Raj Kanwal Anand

The defendant employer brought a motion for leave to appeal an order refusing to strike out the statement of claim against it.

The employer argued that at common law, an employer cannot be impleaded by an employee seeking a remedy for their union's breach of the duty of fair representation.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the common law is dynamic and a plaintiff should not be denied the possibility of establishing a right to a remedy at the pleadings stage.

The defendants appealed a decision of Master Kelly.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly applied the law and exercised his discretion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the responding parties, noting that the appellants filed voluminous, prolix, and largely irrelevant materials, which amounted to an unnecessary onslaught that the responding parties had to defend against.

The applicant, a college professor, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap.

He also filed 14 grievances covering the same allegations under his collective agreement.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission exercised its discretion under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code not to deal with the complaint, finding it could be more appropriately dealt with through the grievance and arbitration procedure.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the Commission's decision was patently unreasonable because it failed to investigate the efficacy of the grievance procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission is not required to conduct a full-scale investigation into the efficacy of the grievance procedure and its decision was not patently unreasonable given the overlap between the grievances and the complaint.

The appellant, a housing co-operative resident receiving social assistance, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on a rent calculation condition in the co-op's operating agreement with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The Board of Inquiry added CMHC as a respondent, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, concluding that the provincial Human Rights Code must be read down so as not to apply to the core of the federal spending power, thereby exempting CMHC and the impugned condition from the Code's application.

The responding party sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision regarding a human rights complaint against a housing co-operative and a federal crown corporation.

In support of her leave application, she filed affidavits to demonstrate the public importance of the legal issues.

The moving party brought a motion to strike the affidavits.

The Court of Appeal held that while affidavit evidence on public importance cannot be filed as of right, the court may grant leave to file such evidence if it is factual and relevant.

The court struck out specific paragraphs containing legal opinions but allowed the remainder of the affidavits to be filed.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning the definition of 'spouse' under Ontario's social assistance legislation.

In the Falkiner appeal, the court held that the 1995 'spouse in the house' rule, which presumed a spousal relationship based on co-residency and financial arrangements, violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The court recognized 'receipt of social assistance' as an analogous ground of discrimination and found the definition discriminated on the basis of sex, marital status, and receipt of social assistance.

The violation was not justified under s. 1.

In the Thomas appeal, the court found the Board erred in classifying a disabled man and his caregiver as spouses without considering if the relationship was marriage-like or accounting for his disability.

The government's appeal in Falkiner was dismissed, and Thomas's appeal was allowed.

The appellants sought a stay of a declaration that their restaurant and lounge violated the City's zoning by-law, pending their appeal of that decision.

The effect of the stay would be to adjourn an expedited trial on remedy issues (whether to permanently enjoin the operation).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the appellants failed to establish a serious issue to be adjudicated or irreparable harm, as their business operations had not changed and any harm would be purely economic.

The balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the expedited trial so all issues could be heard in a single appeal.

The moving parties sought to vacate a stay pending appeal after the Divisional Court held that the regulatory definition of "spouse" under social assistance legislation violated s. 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Court of Appeal held that the governing test for a stay required the party seeking the stay to establish irreparable harm if relief was refused.

Because the prior motion judge had found, on evidence reasonably supporting that conclusion, that the Crown would not suffer irreparable harm, the Crown was not entitled to a stay pending appeal.

The motion to vary was granted, the stay was set aside, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The appellant employer challenged a labour arbitration and Divisional Court ruling concerning accommodation of an employee's religious holy days.

The court held that an employer may satisfy its duty to accommodate religious observance through appropriate scheduling changes without first proving that paid leave would cause undue hardship.

The court found the arbitration board patently unreasonable in characterizing compressed work week days as vacation benefits.

Although the policy had a discriminatory effect to the limited extent it failed to accommodate consecutive holy days, the employer fully met its duty by allowing the employee to bank compressed work week days for use as needed.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and judicial review was granted.

The appellants appealed only the assessment of damages following a negligence finding against criminal defence counsel arising from the handling of an abduction prosecution and plea discussions.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent could not recover amounts paid toward his mother's legal fees or amounts paid by Legal Aid, as those losses were not legally attributable to the appellants.

The majority further held that while the trial judge erred in linking the respondent's family estrangement to counsel's negligence, the expert psychiatric evidence supported a reduced award for depression caused by the negligent conduct of the defence.

The damages award was reduced to $15,000, with prejudgment interest and trial costs preserved on the basis fixed below.

The appellants appealed a judgment finding negligent criminal defence representation and awarding general and special damages to the former client.

Negligence was conceded on appeal, and the dispute concerned causation and quantification of damages.

The court held that the special damage awards relating to the respondent's mother's legal fees and Legal Aid payments were unsupported.

The majority upheld recoverability of mental distress damages in principle but reduced the award to $15,000 after finding no evidentiary basis to attribute family estrangement to counsel's negligence.

The applicant sought an interim stay pending leave to appeal under s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act, after a judge of the Court of Appeal had previously refused the relief.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application, holding that successive applications for a stay should only be permitted in special circumstances.

The Court found no special circumstances to warrant re-examining the lower court judge's conclusion that there was no serious question to be tried.