Peters v. Peters, 2015 ONSC 4006

CITATION: Peters and Peters, 2015 ONSC 4006

COURT FILE NO.: 6303/13

DATE: 2015/06/19

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

GERHARD PETERS

Applicant

• and -

ELMA PETERS

Respondent

COUNSEL: Mervin Riddell for the Applicant James Battin for the Respondent

HEARD: May 21, 22, 2015

GORMAN J.:

[1] The Respondent seeks an order for spousal support, to which the Applicant is opposed. Both parties seek a divorce.

OVERVIEW

[2] Both the Applicant and Respondent were born in Mexico and subsequently immigrated to Canada. Each has a grade 8 education, obtained in Mexico. Each party is 39 years of age. There are no children of the marriage.

[3] The parties married November 17, 1996. During the marriage, Ms. Peters held a number of low-paying jobs. She cleaned hotel rooms, she worked on a mushroom farm; she picked tobacco and worked at Vermeer Flowers in St. Thomas, Ontario. Mr. Peters worked in a welding shop for three years, and then became a long-haul truck driver. He has been with his current employer, Tri-Corp Transport for the past 12 years.

[4] Ms. Peters always earned less than Mr. Peters, but she worked full time employment shifts. When the parties learned that they could not have children, they made a mutual agreement to both work full time in an effort to pay off the mortgage on their home. Ms. Peters’ income went toward groceries, while Mr. Peters paid the mortgage.

[5] Commencing in 2010 Ms. Peters began to see Dr. John Wojcik, a specialist in internal medicine and endocrinology. She was referred to him by her family physician. Dr. Wojcik first saw Ms. Peters on April 14, 2010. He diagnosed her with metabolic syndrome and poly-cystic ovarian syndrome. He testified that her weight was elevated, as was her blood pressure and blood sugar. Her cholesterol was high, her hair was thinning, and she had irregular menstrual periods. Additionally, she had a sluggish thyroid. Dr. Wojcik testified that patients with such a thyroid condition are twice as likely to have a mood disorder, including depression.

[6] Dr. Wojcik continued to see Ms. Peters between 2010 and June, 2013. He did not see her between June 27, 2013 and March 23, 2015.

[7] The parties were formally separated on October 16, 2011 although both agree that they lived separate and apart in their shared home starting in or about October 2010.

[8] On final separation, Mr. Peters paid Ms. Peters the sum of $5500.00 in consideration for half the value of the contents of the matrimonial home. He also unilaterally paid her the sum of $600.00 per month, and did so for seven months. The home was ultimately sold at a loss.

[9] Shortly after the October 16, 2011 separation date, Ms. Peters drove her motor vehicle to Alberta, to follow a man with whom she believed she was involved in a relationship. She ultimately learned that there was no “relationship”, but chose to remain in Alberta. She secured an apartment and a number of part-time jobs in that province.

[10] While in Alberta, without the consent of her husband, Ms. Peters withdrew $2000.00 from his line of credit.

[11] In June 2012 she returned to Aylmer, Ontario in an effort to reconcile with Mr. Peters. It was unsuccessful, and Ms. Peters returned to Alberta. She remained in Alberta until December 8, 2012.

[12] On August 11, 2012, Ms. Peters was admitted to hospital in Edmonton, Alberta. The Admission Report states:

[…] called to a 36 y/o female pt who bystander called ems do to the pt not acting normal on our arrival pt standing in the parking lot starring down to the floor, with no shoes on. Pt just standing there not moving, or talking. By stander states that the pt. was seen on the street lying down and then walking around running into a car with her eyes closed. Pt also yelling that god saved her and the she was a dead person walking and now sog saved her. Pt would not let us take vitals when we first got there but when we talked to her and inform her that EPS was getting called she started to cooperate and came to the unit and agreed to go to the hospital pt stated that she has been depressed and denies any drug use and denies trying to harm herself. (sic)

[13] Ms. Peters was held on a Form 1 psychiatric hold until her discharge on August 11, 2012. Her primary diagnosis was listed as “schizophrenia, disorganized subtype”.

[14] After her release, Ms. Peters resided in Alberta with an aunt. She returned to Aylmer, Ontario on December 8, 2012, and moved in with her parents, where she continues to reside. She is unemployed.

[15] Dr. Giuseppe Guaiana, a licenced psychiatrist, first met Ms. Peters in the late fall of 2013. He reviewed the diagnosis of another psychiatrist and confirmed that Ms. Peters suffered from chronic, treatment-resistant paranoid schizophrenia. She had auditory hallucinations (heard the voice of God); delusions (her food and water were being poisoned); and had a restricted affect. She was placed on three medications: Invega Sustenna[^1] (an anti-psychotic), Abilify (a medication used to counteract a side effect of Invega Sustenna, and Venalafaxine, an anti-depressant.

[16] Dr. Guaiana testified that Ms. Peters is unlikely to have a complete recovery. Indeed, Dr. Guaiana testified that she is unable to work because of the daily hallucinations and delusions, as well as her restricted mood and affect. While she can perform household tasks at her parents’ home, he testified that employer expectations would make it impossible for her to work outside the home. To that end, he assisted her in making an application to ODSP, which was successful.

[17] Ms. Peters currently earns $841/mo. on ODSP. She resides at her parents’ home. Her monthly expenses are approximately $450 per month. She owns a motor vehicle outright.

[18] Mr. Peters filed an Application seeking a divorce, on June 24, 2013. Ms. Peters filed an answer seeking spousal support.

[19] On September 5, 2014 Mr. Justice R. J. Haines made an interim spousal support order in the amount of $1,500.00 per month, retroactive to January 1, 2014.

[20] Mr. Peters is currently in arrears in the amount of $21,225.00.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT

[21] The support provisions of the 1985 Divorce Act are intended to deal with the economic consequences, for both parties, of the marriage or its breakdown. What the Act requires is a fair and equitable distribution of resources to alleviate these consequences regardless of gender. Under this approach, the distinction between traditional and modern marriages may not be as useful as courts have indicated so far. The doctrine of equitable sharing of the economic consequences of the marriage or its breakdown, which the Act promotes, recognizes and accounts for the economic disadvantages or advantages flowing from the role adopted by the spouses in the marriage.

[22] While the objectives of certainty, finality, and the autonomy to settle one’s own affairs are enshrined in the Divorce Act, there are also specific factors and objectives set out in sections 15.2(4) and (6) regarding spousal support:

Factors

(4) in making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

Objectives of Spousal Support Order

(6) an order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

b) a portion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

d) insofar as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[23] Self-sufficiency is only one of the objectives enumerated in the relevant sections of the Divorce Act, 1985. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Moge v. Moge 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, determined that “self-sufficiency” should not be given priority in determining the right to, quantum and duration of spousal support. Rather, all relevant factors must be considered in determining the quantum and duration of support.

[24] Spouses still have an obligation after the marriage breakdown to contribute to their own support in a manner commensurate with their abilities. The ultimate goal of spousal support however, is to alleviate the disadvantaged spouse's economic losses as completely as possible, taking into account all of the circumstances of the parties.

[25] The Supreme Court of Canada significantly clarified the law relating to entitlement to spousal support in the seminal cases of Moge v. Moge (supra) and Bracklow v. Bracklow. Those cases provided a general framework within which the various factors relevant to entitlement to spousal support should be analyzed by establishing three general models for entitlement: compensatory grounds, non-compensatory "needs based" grounds and entitlement based on contractual or consensual considerations.

[26] The fundamental principles set out in Bracklow are as follows:

^a. The presumption in marriage is that spouses owe each other a mutual duty of support. The court emphasized, however, that this premise of mutual support is rebuttable; parties to a marriage may alter this presumption, either through explicit contracting or "through unequivocal structuring of their daily affairs, to show disavowal of financial interweaving."²¹

^b. When a marriage breaks down, the presumption of mutual support no longer applies. However, there is no "judicially created statute of limitations on marriage." McLachlin, J. emphasized that "marriage...is a serious commitment, not to be undertaken lightly. It involves the potential for lifelong obligation. There are no magical cut-off dates."²²

c. Section 15.2(6)(c) of the Divorce Act broadens the right to spousal support beyond situations where a party has suffered losses or disadvantages that are causally connected to the marriage, and recognizes that entitlement may exist where the breakdown of the marriage in itself has caused economic hardship. In discussing this issue, the court clarified that this provision encompasses situations where "a person who formerly enjoyed intra-spousal entitlement to support now finds herself or himself without it."

d. Marriage does not in and of itself automatically entitle a spouse to support.

"To hold otherwise would swing the pendulum too far back and completely ignore the independent, clean-break model of marriage."²⁴ The court stressed that it is not the bare fact of marriage so much as "the relationship that is established and the expectations that may reasonably flow from it [emphasis added] that give rise to the obligation of support under the statutes."²⁵

e. Contract and compensation are not the only sources of a spousal support obligation. "The obligation may alternatively arise out of the marriage relationship itself."²⁶ However, the court added that where a spouse achieves economic self-sufficiency on the basis of his or her own efforts, or by means of a compensatory support order, "the obligation founded on the marriage relationship itself lies dormant."

^f. Where need is established that is not based on compensatory or contractual grounds, "the fundamental marital obligation may play a vital role. Absent negating factors, it is available, in appropriate circumstances, to provide just support."²⁷

g. The court did not specifically elaborate on the "negating factors" that would preclude a finding of spousal support entitlement in non-compensatory cases, or conversely on "the appropriate circumstances" that would give rise to a finding of entitlement. However, in discussing the issue of non-compensatory support in the context of the facts in Bracklow, the court emphasized the importance of analyzing the nature of the parties' relationship during the marriage, and in particular to determine whether there was any evidence as of the separation date to rebut the presumption of mutuality and interdependence in the parties' relationship. The court emphasized the importance of starting this analysis using the correct judicial lens, with the presumption of interdependence between the parties. McLachlin, J. noted that although the Bracklows were relatively financially independent at the outset of their marriage, by the end of the marriage they had established an interdependent relationship. It was on this basis that the court determined that Mrs. Bracklow was in state of economic hardship resulting from the breakdown of the marriage as contemplated by section 15.2(6)(c) of the Divorce Act.

h. It follows from this reasoning that if there was evidence that the parties' relationship was not characterized by interdependence and mutual reliance during the period leading to the marriage breakdown, this would be a relevant factor that could lead the court to conclude that the spouse claiming support did not suffer economic hardship as a result of the marriage breakdown.

i. In determining the issue of entitlement, the court emphasized the point established in Moge that all of the objectives set out in section 15.2(6) must be considered, with no one objective being paramount. Therefore, the objective of promoting self-sufficiency with a reasonable period of time is always a consideration.

j. In cases involving spouses who become disabled toward the end of the marriage, where no compensatory or contractual claim for support exists, it may be unfair to the other spouse to order support on an indefinite basis. The court left open the possibility that spousal support could be time limited, even if the disabled spouse will not be able to achieve self-sufficiency. It should be noted that on the re-hearing of Bracklow,²⁸ the court ordered five years time limited support despite the fact that the wife would never be able to support herself adequately on her own.

[27] However, as the court stated in Fyfe v. Jouppien [2011] O.J. No. 4099 at para 3:

The difficult question that the Supreme Court of Canada was not required to address head-on in Moge v. Moge and Bracklow v. Bracklow was whether a spousal support obligation can arise where there is no entitlement on any basis at the time of separation, the parties were both self-sufficient at that time, but need on the part of one of the spouses arises post separation. This case squarely raises the challenging question of how the courts in these types of cases should balance the obligations that marriage entails with the natural wish on the part of spouses to move forward with their lives, free from the threat of unforeseen support obligations in the future.

The Parties' Relationship and Finances During the Marriage

[28] At the time of the marriage, both Mr. and Ms. Peters worked outside of the home. Exhibit #8 is Ms. Peters’ curriculum vitae, in which she set out her employment history. Between 1996 and 2000 she worked as a cleaner at the Country Side Inn in Aylmer, Ontario. From 2000 to 2004 she was a farm labourer for Eatmore Mushrooms. She worked as a general labourer at Vermeere Flowers in St. Thomas, Ontario from 2005-2006. In 2007 she returned to her position at the Country Side Inn, and stayed there until 2010.

[29] Mr. Peters worked at a tobacco farm until he got a job at a metal shop. As a welder he earned approximately $11/hr.

[30] By the time the parties married, Mr. Peters had been working at the welding shop for more than three years. He began driving a truck in November 1998. As a long-distance truck driver his usual routine was to leave on a Tuesday, deliver (or pick up) his load and return home Saturday or Sunday.

[31] The financial arrangements were such that Mr. Peters paid the mortgage on their home, while Ms. Peters’ employment covered the cost of groceries.

[32] The couple soon learned that they were unable to have children. Accordingly, the decision was made that as a couple they would continue to work full-time, and pay off the home mortgage.

[33] As a truck driver, Mr. Peters is paid by the distance travelled. He also receives a flat fee for unloading cargo. He is entitled to deduct meal expenses.

[34] In 2010 his line 150 income was $70,937.88. His meal deduction was $11,438.46. Accordingly his net income was $59,499.42. In 2011 his line 150 income was $81,159.51. His meal deduction was $10,161.61 for a net income of $70,997.90.

The Parties' Situation and Finances Since the Separation

[35] In 2012 Ms. Peters worked as a cleaner in Edmonton, Alberta, until her return to Ontario. Most recently, she worked at Vermeere for a one month period commencing in October 2014. Ms. Peters has always basically earned a minimum wage.

[36] Ms. Peters receives ODSP in the amount of $841.00 per month. She resides with her parents, rent-free. She estimates her expenses at $450.00 – largely related to personal credit card debt, and the cost to operate her motor vehicle, which she owns outright.

[37] In 2012 Mr. Peters’ line 150 income was $71,682.05. His meal deduction was $10,195.71. Accordingly his net income was $61,486.33. In 2013 his line 150 income was $73,292.22. His meal deduction was $10,295.02 for a net income of $62,997.20. In 2014 his line 150 income was $68,592.91. The meal deduction was $10,084.93 for a net income of $58,507.98.

[38] Mr. Peters’ projected 2015 income is $70,643.52. By taking the average of last three years meal expenses ($10,191.89) his projected net income is $60,451.53.

[39] Mr. Peters detailed his expenses in his financial Statement, sworn February 18, 2015. Including the cost to rent a house in Wyoming, Ontario his monthly expenses are estimated at $5,963.99.

Entitlement- General Principles

[40] The issue of entitlement is the preliminary issue to determine in any spousal support claim.

[41] As the court stated in Thompson v. Thompson 2013 ONSC 5500, [2013] O.J. No. 4001 at para. 54:

The Supreme Court of Canada articulated the fundamental principles respecting entitlement to spousal support in the cases of Moge v. Moge and Bracklow v. Bracklow.³¹ In Moge v. Moge, the court summarized the overall goal of spousal support as being to ensure an equitable sharing of the economic consequences for both parties of the marriage or its breakdown. However, it also emphasized that the entire burden of these consequences should not necessarily fall on the shoulders of one party. The Supreme Court held in both Moge v. Moge and Bracklow v. Bracklow that entitlement to spousal support must be determined in accordance with the terms of the governing legislation, but that the issue should be considered keeping in mind the following three conceptual models upon which entitlement to spousal support may arise: (1) compensatory support, which primarily relates to the first two objectives of the Act; (2) non-compensatory support, which primarily relates to the third and fourth objectives; and (3) contractual support. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal emphasized in Chutter v. Chutter,³² the court is not required to apply one conceptual model of entitlement over the other. In many cases, entitlement may be established on more than one ground.

Compensatory Support

[42] In Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2398 (B.C.C.A.) at paras. 50-53the court stated:

50 Compensatory support is intended to provide redress to the recipient spouse for economic disadvantage arising from the marriage or the conferral of an economic advantage upon the other spouse. The compensatory support principles are rooted in the "independent" model of marriage, in which each spouse is seen to retain economic autonomy in the union, and is entitled to receive compensation for losses caused by the marriage or breakup of the marriage which would not have been suffered otherwise (Bracklow, at paras. 24, 41). The compensatory basis for relief recognizes that sacrifices made by a recipient spouse in assuming primary childcare and household responsibilities often result in a lower earning potential and fewer future prospects of financial success (Moge, at 861-863; Bracklow, at para. 39). In Moge, the Supreme Court of Canada observed, at 867-868:

The most significant economic consequence of marriage or marriage breakdown, however, usually arises from the birth of children. This generally requires that the wife cut back on her paid labour force participation in order to care for the children, an arrangement which jeopardizes her ability to ensure her own income security and independent economic well-being. In such situations, spousal support may be a way to compensate such economic disadvantage.

51 In addition to acknowledging economic disadvantages suffered by a spouse as a consequence of the marriage or its breakdown, compensatory spousal support may also address economic advantages enjoyed by the other partner as a result of the recipient spouse's efforts. As noted in Moge at 864, the doctrine of equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage and marriage breakdown underlying compensatory support "seeks to recognize and account for both the economic disadvantages incurred by the spouse who makes such sacrifices and the economic advantages conferred upon the other spouse" (emphasis added).

52 The Court in Moge discussed the relevance of the parties' standards of living in the context of compensatory support at 870:

Although the doctrine of spousal support which focuses on equitable sharing does not guarantee to either party the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, this standard is far from irrelevant to support entitlement ... As marriage should be regarded as a joint endeavour, the longer the relationship endures, the closer the economic union, the greater will be the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon its dissolution.

[Emphasis added, internal citations omitted.]

53 In W. v. W., 2005 BCSC 1010, 19 R.F.L. (6th) 453, a frequently cited decision in trial decisions in British Columbia, Justice Martinson made the following helpful observation about the interpretation in this province of the emphasized portion in Moge:

[11] In British Columbia this comment in Moge has been interpreted to mean that in long marriages the result will likely be a rough equivalency of standards of living. Doing so recognizes that the longer a marriage lasts, the more intertwined the economic and non-economic lives of the spouses become.

[12] Throughout the marriage, each spouse makes decisions that accommodate the economic and non-economic needs of the other. The decisions include the way in which child care and other family responsibilities will be handled and the way careers will develop. These decisions can have a significant impact upon the income earning ability of each at the time of separation. Yet it is not easy to determine exactly the relationship between these decisions and the consequent benefits and detriments to each spouse. The rough equivalency of standard of living approach has operated as a workable substitute to assess compensatory claims. See for example, Dithurbide v. Dithurbide (1996), 1996 CanLII 1236 (BC SC), 23 R.F.L. (4th) 127 (B.C.S.C.); Rattenbury v. Rattenbury, 2000 BCSC 722; Rinfret v. Rinfret, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2945 (S.C.); O'Neill v. Wolfe (2001), 2001 BCSC 135, 14 R.F.L. (5th) 155 (B.C.S.C.); Walton v. Walton, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1089 (S.C.); Ulrich v. Ulrich, 2003 BCSC 192; and Carr v. Carr (1993), 1993 CanLII 14760 (BC SC), 46 R.F.L. (3d) 326 (B.C.S.C.).

[Emphasis added.]

[43] Based on all of the evidence, I cannot conclude that Ms. Peters’ has a compensatory entitlement to support. She worked throughout the marriage, independently of her husband. The parties did not have children. She was not economically disadvantaged as a result the marriage or her position within it. Both parties are in the same educational position. Further, Ms. Peters had the opportunity to upgrade her education through extended learning and initially sought to do so, but then chose to quit. She continued to work post separation, rented an apartment in Alberta, and conducted herself in an independent fashion. Further, she has testified that it is her intention to work in the future. She stated that she has applied for several jobs and intends to continue to do so.

Non-Compensatory Support – the Fundamental Principles Established in Bracklow v. Bracklow

[44] In my view, the chief issue in this case is whether the Respondent is entitled to non-compensatory support. As the court stated in Fyfe (supra) at para. 47:

[…] The difficult issue which this case squarely raises is whether a non-compensatory claim can arise many years after separation, based on circumstances that did not exist and were not anticipated at separation. This issue was not specifically addressed in Bracklow, and it is a question which trial courts have struggled with since that decision was released[…]

[45] The difficulty in this regard is Ms. Peters’ post-separation diagnosis of paranoid-schizophrenia. As previously noted, the parties separated October 16, 2011. They have lived apart since that date.

[46] Ms. Peters was first diagnosed in Alberta in August 2012, almost one year after the (physical) separation, and almost two years since the parties began living separate and apart within the house. Dr. Guaiana met the Respondent in the fall of 2013 and confirmed the diagnosis.

[47] Ms. Peters worked post-separation, and while currently unemployed, anticipates working again, although that remains to be seen.

[48] She is in receipt of ODSP benefits as a result of a psychiatric illness. She brought an application for spousal support in response to Mr. Peters’ application for a divorce, filed June 24, 2013 – almost two years following the separation.

[49] Mr. Peters testified that at the time of the marriage he was unaware that the Respondent suffered from any mental health issues. He testified that during the marriage he was aware that Ms. Peters had issues with her weight and thyroid, and knew that she saw an endocrinologist. He stated that if she had any issues, they did not affect her ability to work.

[50] Mr. Peters testified that he never went with her to any doctor’s appointments, and that she dealt with her medical issues by herself. He stated that he never knew that she had an issue with depression.

[51] He testified that he learned of Ms. Peters’ Alberta hospitalization approximately one month after the fact, and has no reason to doubt the diagnosis. He has not spoken to her in approximately three years.

CONCLUSION

[52] I accept the principle that a disabled or ill spouse should be entitled to spousal support. This principle accords with the likely expectations the spouses would have held during the course of their marriage and the expectations of society. I do not accept that the principle is applicable in this case.

[53] Mr. Peters testified he had no knowledge nor had Ms. Peters been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia prior to the separation or indeed during the first year of the separation. This evidence is corroborated by the medical records and testimony of Dr. Wjocik and Dr. Guaiana. Further, neither party had contemplated any potential disability of the other spouse during the marriage or upon the breakdown of the marriage.

[54] The timing of the onset of the disability is of importance for I believe that if a disability arises out of a pre-existing condition that existed during the marriage or at the time of breakdown of the marriage, there would exist a connection between the disability and the marriage or its breakdown. The provision for which the non-compensatory basis for support relies reads as follows:

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage

There must be some connection between the economic hardship and the breakdown of the marriage.

[55] As the court stated in Sigurdur v. Wright, [2008] M.J. No. 256 at para 49:

The economic hardship must at least be in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the breakdown of the marriage. The mere existence of a marriage in the past does not give rise to an entitlement to spousal support should a spouse become ill or disabled in the future. Marriage is not a lifetime guarantee for support.

[56] It is most unfortunate that Ms. Peters has been diagnosed with a very serious treatment-resistant illness. However, based on all of the circumstances of this case, I cannot conclude that she has any entitlement to spousal support, be it compensatory or non-compensatory.

[57] Further, it is clear that the interim order of Justice Haines, made September 5, 2014, was made on the basis of limited evidence. Interim orders have been described as orders intended to “provide a reasonably acceptable solution to a difficult problem until trial”: see Sypher v. Sypher (1986), 1986 CanLII 6337 (ON CA), 2 R.F.L. (3d) 413 (C.A.). Justice Haines did not have the opportunity to canvas the issue of “entitlement”, nor did have the opportunity to receive the viva voce evidence.

[58] Mr. Peters was $21,225.00 in arrears of the September 2014 interim order at the date of trial. As I have concluded that there is no entitlement to support, I also conclude that there never was an entitlement to support. However, to order that the Respondent repay the monies paid by the Applicant, would in my view, be harsh in the circumstances of this case.

[59] The order of Justice Haines, dated September 5, 2015 is vacated. The arrears are set at zero. There shall be no support payable by the Applicant to the Respondent.

[60] Divorce Judgment is granted, effective 31 days from today.

[61] Costs of the proceeding are payable by the Respondent, forthwith. If the parties are unable to agree upon quantum, I will receive short written submissions within 60 days.

Justice K. A. Gorman

Justice K. A. Gorman

Released: June 19, 2015

[^1]: This is administered via an injection every four weeks, as Dr. Guaiana was suspicious that Ms. Peters would not voluntarily take the medication because she did not seem to think anything was wrong with her.