His Majesty the King v. Kyle Trepanier, 2026 ONSC 1671

CITATION: R. v. K. TREPANIER, 2026 ONSC 1671

COURT FILE NO.: CR 2023-7

DATE: 2026/03/20

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

KYLE TREPANIER

Defendant

Alexandre Simard, for the Crown

Mark Ertel, for the Defendant

HEARD: January 23, 2026

HOLOWKA J.

reasons for sentence

I. Introduction

1On Thanksgiving Sunday, October 9, 2022, at approximately 9 pm, Frank Poirier and Angelique Lucier travelled eastward in their pickup truck along County Road 17 towards L’Orignal. Concurrently, the defendant, Kyle Trepanier, was operating his vehicle westward on County Road 17 towards Wendover. Mr. Trepanier had spent the day with friends touring eastern Ontario. Emma Roy was present in Mr. Trepanier's vehicle, while other friends of Mr. Trepanier were located in a separate vehicle.

2The night was dark, but the roads were dry, and the highway carried considerable traffic.

3Shortly before the collision, Mr. Trepanier overtook a vehicle heading westbound, then overtook the vehicle driven by his friend, Kyle Trudeau, which had already passed the initial vehicle. At the time of the collision, he was travelling at an exceedingly high rate of speed. He overtook the initial vehicle, which was travelling at approximately 115 km/h, after which he and Mr. Trudeau swiftly accelerated away from it.

4The vehicles operated by Mr. Trepanier and Ms. Lucier converged on a relatively straight segment of roadway. The collision occurred in Ms. Lucier’s eastbound lane after Mr. Trepanier’s vehicle crossed the median line into oncoming lane. Mr. Trepanier was travelling at approximately 190 km/h in a zone with a speed limit of 90 km/h. Following the collision, Ms. Lucier's pickup truck spun 180 degrees, facing back toward Wendover, and came to a stop partly within the southern ditch of County Road 17. Furthermore, Mr. Trepanier’s vehicle deviated from the roadway to the south, entered an agricultural field at high velocity, rolled end over end multiple times, and ultimately came to rest on its roof. The vehicle incurred extensive damage.

5Ms. Lucier, the driver of the pickup truck, sustained injuries, including a fractured wrist and hip trauma. Ms. Roy, a passenger in Mr. Trepanier’s vehicle, suffered multiple injuries, including blunt force injuries to the ribs and sternum, along with numerous internal organ injuries. Tragically, Ms. Roy died later that night because of the injuries incurred in the collision.

6Following a trial, Mr. Trepanier was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous operation of motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

7The sentence I impose today cannot undo the grave consequences resulting from Mr. Trepanier’s driving conduct. However, it reaffirms a message conveyed by Parliament years ago and consistently reiterated by courts nationwide: dangerous driving jeopardizes the safety of all roadway users and constitutes a serious crime. Such conduct typically justifies a substantial custodial sentence, especially in cases where it results in death.

II. The impact on the victims

8Ms. Roy’s family has been deeply affected by her death. She was a vibrant 20-year-old who was loved by her immediate and extended family. Known for her energy and ability to make others feel loved and understood, Ms. Roy's death leaves a lasting impression, reminding them they will never see her grow into more than she already was.

9Her mother, Molly Roy, expressed how her daughter’s death has profoundly affected her personally as well as their family. She articulated her persistent grief and the challenges she faces in advancing each day, noting that family gatherings are significantly impacted due to her inability to share those moments with Ms. Roy. She maintains ongoing therapy sessions to manage her grief.

10Ms. Roy’s sister, Hope Roy-Kennedy, mourns her passing and recalls her as a vibrant person who embraced life to the fullest. She feels her absence has created a significant void in their family.

11Beverley Roy shared her daily sorrow over her grandchild’s death, noting that Thanksgiving will never be joyful again. She also expressed her wish to remain strong to support Ms. Roy's mother, Molly.

12Ms. Roy’s aunt, Shelly Atchison, spoke about the family’s grief. She acknowledged that the criminal process cannot undo what happened, but hopes for some accountability and a step towards healing.

13Wendy Card characterized Ms. Roy’s death as resulting in a permanent and profound void in her life and that of her son. She portrayed Ms. Roy as a beautiful young woman with a promising future, highlighting the significant emotional and psychological impact of her loss.

III. Mr. Trepanier’s background

14A comprehensive pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was prepared and filed during the sentencing proceedings. It greatly assisted in setting out Mr. Trepanier's background.

15Mr. Trepanier is 23 years old and single. He completed secondary school at CPT Minto Secondary School in 2020, graduating with a Red Seal in mechanics. Following graduation, he worked at a mechanic shop and was employed there at the time of the offences.

16At the time of the offences, he was in the early stages of a relationship with Ms. Roy, having been friends for roughly ten months. Since the offences, he has remained on bail without any issues.

17Mr. Trepanier has not been previously convicted of any criminal offence, nor does he have a record for driving offences.

18Mr. Trepanier has a documented history of ADHD, anxiety, and symptoms of depression that existed before the offences. These conditions worsened following the offences. Several healthcare providers have recorded severe depression, clinically significant PTSD symptoms, chronic pain, and intrusive trauma-related thoughts. Psychotherapy notes show he has been engaged and sincere in treatment, but feelings of guilt and shame, along with difficulties in emotional regulation, hinder his progress.

19Mr. Trepanier has notable memory issues and often depends on his mother to verify information. Mr. Trepanier states he cannot recall his life before the offences. He denied any malicious intent and described the incident as a “pure accident". Mr. Trepanier expressed a wish to communicate with the victim’s family, but is unable to do so due to his release conditions.

20The PSR report concludes that Mr. Trepanier presents

[A]s low risk for future criminal behaviour, given his strong social supports, absence of substance misuse, and clear motivation to comply with conditions. The primary concerns relate not to criminality but to mental health stability, functional impairments, and the potential negative impact of any disruption to his treatment or routine. Multiple professionals, psychotherapists, fitness providers, and family express concern that incarceration could destabilize him psychologically and physically, potentially leading to significant setbacks. Overall, [Mr. Trepanier] appears to have been profoundly affected by the index offence, resulting in long-term psychological trauma. He remains motivated to engage in treatment, expresses remorse, and demonstrates behaviour consistent with rehabilitation rather than risk. Considering these factors, community supervision is recommended at this time.

IV. The positions of the Crown and the defence

21Mr. Simard, on behalf of the Crown, requests a sentence of five years' imprisonment. Additionally, he seeks a ten-year driving prohibition effective January 23, 2026, a DNA order, and an order under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, prohibiting communication with Ms. Roy's family and Ms. Lucier and her family.

22Mr. Ertel, representing Mr. Trepanier, submits that the court should impose a conditional sentence of two years less a day. Mr. Trepanier agrees that a DNA order is suitable and asks for a non-communication order to be included in the proposed conditional sentence. Regarding the driving prohibition, Mr. Ertel points out that Mr. Trepanier has been prohibited from driving since the incident, for a total of 27 months at the time of sentencing submissions.

V. The principles of sentencing

A. General principles

23Sentencing is a highly discretionary and individualized process. There is no strict formula for determining the appropriate sentence; instead, judges must consider the unique factors associated with both the offence and the offender to determine a sentence that best aligns with the purpose, objectives, and principles of sentencing.

24The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and to maintain a just, peaceful, and secure society. Accordingly, sanctions for criminal conduct serve to denounce such behaviour; deter it through individual and general deterrence; separate the offender from the community, when necessary; encourage rehabilitation; and cultivate a sense of accountability among offenders: Criminal Code, s. 718.

25The paramount principle guiding sentencing is that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility within the specific circumstances of each case, as outlined in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. In essence, the sentence should correspond to both the gravity of the crime – including the harm caused – and the offender's level of moral blameworthiness in its commission. “The goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction”: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at paras. 10, 12.

26The principles of parity and individualized sentencing also govern the imposition of an appropriate sentence. Still, they are subordinate to the main principle that the sentence must reflect the severity of the offence, the offender's level of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case. The parity principle, outlined in s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code, mandates that offenders in similar circumstances who commit similar offences should receive similar sentences. This principle helps courts ensure that sentences are proportionate. Additionally, individualized sentencing supports this goal by allowing flexibility to tailor sentences based on specific case factors: Parranto, at paras. 11-12.

27Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code provides that sentences should be adjusted based on aggravating and mitigating factors. It outlines specific aggravating circumstances and emphasizes that sentences should be consistent with those given to similar offenders in comparable situations. The law also advises that consecutive sentences should not be unduly long, and that offenders should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions are appropriate. Furthermore, it requires considering all reasonable sanctions besides imprisonment that align with the harm caused to victims or the community.

28In every case, determining an appropriate sentence is a fact-specific exercise, not a purely mathematical calculation. The gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility, the specific circumstances of the case, and the offender’s circumstances all must be considered by the sentencing judge: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 58.

B. The offences of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm

29The offence for which Mr. Trepanier has been convicted, namely, dangerous driving causing death, is subject to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Before 2018, the maximum penalty was limited to 14 years of imprisonment.

30Mr. Trepanier has also been found guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. When the Crown elects to proceed by indictment, the maximum penalty is a term of imprisonment not exceeding 14 years. Before December 2018, the maximum sentence was ten years' imprisonment.

31In that year, Parliament amended the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning driving offences, thereby increasing the maximum penalty for the offence of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. This legislative amendment conveyed that dangerous driving resulting in death is regarded as an offence of the highest seriousness. The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently reaffirmed that the increase in the maximum penalty reflects Parliament’s intention that sentences related to dangerous driving causing death should be increased: see R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, 177 O.R. (3d) 327, at paras. 63-64.

32In the preamble to the Bill, Parliament expressed concern that dangerous and impaired driving injure or kill thousands of people in Canada each year. It stated that dangerous driving and impaired driving are always unacceptable in all circumstances. Parliament also made clear its aim to deter offences related to operating vehicles, especially dangerous driving and impaired driving. Notably, the 2018 amendments treat impaired driving – the criminal offence whose seriousness has been recognized by the public for many decades and for which penalties have increased – and dangerous driving as criminal offences that must be taken seriously, rather than mere violations of driving rules: R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 5922, at paras. 24-31, aff’d 2026 ONCA 27, at paras. 25-26.

33A new statement of principles was added to the Criminal Code in s. 320.12, including that operating a conveyance is a privilege that can be limited in the interest of public safety, and that protecting society is best served by deterring individuals from operating conveyances dangerously, as such conduct threatens the life, health, and safety of Canadians.

VI. Analysis

34Denunciation and deterrence are normally the primary goals in sentencing for dangerous driving causing death: Lojovic, at para. 65. The sentence I impose must condemn what Mr. Trepanier has done and send a warning message to others.

35The sentence I impose must promote denunciation and generally deter the dangerous operation of motor vehicles. I have no doubt that there is no need to impose a sentence specifically aimed at deterring Mr. Trepanier. The PSR report shows the significant impact the offences have had on him. It is evident that Mr. Trepanier understands the enormity of the consequences of his actions.

36However, I am concerned that Mr. Trepanier lacks insight into his conduct when he states that he posed no malicious intent and that it was a “pure accident”. Mr. Trepanier’s choice to make more than one passing manoeuvre and then drive at 190 km/h on a dark, busy road was dangerous and resulted in Ms. Roy’s death and bodily harm to Ms. Lucier. It cannot fairly or accurately be called a “pure accident”. Still, I believe that specific deterrence is not a significant factor in this case.

37Similarly, I am confident that any sentence I impose will neither enhance nor hinder Mr. Trepanier’s prospects for rehabilitation, as the robust support from his family and Mr. Trepanier’s motivation to participate in treatment are positive indicators for his rehabilitative potential.

38The circumstances of cases of dangerous driving causing death vary significantly. No two cases are alike. The sentence must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. While the Court of Appeal has declined to identify a sentencing range for dangerous driving causing death, it has clarified that five years’ imprisonment is not the top of the range: Lojovic, at para. 64.

39Crown and defence counsel referred to numerous sentencing decisions in cases of dangerous driving causing death. I have reviewed all of them, as well as others, though I will not refer to each one. The sentences for dangerous driving causing death vary widely, from conditional or mid-range reformatory sentences at the lower end, to double-digit penitentiary terms at the higher end. This represents a very broad spectrum. The specific position within that range depends on the circumstances of each offence and the individual offender. To determine where this case falls within that range, I am guided by the Court of Appeal’s statement in R. v. Linden (2000), 2000 15854 (ON CA), 147 C.C.C. (3d) 299 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 3:

[T]he particular offence is very much driven by individual factors, especially the blameworthiness of the conduct. The more that the conduct tends toward demonstrating a deliberate endangerment of other users of the road and pedestrians, the more serious the offence and the more likely that a lengthy prison term will be required.

40In Lojovic, the Court of Appeal reduced a sentence for dangerous driving causing death to five years of imprisonment – in addition to consecutive sentences for failing to remain causing death and breach of probation – for an offender who deliberately drove atrociously and dangerously for a sustained period, striking and killing a pedestrian while experiencing a mental health episode. Mr. Lojovic had two prior criminal convictions for serious driving offences. The gravity of Mr. Trepanier’s offence and his moral blameworthiness are much less than those in Mr. Lojovic’s case.

41In R. v Kotula, 2025 ONSC 2388, Akhtar J. sentenced the offender to six and a half years after being convicted of two counts of dangerous operation causing death and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The charges stemmed from dangerous driving in a residential area and rear-ending another vehicle, which triggered a chain reaction that cost two lives and injured two others. Mr. Kotula had no prior criminal record, had family support, and faced immigration consequences. Notably, he was suspended from driving at the time of the offences. The consequences of Mr. Kotula’s offences were greater than those caused by Mr. Trepanier. The severity and moral blameworthiness of Mr. Trepanier’s offences are less than those in Mr. Kotula’s case.

42In R. v. Gomez, 2025 ONSC 2039, Ricchetti J. sentenced the offender to six years for dangerous driving causing death and four years for dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The offences involved Mr. Gomez, who was driving approximately 100 km/h over the posted speed limit, striking a left-turning vehicle, injuring the driver and killing the passenger. While Mr. Gomez had family support and no criminal record, the facts surrounding the offences of Mr. Gomez were much more serious than those committed by Mr. Trepanier, as Mr. Gomez had consumed alcohol and had a blood-alcohol concentration between 53 and 105 mgs of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, as well as a lengthy record for driving offences. Justice Ricchetti also found that Mr. Gomez’s remorse was questionable.

43Recently, in Georgopoulos, the Court of Appeal affirmed a two and a half year sentence of imprisonment imposed on an offender convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The driver was demonstrating the power of his expensive new sports car by rapidly accelerating along the right side of a Toronto streetcar to overtake it, then ran out of space and collided at high speed with a parked vehicle in the curbside lane. His passenger sustained permanent and catastrophic injuries. Mr. Georgopoulos had no criminal record, no relevant driving violations, and a strong employment history. He also had a family and substantial community support. Since Mr. Georgopoulos’s dangerous driving was intentional conduct aimed at displaying his vehicle, his moral blameworthiness is similar to that of Mr. Trepanier, who was driving at excessive speed with his friend, even though the consequences were less severe.

44In R. v. Hamilton, 2025 ONCA 887, the Court of Appeal affirmed a four-year sentence of imprisonment imposed on a driver of an overweight commercial vehicle. The vehicle was operated above the speed limit on a residential street where the driver was not permitted to be, and the driver failed to stop at a stop sign, resulting in a collision with another vehicle that caused the death of the other driver. The Court of Appeal concluded, on an appeal by the accused, that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit. The gravity of Mr. Trepanier’s offence and his moral blameworthiness are marginally less than those present in Mr. Hamilton’s case.

45In R. v. Kuzio, 2025 ONSC 2654, the offender was sentenced to three and a half years' imprisonment after operating a vehicle at a high speed through traffic, engaging in a race with another vehicle. Mr. Kuzio lost control of his vehicle and collided with an oncoming vehicle, resulting in the death of the driver. The offender had no prior criminal or driving record and was young. He was described positively in a PSR, with the report writer advising that the offender was deemed suitable for community service. Furthermore, Mr. Kuzio sustained serious injuries in the collision, including a brain injury and multiple fractures.

46The gravity of Mr. Trepanier’s offences cannot be understated. His dangerous driving caused the death of a wonderful woman and devastated her many family members and others who have suffered a terrible loss. They will experience the effects of Mr. Trepanier’s criminal offence forever. The loss of Ms. Roy’s life is a loss to the community as a whole.

47Mr. Trepanier's driving also resulted in bodily harm to Ms. Lucier, who still experiences the aftermath of this conduct. It is crucial not to underestimate the severity of this offence, especially given the focus on Ms. Roy's death.

48Other aggravating features of this case include:

a. The excessively high speed at which Mr. Trepanier was travelling – on a dark and busy road, with speeds around 100 km/h in excess of the speed limit – was inherently dangerous; and

b. This was a deliberate and sustained course of conduct by Mr. Trepanier. He passed Ms. Milicic on the roadway when she was already travelling in excess of the speed limit by approximately 15 km/h. He then proceeded to pass his friend, Mr. Trudeau, who had already passed Ms. Milicic. The two then accelerated away from Ms. Milicic.

49Mr. Ertel submits that a conditional sentence meets the ends of justice and that Mr. Trepanier does not pose a risk to the community. His submissions are not without merit, but having regard to the gravity of Mr. Trepanier’s offence, a sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary is necessary. However, having regard to Mr. Trepanier’s youth, lack of record, positive PSR report, and taking into account the principle of restraint, I do not think that a sentence of five years’ imprisonment, as sought by the Crown, is required to denounce his offences or to generally deter others.

50The mitigating features of this case that must be considered include: (i) Mr. Trepanier’s otherwise prosocial life as a contributing member of the community; and (ii) Mr. Trepanier’s strong family support and reasonably good rehabilitative prospects.

51I observe that this sentencing takes place subsequent to a trial. Mr. Trepanier is not entitled to claim the mitigating benefit of remorse that arises from an acceptance of responsibility. A statement describing the incident as without “any malicious intent” or a “pure accident” does not demonstrate remorse.

52An appropriate sentence that appropriately balances the competing interests in this case, considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is three years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently on both counts.

53Had I determined that a sentence of less than two years was appropriate in this case, a conditional sentence, to be served in the community, would have been available. However, a conditional sentence would not be appropriate in this case. An actual custodial sentence is necessary because of the nature and circumstances of this particular offence, the harm that was done, and the need to adequately denounce and deter dangerous driving.

54In addition to the custodial sentence, Mr. Trepanier is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle anywhere in Canada for a period of eight years, commencing on January 23, 2026, taking into account the time he has already been restricted from driving under release conditions.

55Given the agreement of the parties, a DNA order shall be issued for the taking of a sample of Mr. Trepanier’s DNA for inclusion in the DNA data bank.

56Finally, an order pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code shall be issued, prohibiting Mr. Trepanier from contacting or communicating with any member of the family of Ms. Roy or with Ms. Lucier or her family during the period of his incarceration.

The Honourable Justice Brian Holowka

Released: March 20, 2026

CITATION: R. v. K. TREPANIER, 2026 ONSC 1671