Raivo Uukkivi

Following a municipal building enforcement dispute, the applicant sought rescission of stop work and compliance orders issued by a municipal chief building official regarding patios constructed without a permit.

Parallel provincial offences proceedings resulted in the applicant’s acquittal on all charges and the municipality subsequently rescinded the orders, rendering the application moot.

The court considered whether the applicant was entitled to costs and whether substantial indemnity costs were justified.

While the applicant was effectively successful because the orders were withdrawn, the court found no evidence of bad faith or reprehensible conduct by the municipality.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore awarded in a reduced amount reflecting excessive time and disbursements claimed.

The appellant municipality discovered an 1854 by-law purporting to establish a public road along the shoreline of Georgian Bay.

It registered the by-law in 2007 and sought a declaration that the road was a public highway owned by the municipality.

The respondents, who own cottage properties on the purported road, successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that summary judgment was appropriate, the 1854 by-law lacked sufficient certainty to establish a road, and the unregistered by-law was void against the respondents who had no actual notice of it.

Two applicants sought judicial review of municipal by-laws implementing a volume-based solid waste user fee and associated rebate program introduced by the City of Toronto.

The applicants argued that the waste collection charge was in substance an unlawful tax affecting provincial tax ratio rules and that the rebate constituted an impermissible redistribution of property taxes contrary to the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court held that the waste charge was a valid user fee because a sufficient nexus existed between the amount collected and the cost of providing waste services.

The court further held that the rebate was properly characterized as a municipal grant authorized under s. 83 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 rather than a tax rebate.

The applications to quash the relevant by-law provisions were dismissed.

An elector appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee declining to order a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.

The elector alleged that the candidate had made false, misleading, and untrue statements in her Form 4 Financial Statement, specifically regarding unreported contributions and underreported campaign expenses.

The court conducted a de novo hearing and applied the "reasonable grounds" test, requiring an objective belief based on compelling and credible information raising reasonable probability of a breach.

The court found that the elector's allegations were based on conjecture, speculation, and circumstantial evidence insufficient to meet the threshold.

The appeal was dismissed and no compliance audit was ordered.

The appellant marketing board appealed a trial decision finding the respondent abattoir was exempt from paying fees for 'barbecue' and extraprovincial hogs.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's order for an accounting regarding partially condemned hogs and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions based on the evidence and the parties' historical practices.

An applicant appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee that rejected her application for a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.

The applicant alleged the candidate had filed false and misleading financial statements.

The court found that the Compliance Audit Committee failed to establish adequate administrative procedures as mandated by statute, failed to provide fair notice to the applicant regarding the hearing process, and failed to create a transparent and complete record of its proceedings.

The court determined that procedural fairness had been compromised and ordered a de novo hearing on appeal, allowing the applicant to present additional evidence that was not before the original committee.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a partially successful application for judicial review regarding the municipal reimbursement of legal expenses for city councillors.

The Divisional Court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs of $15,000 payable by the city, noting the lack of complexity and partial success.

The court declined to award costs against the individual councillors, and ordered the applicant to pay $5,000 in costs to one councillor who successfully opposed the relief sought against him personally.

The applicant, a Toronto city councillor, brought an application for judicial review to quash municipal by-laws authorizing the reimbursement of legal expenses for three other councillors.

The expenses related to compliance audits of election campaign finances and defamation actions.

The Divisional Court held that the by-law reimbursing expenses for the compliance audits was ultra vires, as the expenses were not incurred in the councillors' capacity as members of council.

However, the court upheld the by-law reimbursing expenses for a defamation action brought by a sitting councillor, finding it was reasonably connected to her duties.

The application was granted in part.

The appellant, a mayor, faced a compliance audit of her election campaign finances which revealed apparent contraventions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The municipal council passed a by-law authorizing the commencement of legal proceedings and retained outside counsel to prosecute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to quash the by-law and strike down s. 81 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 81 is not impermissibly vague, does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, and that the delegation of prosecutorial power to outside counsel was lawful and administrative in nature.