Sandra Nishikawa

The defendant, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to stay an order dated August 4, 2017.

Following the Divisional Court's dismissal of Ontario's motion for leave to appeal on October 3, 2017, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion to stay as moot.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the disposition of the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $132,992.26 after successfully opposing the defendants' motions to quash summonses.

The defendants argued that costs should be reserved to the disposition of upcoming summary judgment motions, or alternatively that the costs claimed were excessive.

The court found that the plaintiffs' costs outline did not sufficiently delineate the time spent on the motions to quash versus other related motions.

Due to the lack of required facts and detailed submissions, the court reserved the costs of the motions to quash to the hearing of the motions for summary judgment.

The defendants, Ontario and OLG, brought motions to quash summonses to witness served by the plaintiffs on 13 non-parties, including former and current Cabinet ministers, in advance of pending summary judgment motions.

The plaintiffs sought to examine these witnesses under Rule 39.03 regarding the cancellation of the Slots at Race Tracks Program (SARP).

The court held that the defendants had standing to challenge the summonses and that the plaintiffs had met the low threshold of showing the proposed witnesses might have relevant evidence.

The court rejected arguments that the examinations were an abuse of process or barred by Cabinet confidentiality at this stage.

However, the court quashed the summonses served on Premier Kathleen Wynne and Minister Ted McMeekin on the basis of parliamentary privilege, as they were sitting members of the legislature.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ) sought an order to enforce an agreement between counsel to delay examinations under Rule 39.03 pending a motion to quash summonses, or alternatively, to stay the summonses.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test for a stay, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the quashing of summonses and the standing of HMQ/OLG to quash summonses for unrepresented witnesses.

The court determined that proceeding with examinations would cause irreparable harm to HMQ's legal interests by rendering the motion to quash moot.

The balance of convenience favoured HMQ, and the motion to stay the summonses was granted.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding a freedom of information request for an OPP investigation report.

The Commissioner had found that the Ministry repeatedly failed to properly exercise its discretion under the law enforcement exemption, but closed the appeal file claiming he was functus officio and had no further recourse.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding he erred in law by misapprehending the scope of a prior Supreme Court of Canada remittal order.

The Court remitted the matter back to the Commissioner and issued a declaration that the Ministry had disregarded the Commissioner's proper directions regarding its exercise of discretion.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on disability after a Justice of the Peace denied his request for an adjournment of a traffic court trial and convicted him in absentia.

The respondents argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the application at a preliminary stage, finding it plain and obvious that the complaint was barred by the doctrine of adjudicative immunity, which protects judicial decision-makers from legal proceedings based on their adjudicative actions.

The appellant child care centre brought a motion to stay a Protection Order issued by the Director under the Child Care and Early Years Act, 2014, which suspended its operations due to alleged inappropriate infant feeding practices.

The Tribunal first determined it had the ancillary authority under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and its home statute to grant an interim stay, despite the Act's silence on staying suspensions.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Tribunal found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the appellant's business, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay because the appellant had already eliminated the imminent threat by suspending the involved staff and closing the infant room.

The motion for a stay was granted.

An agricultural industry association sought a stay of a provincial regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid‑treated seeds pending further compliance time, arguing farmers would suffer economic harm due to regulatory timing requirements.

The province opposed and brought a cross‑motion to strike the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that injunctive relief against the Crown is highly restricted and unavailable absent circumstances such as deliberate flouting of the law, which were not present.

Even if relief were available, the applicant failed to meet the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay because the alleged harm was speculative and compensable in damages and the balance of convenience favoured environmental protection.

The court also held the application improperly sought to rewrite or delay the operation of a regulation rather than determine legal rights and therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The defendant Ministry moved to strike a negligence claim arising from the death of a child at an unlicensed private-home daycare after the Ministry had received multiple complaints about excessive numbers of children and had sent a warning letter but allegedly failed to follow up.

The court held that on a motion to strike it was required to accept the pleaded facts as true and determine only whether it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

Applying the duty of care framework and authorities on proximity in claims against public actors, the court found it was arguable that the pleaded facts could establish proximity and foreseeability sufficient to support a private law duty of care.

The claim was novel, but the uncertainties could not be resolved at the pleadings stage and required a full record at trial.

The respondent, Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), brought a motion to strike the applicant's application for declaratory relief, arguing that as a non-corporate statutory entity, it lacked the capacity to be sued.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing prior case law that barred actions for damages against FSCO.

The court held that because the applicant sought declaratory relief rather than damages, the application could proceed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board dismissing its Requests for Hearing regarding the removal of vascular ultrasound services from its licences.

The Board had dismissed the requests due to an inordinate 15-year delay causing prejudice, and found the requests moot because the appellant failed to comply with Minutes of Settlement that provided a mechanism to restore the services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and its application of the test for administrative delay correct.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application for judicial review, the court received written costs submissions from the respondent Ministry.

The applicant did not provide submissions.

The court found the Ministry's requested costs to be fair and reasonable, awarding partial indemnity costs in the amount of $6,275.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its application for judicial review of a ministerial order prohibiting public access to certain Crown lands adjacent to Bala Falls for safety reasons.

It argued that the site was subject to a protected portage under s. 65(4) of the Public Lands Act and that s. 3 required the frontage to be set aside for recreational and access purposes.

The court held that s. 28 of the Public Lands Act is not subject to ss. 3 or 65(4), and that the minister's decision to restrict access was reasonable given the public safety concerns.

The court also held that the common law right of navigation does not include a right to portage over another's land.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to each respondent.

Family members of a deceased victim brought a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act alleging that police breached a duty of care by failing to arrest an intoxicated offender with a known history of violence who later killed the victim.

The defendant moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim on the basis that police owed no private law duty of care to the deceased or his relatives.

The court held that plaintiffs bringing derivative claims under s. 61 need only establish that a duty of care was owed to the deceased, not directly to the relatives.

Applying the Cooper-Anns framework, the court concluded it was not plain and obvious that foreseeability and proximity could not be established based on the pleaded facts, including the police's alleged knowledge of the offender’s past violence against the victim and their shared residence.

Residual policy considerations did not clearly negate a prima facie duty of care at the pleadings stage.

The appellant private career college appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Superintendent to refuse to renew its registration.

The Tribunal's decision was based on findings related to student refunds and compliance issues.

The Divisional Court found that there was ample evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant failed to operate the college in accordance with the law and with honesty and integrity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, commercial motor vehicle operators, sought a mandatory injunction or stay of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to downgrade their safety ratings from 'Satisfactory' to 'Conditional'.

The applicants argued the Registrar erred by using a kilometric measure and by attributing the same rating to an associated company.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the Registrar acted within his statutory authority and did not breach procedural fairness.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in highway safety over the applicants' pecuniary interests.

The applicant applied for a school purposes bus licence.

The Ministry of Transportation deferred the decision until the applicant's outstanding criminal charges were resolved.

The applicant sought judicial review to overturn the deferral or compel a decision.

The Divisional Court found the application was not premature but held that the Minister's decision to defer was reasonable given the safety concerns arising from the outstanding charges, which included possession of a switchblade and possession of controlled drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought an application under the Civil Remedies Act for the civil forfeiture of a residential property and a vehicle, alleging they were instruments of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking.

The court found that both the property and the vehicle were instruments of unlawful activity.

However, the application was dismissed.

The court held that the owner of the vehicle was a 'responsible owner' who took reasonable steps to prevent its unlawful use.

Regarding the real property, although the owner failed to establish the responsible owner exception, the court found that forfeiture was clearly not in the interests of justice due to the Attorney General's unexplained six-year delay in bringing the application, during which the owner unwittingly built up equity in the property.

The moving parties sought exemption from attending examinations for discovery on medical grounds.

The court considered the prima facie right of a party to examine adverse parties under Rule 31.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirement that any exemption be supported by compelling medical evidence.

The medical notes provided were vague and lacked detail regarding the alleged inability to participate in discovery or the specific risks posed by the process.

The court held that the moving parties failed to discharge their burden to justify exemption from discovery.

The motion was dismissed, though the court permitted reasonable accommodations during discovery to mitigate potential health concerns.