Paul T. O'Marra

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of her right to a speedy trial under Section 11(b).

The applicant was arrested on November 30, 2016, and charged with driving over 80.

The information was sworn on December 5, 2016.

Trial dates were scheduled for August 21 and 22, 2018, resulting in a total delay of approximately 626 days or 20 months and 26 days.

The court found that the net delay, after accounting for defence waiver of 11(b) rights during resolution discussions, exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The primary causes of delay were inadequate disclosure practices, particularly the failure to timely provide booking videos and the identity of a searching officer, lack of Crown resources, Crown unavailability for earlier trial dates, and institutional resource constraints.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following a trial.

The offence occurred when the accused, provoked by serious racial slurs directed at him by the victim and another individual, attended a restaurant with two other males and engaged in a violent altercation that resulted in significant injuries to the victim.

The court balanced competing sentencing objectives: general deterrence and denunciation against rehabilitation and restraint principles applicable to a youthful first offender.

The court imposed a conditional sentence rather than incarceration, finding that the provocation and the offender's positive background and prospects for rehabilitation warranted a community-based disposition with onerous conditions.

The respondent was convicted of importing approximately 1,976 grams of cocaine into Canada on December 1, 2015, concealed in four containers (Metamucil, curry spice, and psyllium fibre powder) in her personal belongings upon return from Jamaica.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of six to eight years, while the defence sought three to five years.

The court imposed a sentence of six years' incarceration at the low end of the established range for multi-kilogram cocaine importation, along with a mandatory lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court considered the respondent's personal circumstances, community support, and pro-social conduct since arrest as mitigating factors, but found these did not warrant a departure below the applicable sentencing range given the serious nature of multi-kilogram drug importation.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to section 254(3).

The accused admitted to operating his vehicle while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was transporting an injured friend to hospital and then returning home to protect his sister from imminent danger.

The court rejected the necessity defence, finding no clear and imminent peril to the sister and that reasonable legal alternatives existed.

On the breath sample charge, the court found the accused wilfully failed to provide a sample through malingering rather than incapacity, and that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a reasonable excuse.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant regarding an Information to Obtain a search warrant for his residence.

The search warrant, issued on October 20, 2016, led to the seizure of eight computer devices and the discovery of child pornography.

The applicant was charged with possession of child pornography and accessing child pornography.

The applicant argued that the ITO lacked information about the investigative process linking the computer user at a suspected IP address to the possession of child pornography, and that cross-examination was necessary to remedy these informational shortcomings.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the applicant had not demonstrated that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the warrant's authorization.

The court refused leave to cross-examine, finding that the applicant had not established an evidentiary basis for the proposed cross-examination and that the areas sought were too broad and speculative.

At a preliminary hearing, the accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences, including unauthorized possession of a handgun, possession of a prohibited firearm, possession of a prohibited magazine and ammunition, and breach of recognizance, arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun under a mattress in a motel room.

The Crown sought to establish that the accused possessed the firearm based on circumstantial evidence including his presence in the room, his use of a key card to access it, and his nervous demeanor upon encountering police.

The preliminary hearing judge found insufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of possession, specifically knowledge and control over the firearm, and discharged the accused on all counts.

The accused was charged with three offences: recruiting, holding, concealing, harbouring or exercising control over a person under 18 years of age to offer or provide sexual services for consideration contrary to section 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code; receiving a financial or material benefit from the commission of an offence under section 286.1(2) contrary to section 286.2(2); and knowingly advertising an offer to provide sexual services for consideration contrary to section 286.4.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a vulnerable 17-year-old who was homeless, drug-addicted, and desperate for money when she met the accused through Instagram.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable, and determined that the accused recruited her into sex work, controlled her movements, plied her with drugs, created a Backpage advertisement using her photographs, and took money from her after she engaged with a client.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm following an incident on October 4, 2016, at a Kelsey's restaurant in Georgetown.

The Crown alleged that the defendant and two associates attacked the complainant after a series of racist messages and threats exchanged over social media.

The defendant claimed self-defence, arguing he reasonably believed he faced an imminent threat.

The trial court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the defendant lacked credibility and that his response was disproportionate.

The court also found that any consent to a fight was vitiated by the defendant's intent to cause bodily harm and the severity of injuries inflicted.

The defendant was convicted.

A young person charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Charter based on an alleged infringement of the right to a speedy trial under section 11(b).

The applicant argued that the total delay of 18 months and 7 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that while the net delay fell slightly below the 18-month ceiling when defence delay was deducted, the case warranted a stay because: (1) a reduced presumptive ceiling of 12 months should apply to youth cases; (2) even applying the 18-month ceiling, the delay was unreasonable as a clear case falling below the ceiling; and (3) the defence demonstrated sustained efforts to expedite proceedings while the Crown and trial coordination system failed to provide timely disclosure and trial dates.

The court emphasized that young persons should be tried within a markedly shorter timeframe than adults.

The defendants were convicted after trial of assault with weapons for attacking the victim with knives in a parking lot on July 31, 2016.

The victim sustained a significant cut to his left arm requiring ten staples to close, leaving a permanent scar.

The court found both defendants equally culpable despite being unable to determine which defendant inflicted the wound.

The sentencing judge rejected both a suspended sentence and a conditional sentence, imposing four months custody followed by two years probation with strict conditions including anger management, a weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a collision in a parking lot.

The Crown brought a Charter application regarding the timing of the right to counsel notification.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was minor and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was minimal.

The court found the first breath sample was taken within the required two-hour period and that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol to at least a slight degree.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the over 80 count conditionally stayed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging an infringement of the right to a speedy trial under s. 11(b).

The accused was charged with importing heroin, conspiracy to import heroin, and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The information was sworn on September 9, 2016, and trial was scheduled for June 25-28, 2018, resulting in a total delay of 658 days (21 months and 20 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that after deducting defence delay of 105 days, the net delay was 555 days (18 months and 13 days), exceeding the ceiling by 13 days.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating with excess blood alcohol following an erratic driving report.

A Charter application was brought to exclude evidence obtained following an alleged violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that police delayed providing the right to counsel for 26 minutes after arrest, constituting a breach.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the breach was serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights was significant.

However, the court found the accused guilty of the included offence of care or control while impaired, as the Crown established the accused was in the driver's seat with keys in possession and was heavily intoxicated, presenting a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine into Canada contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence that the accused knowingly or was wilfully blind to the fact that four jars in her suitcase contained approximately 1,976 grams of cocaine.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved the requisite mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility due to multiple inconsistencies with her police statements and with her niece's testimony.

The court concluded that the accused either had actual knowledge or was wilfully blind to the contents of the jars, and convicted her as charged.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code, and with having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in her blood exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b).

Following a serious single-vehicle collision, the accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial proceeded on a blended voir dire basis.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the chain of continuity of the blood sample and that the toxicologist's opinion was undermined by discrepancies in the time the blood was drawn.

The court also found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, as the observed signs of impairment could be attributed to trauma and injuries from the collision.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual exploitation contrary to section 153 of the Criminal Code.

The sexual exploitation charge was withdrawn by the Crown.

The trial involved allegations that the accused, a 51-year-old kitchen preparation cook at Red Lobster, sexually assaulted a 16-17-year-old co-op student on multiple occasions between April and May 2016.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony regarding four discrete incidents in the dry storage room and other physical contact in the workplace.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility and reliability, citing significant inconsistencies between her initial statement to the employer, her statements to police, and her trial testimony.

The court found that while the accused may have committed the alleged assaults, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to material inconsistencies and omissions in the complainant's evidence.

This is a preliminary inquiry judgment determining whether sufficient evidence exists to commit the accused to trial on firearm-related offences.

The Crown charged both accused with ten joint firearm offences, with the accused Taitt facing two additional charges of criminal negligence.

The court applied the established test for preliminary inquiries, examining whether there is any admissible evidence capable of supporting each essential element of the offences.

The court committed both accused to trial on counts involving possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and being occupants of a motor vehicle knowing a firearm was present.

The court discharged both accused on counts alleging discharge of a firearm with intent to wound specific individuals, finding insufficient evidence of the specific intent required.

The court committed only Taitt to trial on the criminal negligence charge.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over .08 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a motion alleging breaches of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the applicant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) was breached when the police officer failed to inform the applicant of a third option to contact any lawyer and instead "foisted" duty counsel upon her without providing resources such as a lawyer's directory or internet access.

The court found that the officer's failure to comply with the informational component of the right to counsel of choice deprived the applicant of making a fully informed choice.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, finding that exclusion best served the long-term repute of the administration of justice, and dismissed the charge.

The applicant was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code following a single-vehicle collision.

At trial, the applicant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the applicant was unlawfully handcuffed during the breath demand without reasonable justification for officer safety.

The handcuffing was found to be arbitrary and the breath sample demand was conducted in an unreasonable manner.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at the close of its case.

The trial proceeded on the failure to remain charge.

The Crown and defence conceded that the actus reus was established.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's conduct was accompanied by an intention to escape civil or criminal liability.

The court found that the accused's post-accident conduct—including parking behind a building, driving away from the scene, passing by a police station without stopping, and continuing to drive away—demonstrated an intent to escape liability.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he had changed his mind and intended to return to the scene.

The accused was found guilty.