Rahool Parkash Agarwal

The applicant sought a declaration that a proposed class action brought by a tobacco growers’ marketing board against a tobacco manufacturer was not barred as a released claim under a comprehensive settlement agreement resolving governmental claims relating to tobacco smuggling and unpaid taxes.

The respondents argued that the class action fell within the broad release provisions and that the marketing board was effectively a Crown entity bound by the agreement.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation governing releases, including contextual interpretation and the rule that general release language is limited to matters within the parties’ contemplation at the time of execution.

It concluded that the settlement agreement addressed governmental tax‑related claims arising from smuggling and did not extend to private claims by growers for price differentials.

The class proceeding was therefore not a released claim by a releasing entity.

Following the Court of Appeal’s reversal of a certification order in a proposed class action alleging misclassification of supervisors and unpaid overtime under the Canada Labour Code, the motion judge was directed to fix the defendant’s costs of the certification motion.

The defendant sought over $1 million in partial indemnity costs, arguing that it had achieved complete success and that the litigation involved substantial complexity and financial exposure.

The representative plaintiff and the Law Foundation argued that costs should be nominal or substantially reduced because the proceeding raised novel legal issues and public interest considerations under s. 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Applying issue estoppel arising from the Court of Appeal’s reasons and considering the purposes of class action costs, the court fixed costs at $475,000 all inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had sued for water damage to their home, and the moving party argued the limitation period began when its technician caused holes in the roof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusion that discoverability could not be determined on the pleadings alone and required a full factual record.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that a restrictive covenant in a franchise agreement was not ambiguous to the point of being unenforceable as a pure question of law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was not facially ambiguous when read in the context of the entire agreement, and that any factual ambiguities would need to be determined at trial.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiffs’ statement of claim on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs alleged that damage to their home occurred after a technician installation, but that significant damage only manifested during a later flooding event.

The court held that the limitation issue involved questions of discoverability and factual context that could not be determined at this preliminary stage.

However, the court found that the plaintiffs’ alternative claim for public nuisance failed to plead the essential elements of the tort, including interference with a public right affecting a substantial number of people.

The public nuisance claim was struck, but the remainder of the action was permitted to proceed.

The respondents brought a motion before the Court of Appeal regarding the appellants' proposed fresh amended notice of appeal.

The court held that the motion judge's finding on the interpretation of the franchise agreement was a final order and properly appealable.

However, the remaining issues decided under Rule 20 were interlocutory, as the motion judge merely found genuine issues requiring a trial without finally determining them.

The motion was granted, with costs awarded to the moving parties.

The defendants, lawyers and a law firm, sought leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to strike paragraphs in a Statement of Claim.

The plaintiffs, victims of a Ponzi scheme, sued the defendants for negligence based on statements made during an Ontario Securities Commission investigation.

The defendants argued the statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to leave the issue of absolute privilege to the trial judge, and that the application of absolute privilege is a matter of significant importance.

The moving party, Maggie's: The Toronto Sex Workers' Action Project, brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of prostitution-related offences.

The moving party sought to raise a new challenge under s. 15 of the Charter and to argue that the legislation was impermissibly driven by moral views.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene on the s. 15 issue, finding that the evidentiary record was not developed for such a challenge and that allowing it would be unfair to the parties and delay the appeal.

The court also declined to grant separate intervener status on the morality issue, as it was already being raised by others, but permitted the moving party to join an existing intervener group.

The Legislative Assembly of Ontario sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision approving a residential development that would allegedly interfere with the public's view of the Legislative Building.

The Divisional Court applied the three-part test for leave to appeal and found that while the proposed appeal raised a question of law, there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB's decision regarding the interpretation of the Official Plan and Secondary Plan.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision setting aside his bankruptcy discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the issue of standing was not raised below and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The court also upheld the admission of fresh evidence and agreed that there were grounds to set aside the discharge under s. 158(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision finding that the respondents were employed under indefinite-term contracts and were entitled to reasonable notice of termination, as well as the award of Wallace damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the nature of the contracts, noting that the parties' conduct significantly varied from the written terms.

The court upheld the Wallace damages award for one respondent due to an unfounded and damaging pager message sent by the appellant, but set aside the award for the other respondent as there was no evidence of similar harm or mental distress.

The appeal was dismissed with respect to the first respondent and allowed in part for the second.