Robert J. Reynolds

The Crown appealed sentence in a case involving prolonged sexual abuse of three child victims by a family member in a position of trust.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years' imprisonment plus probation, despite stating that a three-year custodial sentence would otherwise be appropriate.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentence failed to adequately reflect denunciation and deterrence, marked a departure from the governing case law, and was manifestly unfit in the context of multiple victims.

The appeal was allowed and a global sentence of four years' imprisonment was substituted, with the remaining orders continuing except for probation.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing the trial judge applied a different level of scrutiny to the appellant's evidence compared to the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself in accordance with the principles in W.(D.) and reasonably assessed the inconsistencies in the evidence.

The trial judge's credibility findings were within his purview and supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge engaged in an impermissible line of reasoning regarding photographs taken during the incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's essential conclusion—that the complainant did not consent and was asleep during the assault—was firmly based on the evidence, including the photographs and post-offence conduct.

The impugned comments formed only a minor part of the trial judge's reasoning.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him to be a trespasser on lands beneficially owned by the Band and ordering him to vacate the lands, pay damages, and comply with other consequential relief.

The appellant claimed an equitable interest in the lands based on a purported 1993 agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's evidence was untrue and that the Band was not estopped from asserting its legal rights.

The Court dismissed the substance of the appeal, including the award of punitive damages, but varied the judgment to narrow the scope of orders regarding the removal of chattels and environmental remediation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering threats.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding a threat was made and that the conviction was inconsistent with an acquittal on a related charge from the previous day.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the accepted evidence and that there was no contradiction between the verdicts because the evidence for the two days differed.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for multiple historical sexual offences against young children.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by emphasizing rehabilitation over deterrence and denunciation, and by failing to appreciate the gravity of the offences and the risk of re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a global sentence of five years' imprisonment, less one year credit for pre-sentence custody, was substituted.

The appellants, former nursing students at Loyalist College, sought to certify a class action against the college for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation.

They alleged the college falsely promised a 'Queen's option' allowing them to obtain a nursing degree from Queen's University after completing two years at Loyalist.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the certification motion, finding no identifiable class or common issues.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the lower courts erred in their application of section 5 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court found that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, common issues existed regarding the contract and representations, and a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to defend the respondents against a claim of negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the negligent misrepresentation claim was separate and distinct from the breach of contract claim, and therefore not derivative under the Scalera framework.

The court also found that the exclusion clauses in the policy did not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a management contract.

The appellants argued that the earliest the respondents could terminate the contract was if they failed to meet the 2002 budget, and thus they were entitled to termination pay.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the contract was for a one-year term and was renewable only if the parties agreed on a sound business plan.

Since the parties could not agree on a plan, the contract was not renewed, and the respondents were not required to pay termination pay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Director under the Business Corporations Act ordering them to change their corporate names to names distinguishable from 'Unity Insurance'.

The Director found that the similarity in names caused confusion among insurers, reinsurers, and brokers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the class of persons likely to be deceived includes anyone with an interest in dealing with the corporation, not just customers.

The court also held it lacked inherent jurisdiction to order the appellants to cease using the unregistered business name 'Unity Insurance'.

The appellant property owner erected a large commercial sign on his land adjacent to Highway 401 without a permit.

The Minister of Transportation obtained a warrant to remove the sign pursuant to s. 38(2)(e) of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The appellant appealed, arguing the provision infringed his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the provision limited freedom of expression, the limit was prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter to prevent visual pollution and enhance traffic safety.

The plaintiff sued the defendant lawyer, Highley, and his insurer, LPIC, for professional negligence based on discussions Highley had with the plaintiff's lawyer concerning a priorities motion.

Highley had been retained by LPIC to defend another lawyer in a related matter, and the interests of Highley's client and the plaintiff were aligned at the time.

The motion judge refused to grant summary judgment dismissing the action against Highley and LPIC.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted summary judgment, holding that a lawyer does not owe a duty of care to a non-client represented by their own counsel, even when their interests are aligned, due to a lack of proximity and compelling policy reasons.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge found that the respondent's employment was terminated without cause and that two options offered to employees of Loyalist College were implied terms in her employment contract.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent's acceptance of an early retirement proposal from the college did not constitute a 'return to Loyalist College' under the options, and therefore did not preclude her wrongful dismissal claim against the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences.

He argued the trial judge rendered inconsistent verdicts by convicting him of some acts and acquitting him of others based on the same complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the allegations were logically severable and the acquittals did not imply the complainant was untruthful.

The court also dismissed grounds relating to incomplete Crown disclosure and the trial judge's approach to a conditional sentence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims against the respondents and a real estate agent.

The appellants argued that a release signed in blank was only to be used if a first real estate transaction did not close, alleging the two transactions were linked.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the parol evidence rule precluded evidence of the alleged linkage, as the documentation contained no such linkage and was reviewed by the appellants' lawyers.

The claim against the real estate agent, also based on the alleged linkage, was similarly dismissed.

Borins J.A. dissented, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the release's provenance and the agent's alleged breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant challenged a municipality's sale of surplus land, arguing the sale violated a procedural by-law because the required property appraisal was obtained after public notice and tenders were received.

The trial judge upheld the sale, finding the sequence of procedures did not matter as long as all took place.

The Court of Appeal agreed, dismissing the appeal.

The Court also dismissed the argument that the appraisal was flawed for excluding chattels, and granted the municipality's cross-appeal for mortgage interest up to the closing date.

The plaintiff was given 14.5 months' working notice of termination due to restructuring, plus 3.4 months' statutory severance.

Shortly after receiving notice, she became disabled and was unable to work for the remainder of the notice period.

She received disability benefits to which she had indirectly contributed.

The trial judge awarded damages for the full notice period and declined to deduct the disability benefits.

The employer appealed, arguing it should receive credit for the full working notice period and that the disability benefits should be deducted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a disabled employee is entitled to damages during the notice period even if unable to mitigate, and that disability benefits are not deductible when the employee has contributed to the plan.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding the calculation of her sick leave bank was allowed in part.

The respondent cottagers' association sought a declaration that a portion of Cook's Road, which passed over the appellant's land, was a public road dedicated by a predecessor in title.

The trial judge granted the declaration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The evidence demonstrated that the predecessor in title merely gave permission to the cottagers to use the road for access, an act of neighbourly tolerance, rather than an intention to dedicate the land to the public.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment set aside, and the action dismissed, with the matter remitted to issue an injunction enforcing a prior settlement agreement under the Road Access Act.

A foreign judgment creditor appealed the dismissal of a petition for a receiving order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act based on an unpaid Ohio civil judgment arising from a fatal boating collision.

The Court of Appeal held that the bankruptcy judge erred in treating the foreign plaintiffs as a single creditor and in requiring the petitioning creditor to exhaust other civil enforcement routes before invoking the bankruptcy regime.

The court found there were at least three creditors, substantial unpaid liabilities under a final foreign judgment, and evidence of suspicious asset transfers that made bankruptcy remedies appropriate.

The appeal was allowed, the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, and a trustee was appointed.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment arising from a commercial lease dispute, arguing that a ventilation covenant breach was sufficiently serious to justify rescission.

The court held that any alleged factual or legal errors in the trial judge's oral commentary did not undermine the ultimate finding that the breach was not fundamental.

The panel deferred to the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and witnesses.

A further argument seeking reduction of damages for the breach was rejected because it had not been pleaded or argued below and lacked substance in light of the trial judge's findings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.