Rahool Parkash Agarwal

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent municipality's decision to award a transit operations and maintenance contract to a competing bidder.

The applicant argued that the successful bidder's proposal was non-compliant with the Request for Proposals because it included a subcontractor who was already the contractor for another transit division, allegedly violating a one-contractor-per-division rule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the municipality's interpretation of the RFP—that the restriction applied only to contractors, not subcontractors—was reasonable and that the procurement process was fair and transparent.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing a motion to appoint a new representative plaintiff and recertify a class proceeding.

The motion judge had previously decertified the action after the original representative plaintiff was found unsuitable and class counsel failed to find a replacement within the allotted 60 days.

Almost two years later, class counsel brought a motion to appoint a new representative plaintiff.

The motion judge dismissed the motion as an abuse of process, finding it amounted to relitigation and raised concerns about the lack of a costs indemnity agreement.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of the abuse of process doctrine or his factual findings.

The plaintiff in a proposed class action brought a motion for a declaration that the defendants were contractually precluded from opposing his motion for leave to appeal a decision denying class certification.

The parties had previously entered into a Litigation and Mediation Process Agreement which stated that no party would oppose a motion for leave to appeal an order disposing of all or a portion of the claim.

The court interpreted the agreement and found that the certification decision disposed of a portion of the claim, meaning the defendants were bound by their agreement not to oppose the leave to appeal motion.

The applicant, Gregory Zentner, sought certification of a class action against GFA World and related entities, alleging fraud and misappropriation of charitable donations.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim on limitation grounds.

The court dismissed Zentner's motion for certification, finding that the pleadings did not disclose a cause of action because the donations were unencumbered gifts, meaning donors did not suffer a compensable loss recoverable through civil action.

The court also found insufficient factual basis for common issues, particularly regarding reliance and causation.

However, the defendants' summary judgment motion was also dismissed, as there remained a genuine issue requiring a trial concerning when Zentner discovered, or reasonably ought to have discovered, the material facts of his claim for limitation purposes.

This endorsement addresses two motions for leave to appeal before the Divisional Court.

The Plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal a "set aside" order was dismissed with costs awarded to the Defendants.

Concurrently, the Defendants' motion for leave to appeal earlier certification decisions was dismissed without costs, having become moot.

The plaintiff sought approval of a $22.25 million settlement in a class action alleging unpaid overtime by the defendant trucking company.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair and reasonable given the significant risks of proving systemic liability and the range of damages calculated by experts.

The court also approved a $10,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff and class counsel's 30% contingency fee, noting that while third-party funding arrangements must now be considered in assessing legal fees under the amended Class Proceedings Act, it would not retroactively adjust fees in this case.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add three additional representative plaintiffs during a certification hearing for a class action regarding COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims.

The court found that the original plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., had an arguable cause of action and was a suitable representative plaintiff.

The court also found that the three proposed additional plaintiffs—Hangar9 Studios Inc., Cash and Carry Inc., and Real Food for Real Kids Inc.—had viable causes of action and met the requirements under s. 5(1)(e) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The class action was fully certified with all four as representative plaintiffs.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for re-certification of a class action, the defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded as the motion passed several certification hurdles before failing on the representative plaintiff requirement.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that partial success on hurdles does not equate to a divided result.

However, recognizing the difficult circumstances faced by plaintiff's counsel, the court exercised its discretion to award costs to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the fixed amount of $50,000.

The plaintiffs moved to certify a proposed class action for settlement purposes against a dental clinic and several dentists.

The action alleged negligence in infection control and prevention practices, exposing patients to communicable diseases.

The court found that the five-part test for certification under section 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 was met.

The action was certified on consent for settlement purposes.

The plaintiffs brought motions to certify three proposed class actions against Aviva Insurance for the blanket denial of coverage for COVID-19-related business loss claims.

The claims focused on 'restricted access' and 'negative publicity' coverage provisions in Aviva's standard-form policies.

The court found that the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act were met, noting the commonality of the standard-form policies and the identical denial letters.

The two Lerners Actions were certified, and the Nordik Action was conditionally certified pending a motion regarding the representative plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought a motion to re-certify a class action and appoint a new representative plaintiff, nearly two years after the court had de-certified the action and given class counsel 60 days to find a suitable replacement.

The court found that the proposed new representative plaintiff lacked an appropriate costs indemnity agreement and was implicated in spreading falsehoods among the class.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that allowing a late change of representative plaintiff under these circumstances would be fundamentally unfair to the defendant and an abuse of process.

The defendant sought costs thrown away after preparing a motion to settle the terms of a decertification order, which included a request to make the plaintiff's counsel personally liable for an unpaid costs award of $37,800.

Before the motion was heard, the plaintiff's counsel paid the outstanding costs in full, obviating the need for the motion.

The court declined to award costs thrown away to the defendant, emphasizing the judicial policy of encouraging parties to resolve disputes and reduce litigation expenses.

A case conference was held to discuss next steps in a class action that was previously certified and then decertified.

The plaintiff sought to schedule a recertification motion with a new representative plaintiff, while the defendant sought to settle the terms of the decertification order, specifically seeking to make plaintiff's counsel personally liable for a previous $37,800 costs award.

The court deferred scheduling the recertification motion until the costs issue and the terms of the decertification order are resolved at an upcoming motion.

The applicant, Hudson's Bay Company, sought judicial review of a regulation that required its department stores to close during the COVID-19 pandemic while allowing big box stores that sell groceries to remain open.

The applicant argued the distinction was irrational and ultra vires the enabling statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the regulation was authorized by the Reopening Ontario Act and consistent with its purpose of balancing public health measures with economic concerns.

The court held that it is not the role of the judiciary to assess the wisdom or efficacy of the government's policy choices.

The plaintiff in an unpaid wages class action moved to be re-appointed as the representative plaintiff, having been removed months earlier for prioritizing his personal interests over those of the class.

Class counsel had been unable to find a replacement representative plaintiff.

The court found the plaintiff remained unsuitable due to his volatile, self-focused behavior and inability to provide independent judgment.

Consequently, the motion for re-appointment was dismissed, and the defendant's cross-motion to decertify the class action was granted.

A case conference was held to schedule documentary and oral discoveries.

The parties agreed to exchange Affidavits of Documents by September 30, 2019, and to conduct examinations for discovery in November 2019.

The court noted a potential issue regarding Schedule B documents that may require a further case conference if unresolved.

The representative plaintiff in a certified class action sought to replace existing class counsel with new counsel.

Existing class counsel opposed this and brought a cross-motion to disqualify the representative plaintiff, alleging a lack of competence and seeking a litigation guardian.

The court dismissed both motions, finding the representative plaintiff competent and that the attempt to change counsel was influenced by personal interests related to a dispute between existing and proposed counsel's associate, rather than the class's best interests.

The court directed existing class counsel to find a new representative plaintiff within 60 days and encouraged addressing the retainer agreement's indemnity for adverse costs.

The plaintiff sought a Mareva injunction against the Atkinson defendants (Paul Atkinson, Colin Grieve, and Professional Firefighters Advocates Inc.) due to alleged misappropriation of funds intended for the plaintiff's Retiree's Cancer Claim Fund.

The court found a strong prima facie case of tortious and fraudulent conduct, including false misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and conspiracy.

Evidence indicated the defendants had taken steps to dissipate assets by transferring residential properties to their spouses shortly after the plaintiff's demand letter and notice of motion.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff, with provisions for the defendants' living and legal expenses.

The plaintiff sought to introduce preliminary inquiry transcripts as evidence in support of a pending Mareva injunction motion.

The defendants opposed, arguing that a publication ban from the criminal proceedings prohibited their use and that the transcripts were inadmissible hearsay.

The court ruled that filing the transcripts would breach the publication ban, they were not "otherwise admissible by law" under the Ontario Evidence Act, and their evidentiary purpose in the preliminary inquiry differed from the Mareva injunction motion, leading to actual prejudice for the defendants.

Consequently, the plaintiff was not permitted to rely on the transcripts.

The defendant Sherwin H. Shapiro brought a motion to strike new causes of action (knowing assistance in breach of fiduciary duty and knowing assistance in breach of trust) added by the plaintiff, Ontario Professional Fire Fighter’s Association (OPFFA), in a Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim.

Shapiro argued that these new claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act and that the filing of the Fresh Claim constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding the plaintiff's actions technically consistent with Rule 26.02(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also dismissed the motion to strike based on limitation periods under Rule 21.01, reiterating that such issues, particularly those involving discoverability, are typically inappropriate for determination at the pleadings stage under Rule 21 and are better suited for summary judgment or trial after pleadings have closed.

The court found that the material facts necessary to support the new causes of action were implicitly present in the original claim, and it was not plain and obvious that the claims were statute-barred.