Robert J. Reynolds

This is an amended endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario modifying a prior costs award.

The appellants requested an increase to the costs awarded in the court's endorsement of April 21, 2017, with the respondent not opposing the modification.

The court increased the costs awarded to the appellants to $8,500 for fees plus $1,539 for disbursements plus HST.

The respondent brought an action for wrongful dismissal against a union local and its directors.

The union pleaded that section 3(2) of the Rights of Labour Act precluded it from being named as a party.

After the limitation period expired, the union moved to dismiss the action on this ground.

The motion was dismissed.

The respondent then successfully moved for a representation order allowing individual defendants to defend on behalf of union members.

The appeal addressed whether an action improperly naming a union could be amended after the limitation period expired by obtaining a representation order.

The majority held that the action was not a nullity and that the representation order could be granted as a correction of the party's name under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The dissent argued that section 3(2) created an absolute statutory requirement for a representation order and that the majority's approach created unacceptable uncertainty in the law.

The plaintiff, Maria Struik, sought enforcement relief by way of a motion to appoint herself as receiver over the assets of Dixie Lee Ontario Ltd. (DLOL) and to prohibit the transfer or encumbrance of DLOL's assets.

The defendants, DLOL and Noele Murano, did not object to the asset prohibition but opposed the plaintiff's appointment as receiver, arguing that ordinary execution remedies were sufficient and that the plaintiff might be prejudiced by the appointment due to past allegations.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 60.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found it just and convenient to appoint the plaintiff as receiver, citing her extensive experience with Dixie Lee Chicken operations, the complexity of the assets, the additional expense of a private receiver, and a history of non-compliance and misleading information from the defendants.

The court granted the order as sought by the plaintiff.

On a summary judgment motion arising from a franchise settlement dispute, the court held that a related corporation that received franchisor rights, powers, and a 50% trademark-holding share interest became subject to the guarantee obligation in minutes of settlement.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on the existence of the guarantee, the timing and character of the transfers, the related-entity status of the recipient corporation, or the asserted contractual defences.

The court interpreted 'transfer' broadly, including indirect and circuitous transfers implemented as part of a corporate plan to move assets within related entities.

Declaratory and payment relief was granted against the related corporation, including ongoing monthly payments, interest, and prior costs awards.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against the defendants for breach of a contract to install roof-mounted solar panels.

The defendants failed to respond to the claim.

The court found that the defendants acted fraudulently by taking the plaintiffs' deposit money and depriving them of expected profits.

The court pierced the corporate veil, holding the individual operating mind jointly liable with the corporate entities.

Default judgment was granted for breach of contract and punitive damages, with a declaration that the judgment survives any bankruptcy.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a representation order under Rule 12.07 to amend the statement of claim, adding the individual defendants as representatives of all members of the defendant trade union.

The defendants argued this would improperly add parties after the expiry of the limitation period.

The court found the motion was an attempt to correct an error in the title of proceedings under Rule 5.04, not to add new parties, as the union had been a party from the outset.

The court granted the representation order, noting the defendants' delay in bringing their own Rule 21 motion and the lack of prejudice.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant at trial, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment against him for $25,000.

At trial, the deputy judge prevented the appellant from cross-examining the respondent on undisclosed documents and denied his request for an adjournment to secure a witness.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to offer the appellant the option of an adjournment on terms, which curtailed his ability to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered.

Following dismissal of a Rule 21.01 motion seeking determination of whether damages from a motor vehicle accident included aggravation caused by a later soccer-related incident, the court addressed costs of the motion.

The moving party on the underlying motion had been the plaintiff, but the defendant was entirely successful.

The court applied the principle that costs generally follow the result and rejected arguments that entitlement to costs should be deferred to the trial judge or awarded in any event of the cause.

The court found the defendant’s bill of costs reasonable with a reduction of 12 associate hours and fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were ordered payable within 120 days.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended key evidence when concluding the appellant had denied all physical contact with the complainant.

The appellate court reviewed the trial record and noted that the appellant had admitted holding the complainant’s hands, a fact acknowledged earlier in the trial judge’s reasons.

The appellate court found that the trial judge’s later statement that the appellant denied “any and all physical contact” created a significant inconsistency that may have played a central role in the credibility assessment leading to conviction.

Because the misapprehension concerned material evidence and may have influenced the reasoning process, the conviction could not safely stand.

The court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by engaging in a credibility contest and misapplying the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge's reasons indicated he based his decision on whose evidence he preferred rather than determining whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage sought an interim interlocutory injunction restraining former employee producers and their new employer from soliciting or dealing with certain customers pending a full motion hearing.

The court applied the three‑part test from RJR–MacDonald for interlocutory injunctions.

While there appeared to be a strong prima facie case against one former employee, the evidence against the others was largely speculative, and the alleged harm was found to be quantifiable through damages given the nature of the brokerage business.

Considering the balance of convenience, delay by the plaintiff, and the availability of undertakings proposed by the defendants, the court declined to grant the requested interim injunction and instead accepted undertakings pending the return of the motion.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that dismissed his appeal from a conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no jurisprudential issues raised and no strong likelihood of success on any proposed grounds of appeal.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment that decided a 'guarantee' issue and a 'priority' issue in favour of the respondent.

The motion judge made factual findings regarding the timing of a franchise transfer and the relationship between two companies based on documentary evidence.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellants' cross-motion regarding the interpretation of a settlement agreement, finding that the respondent could exercise multiple remedies upon default.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding they were properly made under Rule 20, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of driving while disqualified where the information alleged disqualification under a Criminal Code prohibition order, but the trial evidence established only a provincial licence suspension.

The Crown conceded on appeal that the courts below erred in treating the source of disqualification as irrelevant and leave to appeal was granted under the second branch of the governing leave test.

The majority held that the court should not amend the information under s. 683(1)(g) because the appellant had been misled or prejudiced in both the conduct of the defence at trial and the appeal, particularly given the late request to amend on a second appeal.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered; there was a dissent that would have allowed the amendment and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of sexual assault and indecent act arising from an incident in a grocery store.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused after concluding that the Crown had not proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, but did so without allowing the Crown to make submissions on the sexual assault charge.

On appeal, both parties agreed this constituted an error in law.

Applying the standard from Graveline, the court considered whether the error might reasonably have had a material bearing on the acquittal.

After reviewing the transcript and witness evidence, the court concluded that the evidence was capable of supporting a conviction and that the verdict could have been different.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision declaring that the respondent landowners could enforce a 1953 agreement in which the municipality agreed to perpetually maintain a storm sewer drainage system.

The municipality argued the claim was statute-barred because previous landowners had accepted its anticipatory repudiation of the agreement by their inaction, and that the respondents lacked privity of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that mere inaction does not constitute acceptance of a repudiatory breach.

Furthermore, the respondents had standing to enforce the agreement as successors in title under the agreement's enurement clause and the principled exception to the privity of contract doctrine.

The successful plaintiffs sought costs following litigation against a municipal defendant.

The court assessed the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate and time spent, noting that the defendant did not dispute either and that the matter involved numerous complex factual and legal issues.

The court also noted the absence of any settlement offers and the cooperative conduct between counsel during the litigation.

Applying the general rule that costs follow the event, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought to amend her human rights application to add claims for lost wages and legal costs.

The respondent consented to the lost wages amendment but opposed the legal costs amendment, arguing the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to award costs.

The Tribunal granted both amendments, noting that while it has consistently held it lacks jurisdiction to award costs, allowing the amendment at this stage causes no prejudice to the respondent and permits the applicant to argue the point at the hearing.

The parties brought a motion to determine a Special Case regarding a 1953 agreement between the former Township of Thurlow and the plaintiffs' predecessor in title.

The agreement required the municipality to perpetually maintain a drainage system.

The court found that the plaintiffs, as successors in title, could enforce the positive covenant against the original covenantor (the amalgamated City of Belleville) despite a lack of privity of contract.

The court also dismissed the City's defences based on public policy, inadequate property description, lack of reliance, limitation periods, and laches.

The appellant appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding a property assessment dispute.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the Divisional Court and dismissed the appeal without costs.