Rahool Parkash Agarwal

The Plaintiff sought costs for a successful class action certification motion, requesting $229,283 (partial indemnity) or $343,924 (substantial indemnity).

The Defendant conceded costs were due but argued the amount was disproportionately high, proposing $102,081.10.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the Plaintiff's counsel's requested hours (1,094.28) to be excessive for a motion of moderate complexity, despite the importance of the issues for access to justice in a class action.

The court awarded costs to the Plaintiff in the amount of $102,000 plus HST and disbursements, aligning closely with the Defendant's proposed amount as a proportionate level of costs.

The Plaintiff moved for certification of a class action concerning overtime and public holiday pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The Defendant argued that its employees fell under construction industry exemptions and that some were managers, requiring individual assessments.

The court certified the action, finding that the causes of action were disclosed, an identifiable class existed, common issues were present (including the applicability of ESA exemptions based on the employer's overall output and the minimal nature of supervisory duties), a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiff was suitable with a workable litigation plan.

A case conference was held to address procedural issues following previous endorsements.

The court directed the parties to draft separate orders for six prior motions.

The court also scheduled a Rule 21 motion brought by the defendant Shapiro regarding the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, and scheduled the plaintiff's renewed motion for a Mareva injunction.

Finally, the court set a timetable for written submissions regarding the Atkinson defendants' request to pay outstanding costs orders from funds held in trust.

The Atkinson defendants brought a motion seeking approval to withdraw funds held in trust to pay legal fees and costs awards.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the funds were subject to a solicitor's undertaking given by the Atkinson defendants' counsel to hold them in trust pending the resolution of the dispute.

The court found that a clear and unambiguous undertaking existed, binding the funds to remain in trust until entitlement was determined by the court or by agreement between the parties.

Consequently, the Atkinson defendants' request to access the funds was denied.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 45.02 for an order requiring the defendants to pay $1,848,000 into court.

The funds were originally held in escrow pursuant to an asset purchase agreement but were released to the defendants after the plaintiff failed to serve a loss notice on the escrow agent before the contractual deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding the plaintiff's claim to the specific fund, as the defendants did not improperly direct the release of the funds and the escrow agent acted in accordance with the agreement.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking answers to questions refused or taken under advisement during the cross-examination of an affiant.

The affidavit was sworn in the context of a pending motion to determine whether certain funds were held in trust pursuant to an agreement.

The Case Management Judge found that while the questions might meet the semblance of relevance test, they fell outside the narrow scope of the upcoming trust funds motion.

To ensure proportionality and efficiency, the court declined to order the questions answered at this time, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew the request after the disposition of the trust funds motion.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff trade union's action for lack of standing, to stay the action pending related criminal proceedings, and to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff union alleged the defendants misappropriated funds intended for the union's Retiree's Cancer Claim Fund.

The court found the plaintiff had standing as a trade union acting within its labour relations functions.

The court declined to stay the civil action, finding no extraordinary circumstances despite pending criminal charges against two defendants.

On the motions to strike, the court upheld most claims against the primary defendants but struck the claims against the defendant lawyer with leave to amend, finding insufficient material facts pleaded regarding his involvement.

Look Communications Inc. sued its former director, Gerald McGoey, and his holding company, Jolian Investments Limited, for breach of fiduciary duty.

The claim arose from the board's approval of $20 million in "Contingent Restructuring Awards" (CRAs) to directors, officers, and employees following the sale of the company's primary assets.

The court found that McGoey breached his fiduciary duty by approving excessive CRAs, particularly the equity cancellation payments based on an inflated share price and an unwarranted $2.4 million compensation payment to himself.

The court also found a breach regarding the advancement of legal fees for directors' defense against CRA-related claims.

The court rejected McGoey's defense of reliance on legal advice, as the advice was general and did not cover the quantum or allocation of payments.

The court ordered restitution and imposed a constructive trust over the funds received by McGoey/Jolian.

The defendants, Pfizer, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike various claims in the plaintiff Apotex Inc.'s Amended Statement of Claim.

Apotex sought relief for being kept out of the market by Pfizer's invalid patent for Viagra, asserting statutory claims under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, Statutes of Monopolies, and Trade-marks Act, and common law claims for unjust enrichment, nuisance, Ashby v. White, and conspiracy.

The court struck the claims under s. 8 of the PMNOC Regulations and the independent cause of action based on Ashby v. White, finding that the statutory conditions for PMNOC damages were not met and Ashby v. White is a principle, not a cause of action.

However, the court dismissed Pfizer's motion to strike the claims under the Trade-marks Act, unjust enrichment, nuisance, and conspiracy, rejecting the 'complete code theory' as insufficiently settled for a preliminary stage motion and finding the pleadings for these claims to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The defendant moved for a declaration that service of a statement of claim was invalid where the plaintiff served the defendant's Canadian patent agent rather than serving the foreign defendant abroad under the Hague Convention.

The action sought damages following invalidation of a patent and included a claim under the Patent Regulations enacted pursuant to the Patent Act.

The court interpreted s. 29(2) of the Patent Act broadly, holding that non-resident patent owners who appoint Canadian representatives for service may be served through those representatives for proceedings arising under the Act or its regulatory regime.

The presence of additional common law or statutory claims did not remove the action from the scope of the provision.

The court concluded that domestic law permitted service in Canada and therefore the Hague Convention was not engaged.

The applicant sought court sanction of a plan of compromise and arrangement under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act to resolve extensive litigation arising from the audit of Castor Holdings Ltd. The plan involved contributions from partners, insurers, and related entities totaling approximately $220 million and included third‑party releases.

A creditor group opposed the sanction, arguing that the releases violated Quebec civil law and that the claims process was unfair.

The court rejected these objections, finding the expert evidence unreliable, confirming that federal insolvency law permits third‑party releases notwithstanding provincial law, and concluding the plan was fair and reasonable given overwhelming creditor approval.

The plan was sanctioned.

The appellant appealed a decision implying a contractual obligation to disclose financial information to the respondent, enabling the respondent to determine whether to exercise an option to acquire up to a 20% interest in a limited partnership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the business efficacy test.

The Court held that the option right would be illusory without the implied right to disclosure, and that implying such a term was necessary to give business efficacy to the parties' agreement.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent and awarding damages based on a 16-month notice period.

The employer argued the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the mining industry's cyclical nature, finding the respondent was not obliged to accept a recall position to mitigate, setting a 16-month notice period, and determining the termination date under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the respondent was constructively dismissed upon recall to a substantially different position.

The applicant sought declaratory relief that its contractual option to acquire up to a 20 percent interest in an LNG terminal project remained valid despite the project's evolution from an import facility to an export facility.

Applying orthodox contractual interpretation principles, the court held the project had evolved but had not become a brand-new project, and the option therefore continued to attach to the existing development.

The court further implied a term requiring disclosure of sufficient financial information to permit the applicant to determine the value of the option and verify the exercise price, holding that such disclosure was necessary for business efficacy and consistent with the organizing principle of good faith in contractual performance.

The disclosure was made subject to confidentiality protections to be negotiated by the parties.

Following trial reasons awarding the plaintiff sixteen months’ notice damages for wrongful dismissal, the court considered post‑trial submissions regarding whether “other commissions” should be included in the damages calculation for the notice period.

The original decision calculated damages based on commissions the plaintiff would have earned from October 2009 to January 2011.

The judge noted that the evidentiary record did not recall proof of additional commissions payable during that period.

The court indicated willingness to receive further submissions if evidence existed establishing entitlement to additional commissions within the notice period.

The defendant tobacco companies brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' proposed class actions as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached their contracts by participating in smuggling duty-free tobacco back into Canada, avoiding higher domestic prices.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the alleged smuggling long before commencing the actions in 2009 and 2010.

The court dismissed the motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiffs discovered the constituent elements of their claims, particularly given the defendants' consistent denials of involvement in smuggling.

The appellant, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Alberta involving a truck owned and operated by the Alberta respondents.

She sued the respondents in Ontario, along with her Ontario automobile insurer for uninsured/underinsured coverage.

The respondents successfully moved to stay the action against them for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellant argued her insurance contract was a presumptive connecting factor under the Van Breda framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the insurance contract had no nexus to the respondents and could not bootstrap jurisdiction over them.

The appellant challenged an order striking pleaded claims against an individual corporate principal and dismissing an unjust enrichment claim on a pleadings motion.

The Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that the statutory claims under s. 131 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the claim under s. 10 of the Partnerships Act, and the pleaded breach of contract and misrepresentation claims against the individual respondent could not succeed.

Applying the unjust enrichment benefit analysis from Peel, the court held the claim was properly struck against the individual respondent personally for lack of material facts showing a tangible benefit, but could proceed against the remaining respondents based on unpaid services and business expenses.

The appeal was allowed in part and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, appealed an order declaring that a claim brought by the Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board in a proposed class action was not a 'Released Claim' under a 2008 Comprehensive Agreement.

The 2008 Agreement settled claims between tobacco companies and government entities regarding tobacco smuggling.

The Court of Appeal held that while the claims might fall within the definition of 'Released Claims', the Board was acting as an agent for tobacco producers to enforce contracts, not as an agent for the Crown.

Therefore, the Board was not a 'Releasing Entity' under the agreement, and the claims were not released.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued their former lawyers for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of loyalty, alleging the lawyers facilitated a Ponzi scheme and failed to disclose the plaintiffs' interests during an Ontario Securities Commission investigation while representing other clients.

The defendant lawyers moved to strike portions of the statement of claim, arguing their statements and omissions before the OSC were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it is not plain and obvious that absolute privilege immunizes a lawyer from a client's claim for breach of loyalty based on statements made while representing different clients in a quasi-judicial proceeding.