Richard H.K. Schwarzl

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Two issues were raised at trial: (1) whether the defendant's Charter rights to counsel under section 10(b) were violated by police conduct, and if so, whether excluding breath test results was an appropriate remedy; and (2) whether the prosecution could rely on the presumption of identity under the now-repealed section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, or whether expert evidence of retrograde extrapolation was required.

The court found no breach of the defendant's right to counsel and held that the old presumption of identity continues to apply to outstanding Over 80 charges commenced after the new law came into force on December 18, 2018.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on October 10, 2016.

The Crown presented evidence of dangerous driving patterns, physical signs of intoxication, and breath test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting Charter arguments and finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and that any delay in providing rights to counsel was justified by safety concerns.

The accused was sentenced to 4.5 years imprisonment for impaired driving causing death.

On November 19, 2016, the accused drove south on Highway 10 while intoxicated and fatigued, exhibiting dangerous driving behavior over an extended distance.

He collided head-on with the victim's vehicle, killing the 56-year-old victim instantly.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was between 150 to 210 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood—approximately twice the legal limit.

After a seven-day trial, the accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death contrary to section 255(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court imposed the joint submission of 4.5 years, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence as paramount sentencing considerations in impaired driving cases.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a minor collision at a coffee shop.

The Crown proceeded on the excess alcohol charge.

The court addressed two key issues: whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the incident to satisfy the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and whether the defendant's Charter rights to counsel were breached.

On the first issue, the court found that based on the totality of evidence and applying common sense, the collision occurred approximately 1.5 hours before the breath test, satisfying the two-hour requirement.

On the second issue, the court rejected the defendant's claim that his rights to counsel were violated, finding that the police provided adequate information regarding his right to counsel and that the defendant failed to communicate any desire to speak with a lawyer other than duty counsel.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after his vehicle went into a ditch on a rural road.

The trial addressed three key issues: whether the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle; whether police had lawful grounds to make demands under section 254 of the Criminal Code; and whether breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the defendant was in care or control, the police had lawful grounds for their demands, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol concentration after his vehicle went into a ditch on Highway 109.

The Crown relied on eyewitness testimony, paramedic observations, police observations, and a toxicology report.

The defendant challenged the identification evidence, the lawfulness of the breath demand, and the reliability of the toxicology report.

The court found the defendant was the driver, the breath demand was lawful, and the toxicology report was admissible.

However, the court found the eyewitness evidence insufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt on its own.

The toxicology report established impairment based on blood alcohol concentration of 125-185 mg/100mL.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a RIDE programme stop.

Three issues emerged at trial: whether the defendant's section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by an improper breath demand; whether the defendant's section 10(a) Charter right to be informed of the charge was breached; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer failed to follow mandatory protocols established by the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the reliability of the approved screening device, specifically failing to eliminate the possibility of false positives from sugary foods and beverages and failing to conduct required self-tests.

The court concluded that the officer's reliance on the screening test result was unreasonable, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 Charter right.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy, resulting in a verdict of not guilty.

The applicant was charged with three drug offences, including trafficking cocaine, by Information sworn on July 9, 2015.

The trial was scheduled for May 17, 2017, resulting in a total delay of 678 days (22.5 months).

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that the net delay of 21 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

The Crown could not rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating case complexity.

Additionally, the police failed to diligently execute the arrest warrant, remaining inactive for nine months despite the applicant being in custody with other police services.

The court found the delay unreasonable both under the new Jordan framework and under pre-Jordan law when applied contextually.

All charges were judicially stayed.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol on February 12, 2016, with the charge laid on February 24, 2016.

The trial was completed on September 19, 2017, approximately 19 months later.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a judicial stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and R. v. Williamson, calculating net delay after deducting defence delay and waivers.

The net delay of 419 days (14 months) fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that the defence did not engage in a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have under the pre-Jordan legal framework applicable to transitional cases.

The application was dismissed, and a finding of guilt was registered on the charge.

The offender pleaded guilty to robbing Jonathan Pavkovic in Orangeville on July 31, 2016.

The offence involved a vicious unprovoked sucker punch that rendered the victim unconscious, followed by theft of his wallet, house keys, and cell phone while he lay bleeding and defenceless.

The offender was intoxicated, driving with a suspended licence in violation of an alcohol-free condition, and ignored pleas from his companion to desist.

The offender has an extensive criminal history including twelve violent convictions over fourteen years and demonstrated poor institutional behaviour during 372 days of pre-trial custody.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence with 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in 170 days remaining, followed by three years probation with strict conditions including restitution, DNA order, lifetime firearms prohibition, and communication prohibition.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

He challenged his detention on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his section 9 rights (freedom from arbitrary detention) and section 12 rights (freedom from cruel and unusual treatment).

The defendant was held in a cold basement cell for three hours while inadequately clothed, with a blanket provided only in the final 45 minutes.

The court found no breach of either Charter right, holding that the police followed appropriate prisoner care policies and released the defendant as soon as practicable.

The court rejected the defendant's application for a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown presented evidence from two police officers regarding observations of impairment at the roadside and at the police station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand and argued the evidence of impairment was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable grounds to make the breath demand and that the totality of evidence, including the defendant's own admission of slight impairment, established guilt on both counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of communicating with minors (ages 14 and 16) for the purpose of obtaining sexual services.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 3-6 months on each count, consecutive.

The defence sought fines or a conditional sentence.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the offender was in a position of trust and exploited it.

Balancing significant aggravating factors (two victims, callous conduct, high moral blameworthiness) against substantial mitigating factors (first-time offender, guilty plea before trial, no actual sexual activity, low reoffending risk), the court imposed substantial fines rather than incarceration, finding this met the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

A young person charged with six sexual offences alleged to have been committed between 1971 and 1976 brought a section 11(b) Charter application claiming his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The accused was 55 years old when charged and 57 at the time of the application.

The total delay from swearing of the Information to the last scheduled trial date was 621 days (21.5 months).

After deducting minimal defence delay and one month for an unavoidable discrete event (judge illness), the net remaining delay was 20 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, having caused significant avoidable delay through failure to provide timely disclosure, unnecessary adjournments during the judicial pre-trial phase for Crown convenience, failure to organize witness lists and police schedules, and failure to prioritize the case until the delay application was heard.

The court granted a judicial stay of proceedings on all counts.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to police officers at the roadside and at the police station, as well as to address Charter violations and voluntariness concerns.

The defendant raised issues regarding violations of his section 10(b) Charter rights (right to counsel), section 7 Charter rights (compelled self-incrimination), and language comprehension difficulties.

The trial judge found that the defendant's statements at the roadside were admissible only for establishing reasonable grounds for a breath demand, while statements at the police station were admissible as voluntary statements against interest.

The judge rejected the defendant's claims regarding language difficulties and found the defendant's testimony to be incredible.

The offender was convicted of intimidating a justice participant and breaching a recognizance following his conduct at a preliminary inquiry.

While testifying as a witness in domestic violence charges against the offender, the victim was subjected to a cut-throat gesture and threatening words by the offender.

The court imposed a sentence of eight months custody on the intimidation charge and two months concurrent on the breach charge, followed by 18 months probation with strict conditions including non-association with the victim.

DNA orders and a lifetime firearms prohibition were also imposed.

The court emphasized the seriousness of offences against the administration of justice and the need to protect witnesses and the integrity of the judicial process.

The defendant was charged with two sexual offences against his seven-year-old niece in November 2008.

After a trial spanning eight days over fourteen months, he was convicted in May 2011 and sentenced in August 2012.

He appealed his convictions, and the appeal was allowed in December 2014, remitting the matter for retrial.

The defendant brought Charter applications under sections 11(b) and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the defendant's section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time was breached due to Crown actions in bringing a similar fact application at the eleventh hour and systemic delays in institutional resources.

The court granted a judicial stay of all charges.

The section 7 application was dismissed.

The defendant was found sleeping in his parked car at a fast food restaurant in Mississauga with a blood alcohol concentration of 180 mg/100ml.

He was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the defendant was arbitrarily detained for approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the investigation was complete.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle based on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which the defendant failed to rebut.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's section 9 Charter rights regarding arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a reduced sentence as the appropriate remedy.

The applicant brought a Charter application under section 11(b) seeking to have domestic violence charges stayed due to delay in trial.

The applicant was charged in October 2013 with two counts of common assault, one count of threatening, and one count of assault with a weapon.

The trial was originally scheduled for February 2015 but was adjourned when the Crown served a late notice of application regarding prior discreditable conduct.

The trial was subsequently rescheduled for May and June 2015.

The court found that while there was some delay, the applicant had been content with the pace of proceedings for a substantial period, there was significant neutral time, and any prejudice was minimal.

The application was dismissed.