corporation, sought the appointment of a receiver and manager over the respondent's properties and assets under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent opposed the application and brought a motion to stay or strike the application, arguing technical deficiencies regarding a co-lender not being named as a party and an allegedly defective s. 244 BIA notice.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, finding no prejudice or injustice from the technical defects.

The court granted the receivership order, concluding it was just and convenient given the respondent's insolvency, default on obligations, and the need for an investigatory receiver to determine the status of the investors' funds and remaining assets.

The offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after driving at 190 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, crossing the median, and colliding with an oncoming vehicle.

The collision resulted in the death of his passenger and bodily harm to the driver of the other vehicle.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the extreme speed and deliberate nature of the driving.

The offender was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, an eight-year driving prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The defendants, a real estate agent and his brokerage, brought a motion under r. 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff estate trustee's action as statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act or s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action alleged that the defendants conspired to purchase property from a cognitively impaired deceased at below fair market value.

The court found the claim was statute-barred under the Trustee Act's strict two-year period and that fraudulent concealment could not toll the limitation because no concealment occurred after the deceased's death.

However, the court held that the limitation period was suspended under s. 7 of the Limitations Act, 2002 due to the deceased's alleged incapacity, and dismissed the motion.

The Minister of Public and Business Service Delivery, operating the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, sought to recover pre-arbitration expenses from two insurers who had accepted priority for Statutory Accident Benefits claims without proceeding to arbitration.

The insurers argued that the Fund was required to arbitrate the dispute and that pre-arbitration expenses were not recoverable.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the 'proper case' exception allowed the Fund to seek restitution in court because there was no dispute over the payment of benefits to arbitrate.

The court found that the insurers were unjustly enriched by the Fund's investigative work and ordered them to reimburse the Fund for its pre-arbitration expenses.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming $350,000 in damages arising from the defendant's alleged failure to close a purported assignment of an agreement of purchase and sale for a newly constructed home.

The court found the plaintiff did not have the builder's required written consent to assign the original agreement.

The court further found the plaintiff made fraudulent misrepresentations regarding upgrades, a fourth ensuite bathroom, and his right to assign the agreement, rendering the contract voidable.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed as he failed to prove his claim on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order compelling the self-represented plaintiff to undergo a capacity assessment.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion seeking procedural accommodation for the plaintiff's participation to proceed exclusively in written and asynchronous formats due to severe disabilities.

The court found that the threshold requirements under s. 105(3) were met, as the plaintiff's own pleadings and conduct raised genuine concerns about litigation capacity.

The court further held that the requested accommodation of exclusively written and asynchronous participation would cause undue hardship by undermining procedural fairness, prejudicing the defendant's right to cross-examine, and straining court resources.

The defendant's motion was granted, and the accommodation request was dismissed without prejudice pending completion of the capacity assessment.

The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment regarding a real estate joint venture.

The plaintiff had secured financing for the purchase of a property and was promised a 50% carried interest in the defendant corporation's share of the profits.

When the property was sold 10 years later, the defendant corporation distributed the majority of its profits to related parties, paying the plaintiff significantly less than his 50% entitlement.

The court found that the defendant breached the contract and its fiduciary duties, and that the related parties were unjustly enriched.

The court pierced the corporate veil to hold the individual defendant personally liable, awarding the plaintiff $1,297,500 in damages.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The action, commenced in 2018 under simplified procedure rules, had not progressed past the exchange of productions after nearly eight years.

The court applied the four-factor test from Piedrahita v. Costin, finding that while the motion was brought promptly and the defendant suffered no actual prejudice from the delay, the plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for abandoning litigation steps for 17 months in favour of settlement discussions, and did not establish inadvertence.

The court held that the values of timeliness and efficiency outweighed the absence of prejudice, and dismissed the motion.

In CCAA proceedings arising from a major construction project, the monitor sought an order authorizing release of a contractor-specific holdback notwithstanding the continued construction of the project and the resulting technical inability to satisfy the timing requirements of the construction lien regime.

The court held that s. 11 of the CCAA gave it jurisdiction to deem compliance with statutory preconditions where doing so usefully furthered the remedial objectives of the restructuring, caused no demonstrated prejudice, and preserved the substantive rights of affected stakeholders.

The court also held that it could protect the monitor and CRO from potential personal liability under specified tax statutes for implementing the court-authorized payment, but revised the proposed wording to grant a narrower and more direct liability shield.

The holdback release order was approved with modifications, including removal of an unnecessary overlapping protection.

The accused faced charges arising from a sustained online harassment campaign involving sexually explicit videos, pornographic material, and demeaning messages directed at the complainant, her then boyfriend, and others in their social and professional circles.

The Crown relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove identity, alleging motive, means, opportunity, exclusive knowledge, and sophisticated efforts to mask the source of the communications.

The court applied the circumstantial evidence framework and found that, although the evidence raised suspicion and pointed toward the accused in some respects, it did not establish that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the whole of the evidence.

Concerns about the credibility and reliability of key witnesses, the lack of forensic linkage to the accused’s seized devices, and unresolved alternative inferences arising from third-party internet attribution created a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial arising from alleged intimate-partner violence in a bedroom of a multi-tenant house, the court assessed credibility, reasonable doubt, incremental disclosure, and sexual-assault myth-based reasoning.

The complainant's evidence was found generally credible and sufficiently reliable on the core allegations, notwithstanding inconsistencies about peripheral details and a delayed disclosure of anal penile penetration.

The court held that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of sexual assault, choking while committing an assault, assault, and unlawful confinement.

The Crown did not prove the mens rea for using or threatening to use a dumbbell as a weapon, and the accused was acquitted on that count.

Following a prior costs endorsement, it came to the court's attention that the moving party had renewed an original motion for additional disclosure that had not been brought to the court's attention due to filing irregularities.

The court reviewed its prior costs order and limited the cost award to the sum associated with fake case references, staying the balance of the costs order pending a scheduled in-person hearing on the renewed motion.

Costs endorsement following a three-day family law trial in which the applicant obtained a Final Order on parenting issues.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $24,577.27 based on her Offer to Settle and the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

The court found the applicant's Offer to Settle met the requirements of Rule 24(12) FLR, entitling her to full recovery of costs.

However, applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness from Beaver v. Hill and Lawrence v. Lawrence, and considering the respondent's unreasonable behaviour including overholding the child and breaching court orders, the court awarded the applicant 80-85% of her costs, totalling $20,000 all-inclusive payable within 30 days.

Following separation and the applicant's assignment in bankruptcy, the respondent sought to quantify claims against the applicant arising from his failure to comply with their separation agreement.

The respondent claimed increased mortgage costs resulting from the applicant's refusal to sign a mortgage renewal, reimbursement for payments on two joint lines of credit, and sought to characterize these debts as spousal support to survive the bankruptcy.

The court found the debts were property and debt settlements, not spousal support, and valued the respondent's claims for filing in the bankruptcy.

The court also held that a post-bankruptcy costs award relating to pre-bankruptcy litigation was provable in the bankruptcy.

A request to revive a withdrawn divorce claim was denied.