Samuel Greene

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted William Craig Robson’s motion for release pending appeal and a partial stay of his driving prohibition after his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and raised significant legal issues, including the definition of “public” under s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code and causation in the context of dangerous off-road activities.

The court concluded that Robson did not pose a risk to public safety and that his continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings in a sexual assault case, finding that the premature disclosure of defence materials to the complainant’s counsel was an innocent error and did not result in prejudice to trial fairness.

The court held that a stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy reserved for the clearest of cases and that alternative remedies were available.

The matter was remitted for trial before a different judge.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving.

At trial, the appellant brought applications alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 11(b) Charter rights, which the trial judge dismissed by largely adopting the Crown's submissions without providing independent analysis or factual findings.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons on both Charter applications were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a physician, appealed his conviction on three counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered grounds including the admission and use of cross-count similar act evidence, the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons, errors in credibility and reliability assessment, and the trial judge's treatment of prior consistent statements and motive to fabricate.

The Court found no errors in the trial judge's handling of similar act evidence, the sufficiency of reasons, or the credibility assessments.

It also found no error in the application of the totality principle in sentencing.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged his convictions for firearm and drug trafficking offences, and his 10-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in determining the scope of a s. 10(b) Charter breach (right to counsel).

The appellant contended that the delay in facilitating his lawyer call began earlier, at the point of arrest by Toronto Police Service (TPS), rather than only upon arrival at the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) station.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the initial delay by TPS was justified due to ongoing public and officer safety concerns and evidence preservation tasks.

The court concluded that the s. 10(b) breach only commenced at the DRPS station, as found by the trial judge, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant, Nicholas Doering, brought a second appeal against his conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life, after the Court of Appeal had previously affirmed his guilt on that charge and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in not re-opening the case to allow new legal arguments on his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to re-open the case as the matter was remitted for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the issue of guilt was res judicata and the current appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on its previous order, emphasizing the principle of finality in the appellate process.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Pedro Hechavarria-Tapia, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for serious intimate partner violence.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's findings of fact regarding the appellant's treatability and willingness to engage in rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample support in the record for the sentencing judge's conclusions that the appellant was intractable and unwilling to be treated for the relevant conditions, despite some superficial engagement with probation officers and past program enrollment.

The offender, a police officer, was found guilty of failing to provide necessaries of life after a conviction for criminal negligence causing death was quashed on appeal.

The court addressed the defence's application to re-open the case and decline conviction on the remaining charge, which was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.

The court then proceeded to sentence the offender for failing to provide necessaries of life, imposing an 18-month conditional sentence, considering the reduced moral blameworthiness after the criminal negligence conviction was overturned, and the offender's mental health and the harsher impact of custody on a former police officer.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his drug dealing partner.

At trial, he claimed self-defence, abandoning his initial statements to police that the victim was killed during a robbery by unknown intruders.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter delay application, excluding expert evidence on 'fight or flight' syndrome, and admitting statements made to police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay or expert evidence rulings, but held that the appellant was psychologically detained at the police station earlier than the trial judge found.

The failure to advise him of his right to counsel violated ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, requiring exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from a fatal group assault.

The primary appellant, convicted of murder as the stabber, sought to introduce fresh expert evidence and challenged the trial judge's instructions on identification and a key witness.

The co-appellants, convicted of manslaughter, argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, specifically regarding whether the stabbing was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding the jury instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the law of causation and the requirements for assessing witness credibility.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a third child pornography conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the two-stage Proulx framework, specifically by not determining an appropriate sentence of less than two years and by not assessing the danger to the community or consistency with sentencing principles (denunciation and deterrence).

Given the respondent's repetitive conduct and lack of genuine rehabilitation, the conditional sentence was deemed manifestly unfit.

The appeal was allowed, and a three-year penitentiary sentence was substituted, with credit for pre-sentence custody, time on house arrest bail, and time served on the conditional sentence.

The appellant, convicted of breaking and entering, sought to re-open his dismissed appeal and admit fresh evidence, including his own and his co-accused's affidavits denying his participation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the fresh evidence not reasonably capable of belief due to inconsistencies, implausibilities, and contradictions with trial counsel's evidence and physical evidence.

The court emphasized the finality principle in re-opening appeals and the high threshold for admitting fresh evidence.

The appellant, convicted of dangerous driving and arson, appealed only the arson conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the cause of the fire, specifically in excluding the possibility that a cigarette accidentally caused it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to accept or reject expert testimony and to conclude, based on the evidence, that the fire was intentionally set by the appellant.

The appellant, A.A., appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing that the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainant's life was endangered and that the evidence did not support such a finding.

The conviction stemmed from an incident where A.A. sprinkled ignitable fluid on the complainant's hair while holding a lit torch.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the actus reus of aggravated assault, specifically "endangerment of life," was met.

The court found there was a "realistic possibility" that the complainant's hair would ignite, even if the appellant's intent was merely to scare.

The court affirmed that the mens rea for aggravated assault was also established, as the risk of bodily harm from the dangerous conduct was objectively foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning convictions and sentencing.

Counsel for both the appellant and the Crown agreed that the matter should be remitted to the trial judge for sentencing on the failure to provide necessaries charge.

The Court ordered the remittal.

The appellant, a police officer, arrested an individual who was highly intoxicated by methamphetamine.

He later transferred custody to the OPP without seeking medical assistance, and the individual subsequently died of methamphetamine toxicity.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of failing to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing death.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life, finding the appellant's failure to seek medical assistance was a marked departure from the standard of care.

However, the Court quashed the conviction for criminal negligence causing death, concluding that the trial judge's finding that the appellant deliberately misled the OPP was unreasonable and that causation was not established.

The appellant was convicted of possessing and making child pornography and received a conditional sentence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a position of trust and in failing to apply the private use exception to sexting.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the finding of a position of trust and declining to expand the private use exception to include sexting.

While agreeing that the conditional sentence was unfit and a carceral sentence should have been imposed, the court dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal due to the appellant having largely served the conditional sentence, deeming it inappropriate to substitute a carceral term at that stage.