CITATION: Conroy v. Vassel, 2026 ONSC 1755

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00036006-0000

DATE: 20260323

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

David Conroy Applicant

– and –

Donna Vassel Respondent

Counsel: Self-represented Self-represented

HEARD: January 31, 2025

DES ROSIERS J.

1The Respondent (“Ms. Vassel”) brought this motion for summary judgment to dismiss the application for spousal support brought by the Applicant (“Mr. Conroy”).

2Mr. Conroy is claiming spousal support based on a 2010 separation agreement between the parties. He is claiming retroactive spousal support in the amount of $121,343 (if rental income is imputed to Ms. Vassel) or $87,544 if no rental income is imputed.

3Ms. Vassel argues that it would be unfair for her to pay retroactive spousal support to Mr. Conroy because their relationship ended in 2008, with a separation agreement in 2011. She argues that the intention of the separation agreement was to deal with her entitlement to spousal support and not Mr. Conroy’s. She argues that the delay in bringing the claim should disentitle Mr. Conroy to spousal support, that she has no ability to pay spousal support considering her debt load, and that the court should impute sufficient income to Mr. Conroy to disallow his spousal support claim.

4Mr. Conroy relies on the separation agreement to claim spousal support. He argues that the delay stemmed from his desire to avoid having to ask for spousal support by obtaining the return of his medical license. He argues that rental income should be imputed to Ms. Vassel and that she may have sufficient equity in her home to provide him with retroactive spousal support. Finally, he argues that he is unable to earn an income because of his disability, his age and the social media coverage of his litigation with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

5A mini-trial was held pursuant to r. 16(6.2) of the Family Law Rules to determine four issues:

the impact of the delay (2010 -2017) on the entitlement to claim spousal support;
whether Ms. Vassel had the capacity to pay spousal support from June 2015 to March 2023;
whether Mr. Conroy was unable to work between 2020 and March 2023; and
what amount of spousal support, if any, should be awarded.

6In my decision of September 20, 2024, I reviewed the factual background of the parties. For the sake of completeness, I reproduce here some of the factual summary.

Factual Background

7Ms. Vassel and Mr. Conroy met in 1987. At the time, Mr. Conroy was attending law school, and Ms. Vassel was working as an administrative assistant.

8After graduating from law school, Mr. Conroy enrolled in medical school.

9Ms. Vassel and Mr. Conroy have two children: Dana Conroy (“Dana”) born on June 12, 1992, and Collin Conroy (“Collin”) born on September 9, 1993.

10In May of 1994, Ms. Vassel and Mr. Conroy were married.

11Mr. Conroy graduated from medical school and began working as a physician in December of 1997.

12In September of 1999, Mr. Conroy had a hunting accident and lost the use of his right hand. As a result of the accident, Mr. Conroy received $600,000 in income replacement and dismemberment insurance benefits. The benefits terminated in 2019.

13Mr. Conroy resumed his work as a physician in June 2002.

14Five years later, in June 2007, Mr. Conroy suffered a mental breakdown and became afflicted by a psychotic delusion. He experimented on himself by using cocaine daily, thinking that he was making a medical discovery. He was convinced that he had discovered a new type of fungus infecting cocaine users.

15In February of 2008, Mr. Conroy moved out of the matrimonial home.

16At that time, Mr. Conroy paid spousal support to Ms. Vassel.

17In February of 2009, Mr. Conroy’s use of illegal drugs was brought to the attention of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario that eventually determined that, as of August 14, 2009, Mr. Conroy was no longer authorized to practice medicine in Ontario.

18Mr. Conroy returned to the matrimonial home for a short period of time.

19Ms. Vassel commenced a family law application in November of 2009 with Court File No. FS- 09-16423 (the “2009 Application”). The relief sought included issues relating to child custody and support, spousal support, division of net family property, and a transfer of the matrimonial home to Ms. Vassel.

20On February 10, 2010, Ms. Vassel and Mr. Conroy agreed to resolve the issues in the 2009 Application by way of a “house and separation agreement” (the “Separation Agreement”). Mr. Conroy drafted the Separation Agreement. Ms. Vassel’s lawyer reviewed it and made some changes.

21The Separation Agreement distributes the assets. Several provisions are relevant to the disposition of the present case.:

“1. Donna Vassel will own the matrimonial home and will keep all of the equity and profit from the sale.

Donna Vassel will be responsible for all lines of credits jointly held at the time of this agreement and her credit card debts.
Donna Vassel will be the sole possessor of all joint bank accounts and be responsible for all lines of credit attached to those accounts.
Spousal support will be determined in accordance with the law based on the current income of both parties and the amount will be the average amount for persons similarly situated and will continue until March 1st, 2023.”

(Emphasis added)

22At that time, neither party availed themselves of clause 20 of the Separation Agreement.

23The Separation Agreement resolved all other outstanding issues between the parties, including ownership of the matrimonial home and its contents, ownership of the joint bank accounts, and child support. Ms. Vassel received the heavily mortgaged matrimonial home.

24On July 25, 2011, an uncontested Divorce Order was granted.

25Between 2009 and 2012, Mr. Conroy was involved in legal proceedings against the College of Physicians and Surgeons, which were dismissed in 2011. Mr. Conroy appealed the dismissal of his action to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal on January 12, 2012.

26In June of 2017, Mr. Conroy and the two children commenced a civil action for damages against Ms. Vassel (the “2017 Claim”). In the 2017 Claim, Mr. Conroy alleged that Ms. Vassel had breached the Separation Agreement and that Mr. Conroy should be entitled to receive half of the marital assets and spousal support. The children claimed damages for alleged abuse at the hands of Ms. Vassel.

27Ms. Vassel brought a motion to strike the 2017 Claim on the basis that it was an abuse of process and disclosed no cause of action. Justice Belobaba transferred her motion to the Family Division.

28On July 4, 2019, Justice Penny heard Ms. Vassel’s motion to strike. Justice Penny severed Mr. Conroy’s claims from the claims of the children and directed the children’s claims to the civil list.

29Justice Penny held that one of Mr. Conroy’s claims proceed as a family law application for spousal support. Justice Penny’s endorsement states that the application for spousal support can only reach two years before Mr. Conroy issued his 2017 claim, that is June 2015.

30Mr. Conroy’s family law claim was moved to the Family Division and a new Family Division Court File Number was assigned (Court File No. FS-19-7777) (the “2019 Application”).

31Mr. Conroy appealed Justice Penny’s decision and his costs order. The Court of Appeal reduced the costs and otherwise dismissed the appeal.

32Mr. Conroy did not pursue his 2019 Application in a timely manner, and it was eventually “frozen” due to inactivity.

33In May of 2023, on the advice of court staff, Mr. Conroy commenced the present application (the “2023 Application”), where he seeks spousal support. On March 11, 2024, Mr. Conroy served an Amended Application seeking, inter alia, damages for “the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress”, damages for pain and suffering, and aggravated and punitive damages.

34At a case conference on March 13, 2024, Mr. Conroy withdrew the tort claims asserted in his Amended Application. Justice Kraft’s endorsement of March 13, 2024, stipulates: “The applicant's Amended Application, which was served on the respondent on March 11, 2024, which included a tort and damages claims, shall not be filed by him. The Amended Application was not accepted by the Court and the applicant acknowledged that he has no intention to pursue these additional claims.”

35Justice Kraft granted Ms. Vassel leave to bring a motion to strike the 2023 Application on the ground that it is an abuse of process and/or that there is no cause of action.

36The motion was heard before me. I ordered a minitrial to determine whether Mr. Conroy is eligible for spousal support.

37I also ordered that the following information be provided:

income tax returns for years 2015 – 2023 as well as rental income and expenses for the same years (Ms. Vassel);
income tax returns for years 2015 – 2023 and bank statements for years 2015 to 2023 (Mr. Conroy); and
updated medical information regarding his diagnosis for the period between 2020 to 2023 (Mr. Conroy), including reasons for benefits being terminated in 2019.

38The issues in front of me are:

whether the delay in claiming spousal support disentitles Mr. Conroy from pursuing his claim for spousal support?
whether income should be imputed to Mr. Conroy for the relevant period?
whether additional rental income should be imputed to Ms. Vassel for the relevant period?
whether Ms. Vassel has the capacity to pay spousal support?
what amount of spousal support, if any, should be awarded?

39For reasons below I conclude that Mr. Conroy is not entitled to spousal support. It would be unjust and contrary to the objectives of the Divorce Act to allow a claim for spousal support in the circumstances. I also conclude that no additional rental income should be imputed to Ms. Vassel and that Ms. Vassel does not have the capacity to pay spousal support to Mr. Conroy. I decline to impute any income to Mr. Conroy.

Does the delay disentitle Mr. Conroy from claiming spousal support?

40Mr. Conroy relies on the Separation Agreement of 2010 to claim spousal support. He did not instigate his claim until 2017. Mr. Conroy claims that the argument about delay has already been determined by Justice Penny. I disagree.

41In his July 4, 2019 endorsement, Justice Penny dealt with the claim for spousal support in the following way:

“The plaintiff submits that he is unrepresented and accepts that he may have asserted his spousal support claim in the wrong way. He asks for leave to amend. I accept that as an unrepresented litigant, some consideration must be shown for the plaintiff's lack of legal training and experience. The fact remains, however, that the Family Law Act and Rules set out a complete code for the bringing, proving and adjudicating of spousal support claims. These are not just empty or formalistic requirements. For example, a critical element in the adjudicating of a spousal support claim is the filing of financial statement. The pleadings in spousal support claims typically lay a foundation for the claim by alleging facts dealing with such things as sources of the parties' income, financial or other contributions to the family unit and education, training and employability and the like. There are no financial statements filed and there is next to no pleading of facts and circumstances upon which a spousal support claim could be considered.

I agree with the defendant. The attempt to seek spousal support in the guise of a civil claim for damages is misguided and constitutes an abuse of process, Cunningham v. Moran, 2011 ONCA 476. This claim must be struck out without leave to amend.

If the plaintiff intends to proceed with a claim for spousal support, he must do so by delivering an application in accordance with the Family Law Act and Rules using the Family Court File No. FS-19-7777, not by way of amendment to the civil statement of claim. The plaintiff also conceded during oral argument that, under the Limitations Act, his spousal support claim could only reach back two years before the issuance of his statement of claim. Any claim for spousal support before June 2015 is barred.” (par. 15 -17)

42In my view, Justice Penny did not address the issue of the delay being considered in assessing the entitlement for spousal support. Justice Penny simply allowed Mr. Conroy the possibility of filing a new and proper Family Law claim. I conclude that I must deal with the issue of whether the delay in claiming support disentitles Mr. Conroy from succeeding in his claim for spousal support.

43The law of spousal support recognizes that interdependency between spouses may develop during a marriage. Nevertheless, after separation, each spouse is expected to attempt to become self-sufficient.

44The Divorce Act provides as follows:

15.2 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse.

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

45Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, there are three bases to determine entitlement for spousal support according to the Divorce Act. A spouse may be entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis, on a non-compensatory or “needs” basis, or pursuant to a contract.

46I have already ruled in my September 2024 decision that Mr. Conroy is not eligible for spousal support on a compensatory basis. Mr. Conroy is relying on the contractual basis as well as the second basis for entitlement for spousal support, the “needs-based” entitlement. In Bracklow v. Bracklow, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the obligation of mutual support inherent to marriages may survive the end of the marriage in certain circumstances. In Bracklow, the wife showed progressive signs of mental illness during the 7 years of cohabitation.

47The Court considered that even if the wife’s illness, and her inability to support herself, was not “caused” by the marriage, she could still be entitled to support according to the Divorce Act.

48The Bracklow decision has been interpreted in Ryan v. Ryan, 2017 ONSC 1377. Wilson J., drawing on the principles outlined in Fyfe v. Jouppien, 2011 ONSC 5462, as well as Peters v. Peters, 2015 ONSC 4006, [2015] CarswellOnt 9285, summarized the relevant principles in assessing entitlement to support for circumstances arising post- separation as follows:

“(a) The question is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances of the particular case, and the objectives underlying a spousal support award it is reasonable on an objective analysis to expect the parties to continue to be responsible for each other in the event of post-separation need, and if so, for how long.

(b) Economic hardship in light of the new circumstances must be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the breakdown of the marriage. Marriage is not a lifetime future guarantee for support.

(c) The starting point is whether there is evidence during the period prior to separation to rebut the presumption of mutuality and interdependence arising from the marriage relationship itself. If there is not, it may be reasonable to expect that the parties will support each other for a reasonable period of time for need arising post-separation.

(d) The passage of time may or may not be an important consideration in assessing entitlement.

(g) However, where the parties both take steps post-separation to unravel their interdependencies, effect a clean break, and do not have children in their care, then the objective of promoting self-sufficiency within a reasonable time post separation becomes more important.

(h) If the situation giving rise to need is a medical problem, then the timing of the onset is important. If a disability arises out of a pre-existing known condition that existed during the marriage or at the time of breakdown of the marriage, there would exist a connection between the disability and the marriage or its breakdown.” (par. 211)

49A spouse must provide a compelling reason for the delay in seeking spousal support because lengthy delays lead the other spouse to assume a clean break and move on with their affairs. In Karlovic v. Karlovic, 2018 ONSC 4233, the court summarized the caselaw in the following way :

“In trying to discern a consistent pattern in the case law, it seems that the determination of entitlement to support after a significant delay involves a discretionary balancing of the length of the delay and the reasons for it. The longer the delay, the greater the need to offer a compelling explanation for the delay because of the increasing presumption of financial independence and clean break.

On the other hand, the more likely that the recipient was physically or emotionally unable to make an application for their support, or the greater the post separation financial interdependence, the more likely it is that the applicant will be entitled to make the claim.” (par. 70 and 71)

50Because spousal support is taxable in the recipient’s hands and deductible for the payor, any retroactive spousal support requires that the parties refile their income tax.

51A long delay is indicative that the parties have recognized the end of their financial interdependence.

52Mr. Conroy explains his delay in the following way. Until 2016, he remained hopeful that he would be able to return to the practice of medicine and resume having an income. He also did not believe at the time that Ms. Vassel had a sufficient income to provide him with spousal support until 2011. Thereafter, for three years, until 2014, he says that he “arranged” for Ms. Vassel to give their son Colin $175 monthly.

53The evidence before me demonstrates that Mr. Conroy was genuine in his desire to return to the practice of medicine and was unable to do so.

54However, during that time, for six years, Mr. Conroy took no steps to assert his right to spousal support. Indeed, he often let Ms. Vassel believe that he was not going to claim spousal support. In April 2013, he wrote:“ I consider our agreement giving you the house null and void… Be advised that I won’t be taking you to court for the house, the back child support and the back spousal support you owe me, but I do consider those my final payments to you and the termination of our financial dealings together.”

55A delay of seven years is significant. I conclude from the parties’ behavior during that seven-year period (from 2010 to 2017) that neither expected nor wished to claim spousal support from the other. Mr. Conroy remarried and Ms. Vassel also found a new partner. Because Mr. Conroy expected to return to the practice of medicine, he did not expect that he would ever need spousal support and knew that Ms. Vassel had limited means. Ms. Vassel was entitled to assume that the relationship had ended and that no financial interdependency was to continue.

56I conclude that Mr. Conroy has not provided a compelling reason for delaying his claim for spousal support. This is sufficient to grant a summary dismissal of his application for spousal support. For the sake of completeness, I also address Mr. Conroy’s other arguments.

Was Mr. Conroy unable to work between 2020 and March 2023?

57Ms. Vassel argues that I should impute an income to Mr. Conroy for the relevant years because he is highly educated and should be self-sufficient. She also alleges that he supported their daughter during that time as well.

58In my reasons, I specifically requested that Mr. Conroy provide updated medical information regarding his diagnosis between 2020 to 2023 as well as the reasons why his RBC benefits were terminated in 2019.

59Mr. Conroy did not provide additional medical information. He explained that an expert report or a letter from a psychiatrist to determine his current state would have cost him $3000, which he does not have.

60RBC terminated his disability premiums on the basis that he could gradually return to work. A review of the medical notes provided at the time and upon which RBC relied upon to reach its decision indicated that Mr. Conroy continued to suffer from depression but pointed out several options for treatment.

61Mr. Conroy disagreed with the termination of his benefits and the matter was settled with RBC in March 2020 for $210,000, of which Mr. Conroy received $127,000.

62Mr. Conroy’s argument is that Dr. Shaffer concluded as to his inability to work in 2020 because Mr. Conroy’s mental disability arose from two major stressors, the inability to regain his medical license and his escalating financial distress. Since neither of these stressors has alleviated, Mr. Conroy argues that he is still suffering from a disability that prevents him from working.

63Mr. Conroy also indicates that any attempt to find work is thwarted by the social media coverage of his legal battle with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

64Mr. Conroy is a wounded man who, although very talented, has not been able to overcome the tragedies that have befallen him. The loss of his hand prevents him from working in any manual labour. The loss of his medical license has had a profound impact on him and has set him on a path of depression.

65Mr. Conroy is currently in receipt of ODSB. Any spousal support payment would be deducted from his benefits.

66The loss of his license to practice medicine has caused Mr. Conroy’s depression which continues to this day. I conclude that Mr. Conroy is unable to work and no income should be imputed to him.

Did Ms. Vassel have the capacity to pay spousal support during the relevant period (between June 2015 and March 2023)?

67As part of the separation agreement, Ms. Vassel had to assume the household debts and a heavily mortgaged home.

68The review of her income tax returns from 2015 to 2023 demonstrate the following:

Year	Income according to tax returns	Rental income admitted
2015	$49,292	$4,300
2016	$62,840
2017	$68,990
2018	$52,227
2019	$68,000	$400
2020	$63,182
2021	$50,000
2022	$55,562
2023	$55,999

69Mr. Conroy suggests that rental income should be imputed to Ms. Vassel who sometimes had rented her property. Mr. Conroy relies on statements from his daughter to that effect. This hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Furthermore, Ms. Vassel explained that she chooses not to rent rooms in the house where she lives. I am not prepared to impute rental income to Ms. Vassel. The evidence is unreliable and it is not reasonable to expect her to rent rooms in the house where she lives.

70Ms. Vassel claims that she has a significant debt load, arising out of debts carried from the marriage as well as significant legal debts because of the litigation instigated by Mr. Conroy and her children against her.

71Mr. Conroy disputes the amount of debt and asserts that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Ms. Vassel has significant debt. Mr. Conroy relies on hearsay from his daughter to claim that Ms. Vassel has received some additional income in 2016.

72Mr. Conroy also claims that Ms. Vassel could use the equity in the home to provide with retroactive spousal support. This contravenes the Separation agreement on which he relies to claim spousal support. The agreement is quite clear that Ms. Vassel was to keep the equity in the house. Mr. Conroy cannot have it both ways: using one part of the separation agreement while rejecting another part. The agreement was a comprehensive deal bargained by the parties in 2010 and it must be respected in its integrality.

73I conclude that the objectives of the Divorce Act would not be served by an award of retroactive spousal support in favour of Mr. Conroy. The parties severed their relationship and did not continue to be financially interdependent. Mr. Conroy’s disability stems from his inability to return to the practice of medicine and does not arise from the breakdown of the marriage.

74The motion for summary judgement is granted.

Costs

75This is not a matter for costs. Mr. Conroy is a self-represented litigant in receipt of social assistance. He has no ability to pay costs.

Des Rosiers J.

Released: March 23, 2026