Robert J. Sharpe

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for a share of profits made by the respondent from the purchase and resale of a recreational property.

At trial, the appellant claimed an agreement to jointly purchase and market the property, which the trial judge rejected.

On appeal, the appellant argued breach of fiduciary duty and sought 100% of the profits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that breach of fiduciary duty was not pleaded at trial, the record did not support an agency or fiduciary relationship, and the appellant had repudiated his agreement to purchase the property before the respondent resold it.

The applicants challenged a City of Toronto by-law imposing an annual tax on third-party signs, arguing it was an ultra vires indirect tax, discriminatory, and that existing signs were grandfathered under the City of Toronto Act.

The application judge upheld the by-law but found existing signs were grandfathered and granted a sealing order over the applicants' financial information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeals, finding the tax was direct and not discriminatory.

The Court allowed the City's cross-appeal, holding that the grandfathering provision applies only to regulatory by-laws, not taxing by-laws, and that the sealing order was unjustified under the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a California default judgment against him.

He argued that the California court's jurisdiction was obtained by fraud, specifically alleging that the complaint falsely claimed he signed certain contracts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a real and substantial connection between the causes of action and California, and concluding that the appellant failed to present evidence of fraud going to jurisdiction.

The court held that the appellant was improperly attempting to re-litigate facts already determined by the default judgment.

The appellant, an immigration consultant, sued a Korean-language newspaper and its reporter for libel over an article concerning a scheme that left South Korean truck drivers stranded in Canada.

At trial, the jury found that the article did not defame the appellant.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was perverse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury acting judicially could have reached it, as it was open to the jury to conclude that the ordinary reader would not understand the article to discredit the appellant.

The moving parties brought motions to quash appeals from an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the appeals were from interlocutory orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to the Dewan motion, finding the order appealed from did not finally dispose of any defences, and quashed that appeal.

For the Condominium motion, the Court found that most paragraphs of the order were interlocutory, except for one paragraph that removed a defence at trial, making it a final order.

The Condominium motion was allowed in part, quashing the appeal except for the final order paragraph.

The respondent sought costs for a previous motion where the appellant was ordered to pay $15,000 into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs for the motion, despite the respondent's reference to a previous offer to settle.

No order as to costs was made.

The appellant, a plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action, appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The appeal judge had overturned a Master's decision allowing the action to proceed, reasoning that the appellant failed to meet her onus by not filing affidavit evidence at the status hearing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that initial status hearings ordinarily proceed on oral submissions and affidavit evidence is not strictly required unless a full hearing is ordered.

The Court further found that the delay was sufficiently explained and partially attributable to the respondent's conduct, permitting the action to proceed.

The appellants appealed a decision confirming that the composition of the County Council should be reduced from 20 to 16 members due to a decline in the number of electors in four townships.

The Court of Appeal held that the municipal by-law governing representation implicitly required a reduction in representatives when a township's population fell below the specified threshold.

The Court also found no error in the application judge's decision to nullify the Striking by-law and remove the additional representatives mid-term, as they had no legal entitlement to hold office.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment finding her personally liable to the respondent bank under section 100 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge found that the appellant's company and her father's bankrupt company engaged in a non-arm's length transaction for less than fair market value, and that the appellant was privy to the transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant, as the sole principal and controlling mind of her company, was privy to the transaction because she had knowledge of it and benefited from it.

The respondent's cross-appeal for substantial indemnity costs was also dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion for security for costs pending the disposition of the appellant's appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious given the extensive history of delay and failure to comply with court orders.

Despite the appellant's claim of impecuniosity, the Court ordered her to post $15,000 as security for costs to balance the respondent's right to protection against the appellant's access to justice.

The appellant's private prosecution was stayed by the Attorney General prior to a pre-enquete hearing.

The appellant's application for mandamus was dismissed based on binding precedent.

Seeking to challenge that precedent, the appellant requested a five-judge panel, which was denied by the Associate Chief Justice.

A motion to review that denial was dismissed by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant then moved to review and set aside the single judge's order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that there is no statutory authority or rule permitting an appeal or review of a decision by the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice regarding the assignment of judicial duties, including the refusal to strike a five-judge panel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's inference that the appellant knew there was a gun in the car he was driving was logically consistent and reasonably supported by the totality of the evidence, including the time of day, the presence of latex gloves, and the fact that the gun was not hidden.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine.

He argued that the jury verdicts were inconsistent, the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on aiding and abetting, and the trial judge erred in finding he was not entrapped.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or the entrapment ruling.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-month sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering that he continue to be subject to a Conditional Discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board made serious errors of law, as there was no positive evidence that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant had been living in the community for almost five years, adhered to his medication, and had the support of his treatment team for an absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding evidence under section 276 of the Criminal Code that the complainant engaged in consensual sex with another man shortly after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address presented a distorted narrative regarding the complainant's emotional state and loyalty to her boyfriend, making the excluded evidence highly probative to the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The moving parties, officers and directors of the Gandi Group, sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order in CCAA proceedings.

The motion judge had limited their indemnity claims to specific corporate entities, subordinated one claim to a major creditor, and characterized the indemnity claims as 'equity claims' under the CCAA, thereby subordinating them to unsecured creditors.

The Court of Appeal applied the Stelco test and denied leave to appeal, finding the issues were either factual, not of significance to the practice, or lacked prima facie merit.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out their statement of claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada under Rule 21.

The appellants alleged the Law Society was liable in negligence for failing to take appropriate action against lawyers who acted for other parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim was precluded by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada due to a lack of proximity between the appellants and the Law Society.

The appellant appealed a bankruptcy court judge's refusal to annul his bankruptcy or stay it pending the outcome of his damages action against the Canada Revenue Agency in the Federal Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the bankruptcy judge.

The Court noted that the CRA exercised its statutory right to vote down the appellant's proposal, and the Federal Court action would not affect the legal validity of the bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision granting certiorari to quash a committal for trial for manslaughter and committing him for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing evidence and preferring inferences favourable to the accused.

However, the Court found the application judge erred by directly committing the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a mandamus order was issued remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

Commercial lease appeal concerning whether a successor landlord could re-measure leased premises and charge rent on a larger area than that fixed in a prior lease amending agreement.

The court held that the successor in title took subject to the existing lease and was bound by the stipulated square footage in the amending agreement.

The landlord failed to demonstrate any change permitting re-measurement under the original lease.

The appeal was allowed, declaratory relief was granted, and the tenant obtained a refund of excess rent paid with interest and costs.