Robert A. Blair

The Crown appealed a 15-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for four counts of abduction in contravention of a custody order, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include punitive conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a conditional sentence must generally include punitive terms such as house arrest or a curfew.

However, because the respondent had served six weeks of pre-trial custody, faced punitive terms for related passport offences, and had already served a significant portion of the conditional sentence, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The self-represented appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's reasons regarding both the motions and the final disposition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding sole custody of a child to the respondent with generous access to the appellant.

The appellant argued that the reasons of the trial judge and the Superior Court appeal judge were purely conclusory and tautological.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately assessed the parenting skills and plans of the parties, and correctly concluded that joint custody was not workable due to the parties' lack of cooperation.

The court also upheld the Superior Court judge's costs award.

The appellant insurer sought contribution from the respondent insurer for a $2.75 million settlement paid to a student injured at a university judo club.

Coverage under the respondent's policy depended on whether the club was a 'member club' of the provincial judo association at the time of the accident.

Although the club had not paid its annual fees, the Court of Appeal found that under the association's by-laws, membership continues until formal suspension or expulsion.

Since no such action was taken, the club remained a member, and the respondent's policy provided coverage.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering threats and assault, as well as his sentence of two years' imprisonment.

He argued the conviction for uttering threats was unreasonable because his father, the target of the threats, testified he was not afraid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting other witnesses testified the appellant was loud, upset, and had been drinking, and the trial judge found the father was minimizing his evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not unfit given the appellant's history and criminal record.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.

The interim receiver of a bankrupt company sought to distribute funds from operating assets to a secured creditor.

The pension plan administrator opposed, claiming priority under a statutory lien for unpaid pension contributions pursuant to s. 57(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Ministry of the Environment also opposed, arguing funds should be retained for environmental remediation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, holding that the pension administrator is not a secured creditor under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the unpaid contributions are not a debt due to the administrator.

The Court also held that the MOE was an unsecured creditor regarding the operating assets and that the BIA's specific provisions for environmental claims governed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a home invasion.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence and Vetrovec concerns regarding a co-accused's testimony.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his trial lawyer prevented him from testifying in his own defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors and the appellant failed to establish his ineffective assistance claim on a balance of probabilities.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on the ineffective assistance claim.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of robbery and was sentenced to 35 months' imprisonment concurrent on each charge.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a variation to avoid losing his right to appeal a deportation order under s. 64(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which applies to sentences of two years or more for a single offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varying the sentence to 23 months concurrent on four counts and 12 months consecutive on the fifth count, maintaining the global sentence of 35 months while preserving the appellant's right to appeal his deportation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, possession of stolen property, and possession of burglary tools, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his sections 8 and 9 Charter application and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police had grounds for an investigative detention based on a radio broadcast describing the suspects and their vehicle.

The court also upheld the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest after an officer observed cartons of cigarettes in plain view in the vehicle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence after being convicted of sexual assault, choking, unlawful confinement, uttering threats, assault, and failing to comply with a probation order.

The sentencing judge found the appellant to be a long-term offender and imposed a 9-year determinate sentence for the sexual assault and related offences, plus consecutive sentences for other offences and a 10-year supervision order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence appropriate given the appellant's extensive record and the horrific circumstances of the offences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a knife after holding a knife to the throat of a 70-year-old man.

He was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment in addition to 12 months' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and that the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 6.5 years imprisonment for breaking and entering, dangerous driving, possession of a stolen vehicle, and other related offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his prior record, ignored mitigating factors, and imposed a disproportionate sentence that offended the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record of 33 prior break and enters and three prior police chases.

The court found the sentence was at the upper end of the range but fit and did not offend the totality principle.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to stay or dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the dispute did not arise 'in connection with' the Confidentiality Agreement, and therefore the arbitration clause did not apply.

The Court also agreed that there was a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the subject matter of the action, and found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's determination that Ontario was the forum conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

He argued that the Canadian authorities' withdrawal of domestic charges without notice constituted an abuse of process, depriving him of the opportunity to build a record to argue against extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the extradition judge's refusal to grant a stay, as the domestic charges were not a ruse and the appellant had other avenues to raise his arguments.

The Court also upheld the Minister's surrender order, finding it was not unjust or oppressive despite the potentially severe penalty in the United States.

The appellant police officers sued the respondents for malicious prosecution after assault charges against them were stayed.

The respondent Bapoo counterclaimed for assault and breach of his s. 7 Charter rights.

The trial judge dismissed the malicious prosecution claim and awarded Bapoo damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the unauthorized use of force, despite finding the officers did not act with mala fides.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but set aside the Charter damages, holding that liability for a constitutional tort requires proof of wilfulness or mala fides.

The court also adjusted the costs awards, finding the trial judge's characterization of the appellants' testimony as perjury was inappropriate.

The appellants appealed a sending order made under s. 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The application judge had found that the search warrant was facially overbroad and that the seizure exceeded the terms of the warrant, but concluded he had the discretion to send the requesting state the materials that could properly have been seized under a valid warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge did not err in his interpretation of s. 15 and properly exercised his discretion in making the sending order despite the defective warrant.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that they had repudiated Minutes of Settlement and lifting a stay in bankruptcy proceedings to allow the respondent's action to continue.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in making the declaration of repudiation because the relief was sought by motion rather than by originating process.

However, the Court upheld the order lifting the stay, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded there had been repudiation in the context of the motion to lift the stay.

The appeal was allowed in part to quash the declaration, but dismissed regarding the lifting of the stay.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.

In a complex CCAA restructuring of Stelco Inc., four appeals were brought regarding the distribution of assets among creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that Senior Debt Holders could enforce subordination and turnover provisions against Noteholders via trust principles, and that post-filing interest was payable.

However, the Court reversed the motion judge on two key issues: it found that a massive IT outsourcing contract was not in the 'ordinary course of business', thereby elevating its assignee to Senior Debt status, and it ruled that the distributed securities must be valued at the 'Plan value' ($5.50 per share) rather than the post-emergence market value.