Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff, Rana Alsous, claimed a beneficial interest in a property (227 Rymal Road) held in the names of the defendants, Bishara and Duaa Hadweh, asserting it was purchased with her funds or gifted to her.

The defendants contended the property was beneficially owned by their father, Ibrahim, who provided the funds for an earlier property (536 Upper Sherman Avenue) which was then used for Rymal Road.

The court found that Ibrahim provided the funds for Upper Sherman, and Rana held it in a resulting trust for him, failing to rebut this presumption.

Consequently, the proceeds from Upper Sherman, used for Rymal Road, also belonged to Ibrahim, and the defendants held Rymal Road in trust for him.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The applicants, Greenwin Inc. and Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, sought a declaration that St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company was obligated to fund 50% of an $18.75 million settlement for Greenwin's share of property damages in a subrogated claim by Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC).

The court dismissed the application, finding that St. Paul did not deny coverage or breach its policy, and that the owned property exclusion applied, precluding coverage for damage to TCHC's property.

The court also found that the applicants failed to obtain St. Paul's consent to the settlement, breaching a fundamental term of the insurance contract, and denied relief from forfeiture.

This decision concerns a costs award following a successful application for partition and sale.

The applicant, Sukhminder Sidhu, who was fully successful at trial, sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $43,000.

The respondents, Parminder and Amandeep Sidhu, who had brought an unsuccessful cross-application for unjust enrichment, did not make any submissions on costs.

The court, exercising its broad discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the claimed costs to be reasonable, considering factors such as the complexity of the matter, the conduct of the parties, and the reasonableness of counsel's hourly rate.

The respondents were ordered to pay the full amount jointly and severally.

The plaintiff purchaser failed to close a real estate transaction after being unable to secure financing.

The defendant vendor subsequently sold the property for a higher price and brought a summary judgment motion to retain the $70,000 deposit.

The plaintiff sought relief from forfeiture, arguing she lacked capacity due to mental health struggles when signing the agreement.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding no inequality of bargaining power or improvident bargain, and ordered the deposit forfeited.

The applicant sought a declaration that their tenancy was governed by the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) and to continue an interim injunction against lockout.

The respondent sought a declaration that the Commercial Tenancies Act (CTA) applied and an order for possession.

The court applied the "predominant purpose" test under RTA s. 5(j) and s. 202, considering all circumstances including the actual use of the premises, the parties' intentions, and the landlord's knowledge.

The court found the tenancy's predominant purpose was residential, thus the RTA applied, and the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving the s. 5(j) exemption.

The plaintiff, Atlas Copco Canada Inc., brought a motion for contempt of a Mareva injunction against Dirk Johannes Plate and Maria Van Noorden Plate for selling properties despite court orders.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking a stay of action against Mr. Plate and dismissal of the action against Mrs. Plate.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's contempt motion, finding no intentional breach by the defendants due to the plaintiff's own non-compliance with the orders and lack of pursuit of real property claims.

Mr. Plate's cross-motion for a stay was dismissed, as the plaintiff was entitled to set off appeal costs against Mr. Plate's restitution debt.

Mrs. Plate's cross-motion to dismiss the action against her was granted on the grounds of merger of claims and, alternatively, inordinate and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff causing prejudice.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce personal guarantees signed by the defendants for loans made to a now-bankrupt corporate borrower.

Three of the defendants brought competing summary judgment motions seeking to discharge their guarantees, arguing they lacked independent legal advice and that the bank acted in a commercially unreasonable manner.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the defendants' motions, finding the guarantees valid and enforceable.

The court held that the lack of independent legal advice did not invalidate the guarantees absent unconscionability or misrepresentation, and the express terms of the guarantees precluded the commercially unreasonable realization defence.

The defendants' counterclaims were also dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion where the applicant's claim for security for spousal support was dismissed.

The respondent sought full recovery costs, alleging bad faith and unreasonable behaviour by the applicant, and relying on an offer to settle.

The court found the applicant guilty of bad faith for intentionally sabotaging the respondent's personal injury claim and misrepresenting employment facts to the court.

Applying r. 24(8) of the Family Law Rules, the court ordered full recovery costs.

Despite the respondent claiming over $22,000, the court fixed the costs at $15,000, emphasizing that even full recovery costs must be reasonable and proportionate, and requiring a detailed breakdown of hours spent.

The respondent, Larry Bruni, brought a motion to change seeking to terminate his child support obligations for his two children, Taylor (22) and Brandon (19), and to recover alleged overpayments.

The applicant, Catherine Bruni, sought ongoing child support and contribution to extraordinary expenses.

The court determined that Brandon remained a "child of the marriage" until April 2020, and Taylor for specific periods (May-August 2018 and January 2019-April 2020), with a gap from January 2016 to August 2017.

Ongoing child support was set at $915 per month for both children based on the father's 2018 income.

The court found the father had overpaid child support by $7,071 for prior periods.

The father was ordered to contribute to post-secondary education expenses and other extraordinary expenses, with a 40% share for the father, 26.67% for the mother, and 33.33% for the children for college fees.

After offsetting the overpayment, the father was ordered to pay the mother $3,935.80 for past expenses.

The Applicant sought to enforce an informal handwritten settlement document signed by the parties regarding property and support issues.

The Respondent argued it was merely a framework.

The court applied contract law principles, finding that the document lacked an essential term regarding the method and timing of the $650,000 payment.

Despite the parties' subjective belief of a final agreement, an objective assessment of their conduct revealed an "agreement to agree" on this crucial term.

Consequently, the document was deemed unenforceable, and the Applicant's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, requiring the matter to proceed to a full trial.

The court also found that the formal requirements of s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act were met, as the agreement was in writing, signed, and witnessed by sworn testimony.

In a personal injury action, the plaintiff objected to the defendants' attempt to introduce evidence and arguments suggesting that the plaintiff's receipt of collateral benefits was relevant to her motivation to work and her actual disability.

The court sustained the plaintiff's objection, ruling that such considerations were speculative and lacked relevance to the determination of disability.

The decision emphasized that while collateral benefits are relevant for calculating offsets, they should not be used to imply a lack of motivation to work or to undermine claims of disability.

Echelon Environmental Inc. sought to vary a costs disposition in its favour, requesting substantial indemnity costs after an Offer to Settle, arguing its judgment was greater than the offer.

The target defendant, Jeda Rose Management Inc., opposed this.

The court found Echelon's Offer to Settle lacked clarity regarding pre-judgment interest calculation and that the $2,000 discount from the judgment amount did not fulfill the incentive to settlement under Rule 49.10.

The court exercised its discretion under Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, refusing to apply Rule 49.10 and maintaining the original costs award of $22,500.00.

The defendants Robert Stewart and Indicom Appraisal Associates Ltd. brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs, Correct Building Corporation and Correct Group Inc., claimed damages under various causes of action, including civil conspiracy, negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, unlawful interference with economic relations, and inducing breach of contract, stemming from an appraisal of the Allandale Station lands prepared for the City of Barrie.

The court dismissed the claims for civil conspiracy and negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, finding no genuine issue for trial.

However, the court found genuine issues requiring a mini-trial for the remaining claims (negligence, inducing breach of contract, wrongful interference with economic relations) concerning the limitation period and the enforceability of the Preliminary Agreement, particularly regarding the role of an agent and the impact of environmental/archaeological issues on property value.

The applicant father brought a motion for contempt against the respondent mother for unilaterally relocating their three children more than 50 kilometres from Hamilton, contrary to a final mediated agreement and court order, and for restricting his access.

The mother brought a cross-motion for custody and transfer of proceedings, asserting she believed the order was withdrawn and alleging an assault by the father.

The court found the mother in contempt, rejected her justifications and assault allegations, and found her actions detrimental to the children's interests.

The court varied the previous order, granting primary residence of the children to the father and ordering an Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation.

The Ontario Psychological Association (OPA) sued its former employee, Charlotte Mardonet, for misappropriating over $1.6 million.

Mardonet counterclaimed against the OPA and its individual officers and directors, seeking contribution and indemnity based on their alleged failure to supervise her.

The individual officers and directors moved to strike these paragraphs of the counterclaim, arguing they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that officers and directors owe no duty of care or fiduciary duty to an employee to protect them from their own wrongdoing.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from three consolidated legal actions and subsequent motions following a lengthy trial.

The primary issue was whether the Estate of Albert Curé was entitled to substantial indemnity costs from Helen Kilitzoglou and Life Line Manufacturing Inc. The court found that the Estate's offers to settle did not meet the criteria under Rule 49.10(2) for cost consequences, nor did they justify substantial indemnity under Rule 57.01.

While allegations of civil conspiracy were not found to warrant substantial indemnity due to the high-conflict nature and mutual responsibility, unsubstantiated allegations of fraud regarding an $800,000 dividend and improper receiver appointment were deemed reprehensible.

Considering the divided success, with the Estate being substantially more successful overall, the court awarded the Estate 50% of its partial indemnity costs, plus a $5,000 premium for the fraud allegations.

The insured sought a declaration that his home insurer was required to defend and indemnify him in a personal injury action arising from a cycling accident with a pedestrian.

The insurer had denied coverage by letter and the insured commenced an action nearly three years later.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered whether the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The insured argued that an additional policy condition created ambiguity and delayed the limitation period until the underlying action was resolved.

The court rejected that interpretation, holding the condition applied only to indemnification claims and not to the duty to defend.

The action against the insurer was therefore commenced out of time.

The moving defendants sought costs of a motion following reasons previously released awarding them costs of a discontinued action but not addressing the motion itself.

The responding plaintiff argued that the absence of a costs provision meant no costs were payable and that the court was functus officio.

The court rejected both arguments, holding that because no formal order had yet been issued and entered, the court retained jurisdiction to address costs.

Applying the principles of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1.1) and the cost factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the claimed amount and fixed enhanced costs at $8,000 payable by the plaintiff.

Following a successful application by a condominium corporation to enforce compliance with the Condominium Act, 1998 and the corporation’s declaration regarding exclusive use rights to sell fresh meat and poultry, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The corporation sought recovery of its legal costs pursuant to s. 134(5) of the Act, which allows a condominium corporation to recover both court-awarded costs and additional actual costs incurred in obtaining a compliance order.

The respondents argued that they should not bear responsibility for the costs or that liability should fall on the other respondent.

The court held that the policy behind s. 134(5) shifts the financial burden of obtaining compliance orders to the offending unit owner or occupier.

The full amount of the claimed legal costs was found reasonable and awarded, with the owner liable for the total amount but entitled to recover half from the tenant.

The plaintiff sought certification of a proposed national class action alleging that a prescription smoking‑cessation drug caused neuropsychiatric adverse events and that the manufacturer breached its duty to warn consumers and physicians.

The court considered the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including whether there was some basis in fact for the proposed common issues and whether a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

The court held that there was some basis in fact for a duty to warn claim against the Canadian manufacturer based on expert and anecdotal evidence of adverse psychiatric events.

The proposed class definition and common issues were amended to focus on specific neuropsychiatric symptoms and the adequacy of product monograph warnings between 2007 and 2010.

The proceeding was certified against the Canadian manufacturer but not against the U.S. parent company, whose involvement lacked a factual basis.