Rahool Parkash Agarwal

The Plaintiff sought costs for a successful class action certification motion, requesting $229,283 (partial indemnity) or $343,924 (substantial indemnity).

The Defendant conceded costs were due but argued the amount was disproportionately high, proposing $102,081.10.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the Plaintiff's counsel's requested hours (1,094.28) to be excessive for a motion of moderate complexity, despite the importance of the issues for access to justice in a class action.

The court awarded costs to the Plaintiff in the amount of $102,000 plus HST and disbursements, aligning closely with the Defendant's proposed amount as a proportionate level of costs.

The Plaintiff moved for certification of a class action concerning overtime and public holiday pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The Defendant argued that its employees fell under construction industry exemptions and that some were managers, requiring individual assessments.

The court certified the action, finding that the causes of action were disclosed, an identifiable class existed, common issues were present (including the applicability of ESA exemptions based on the employer's overall output and the minimal nature of supervisory duties), a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiff was suitable with a workable litigation plan.

The Atkinson defendants brought a motion seeking approval to withdraw funds held in trust to pay legal fees and costs awards.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the funds were subject to a solicitor's undertaking given by the Atkinson defendants' counsel to hold them in trust pending the resolution of the dispute.

The court found that a clear and unambiguous undertaking existed, binding the funds to remain in trust until entitlement was determined by the court or by agreement between the parties.

Consequently, the Atkinson defendants' request to access the funds was denied.

Look Communications Inc. sued its former director, Gerald McGoey, and his holding company, Jolian Investments Limited, for breach of fiduciary duty.

The claim arose from the board's approval of $20 million in "Contingent Restructuring Awards" (CRAs) to directors, officers, and employees following the sale of the company's primary assets.

The court found that McGoey breached his fiduciary duty by approving excessive CRAs, particularly the equity cancellation payments based on an inflated share price and an unwarranted $2.4 million compensation payment to himself.

The court also found a breach regarding the advancement of legal fees for directors' defense against CRA-related claims.

The court rejected McGoey's defense of reliance on legal advice, as the advice was general and did not cover the quantum or allocation of payments.

The court ordered restitution and imposed a constructive trust over the funds received by McGoey/Jolian.

The defendants, Pfizer, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike various claims in the plaintiff Apotex Inc.'s Amended Statement of Claim.

Apotex sought relief for being kept out of the market by Pfizer's invalid patent for Viagra, asserting statutory claims under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, Statutes of Monopolies, and Trade-marks Act, and common law claims for unjust enrichment, nuisance, Ashby v. White, and conspiracy.

The court struck the claims under s. 8 of the PMNOC Regulations and the independent cause of action based on Ashby v. White, finding that the statutory conditions for PMNOC damages were not met and Ashby v. White is a principle, not a cause of action.

However, the court dismissed Pfizer's motion to strike the claims under the Trade-marks Act, unjust enrichment, nuisance, and conspiracy, rejecting the 'complete code theory' as insufficiently settled for a preliminary stage motion and finding the pleadings for these claims to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The applicant sought a declaration that a proposed class action brought by a tobacco growers’ marketing board against a tobacco manufacturer was not barred as a released claim under a comprehensive settlement agreement resolving governmental claims relating to tobacco smuggling and unpaid taxes.

The respondents argued that the class action fell within the broad release provisions and that the marketing board was effectively a Crown entity bound by the agreement.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation governing releases, including contextual interpretation and the rule that general release language is limited to matters within the parties’ contemplation at the time of execution.

It concluded that the settlement agreement addressed governmental tax‑related claims arising from smuggling and did not extend to private claims by growers for price differentials.

The class proceeding was therefore not a released claim by a releasing entity.

Following the Court of Appeal’s reversal of a certification order in a proposed class action alleging misclassification of supervisors and unpaid overtime under the Canada Labour Code, the motion judge was directed to fix the defendant’s costs of the certification motion.

The defendant sought over $1 million in partial indemnity costs, arguing that it had achieved complete success and that the litigation involved substantial complexity and financial exposure.

The representative plaintiff and the Law Foundation argued that costs should be nominal or substantially reduced because the proceeding raised novel legal issues and public interest considerations under s. 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Applying issue estoppel arising from the Court of Appeal’s reasons and considering the purposes of class action costs, the court fixed costs at $475,000 all inclusive.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiffs’ statement of claim on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs alleged that damage to their home occurred after a technician installation, but that significant damage only manifested during a later flooding event.

The court held that the limitation issue involved questions of discoverability and factual context that could not be determined at this preliminary stage.

However, the court found that the plaintiffs’ alternative claim for public nuisance failed to plead the essential elements of the tort, including interference with a public right affecting a substantial number of people.

The public nuisance claim was struck, but the remainder of the action was permitted to proceed.