Paul J. Pape

The appellant was injured while working as a go-kart race director.

He had signed a waiver releasing the respondents from liability.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action based on the waiver.

On appeal, the court found that the appellant was an employee covered under Part X of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The court held that it is contrary to public policy to allow individuals to contract out of the protections of Part X of the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim to add two corporate defendants and assert a fraudulent conveyance claim relating to rights under a letter of intent associated with a hotel development project.

The defendant opposed the amendment on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel, limitation periods, and abuse of process, and also sought security for costs against the plaintiff corporation.

The court held that the proposed claim was not finally adjudicated in earlier summary judgment proceedings and that the new pleading asserted a different theory based on joint venture ownership and fraudulent conveyance.

The court also rejected the limitation defence, finding the amendment motion was effectively commenced within the limitation period.

The defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff corporation was impecunious or that the action was frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, sought a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal his son's law firm was handling.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the son's interest was neither remote nor insignificant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by conflating the analyses under sections 3 and 4(k) of the Act.

Applying the reasonable elector test, the Court concluded that the appellant's deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it could not reasonably be regarded as likely to influence his participation in council matters.

The plaintiff sued his former family lawyer for professional negligence arising from the drafting of a marriage contract.

He alleged the solicitor failed to advise him about a potential 'downside' or catastrophic change clause that would have protected him if his wealth declined during the marriage.

After the marriage ended, the contract was enforced and the plaintiff paid substantial sums to his spouse, which he claimed constituted damages caused by negligent legal advice.

The court found the solicitor had adequately explained the operation of the Family Law Act and equalization and met the standard of care of a reasonably competent solicitor.

The court also held that even if negligence had been established, the plaintiff failed to prove causation or damages, including claims relating to lost investment opportunities.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following the appeals in Westerhof v. Gee Estate and McCallum v. Baker.

The court ordered that the costs of the appeal in McCallum v. Baker be awarded to the respondent, fixed in the amount of $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The respondent, having been successful on the appeal, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the appeal involved an issue of public importance, or alternatively, that costs should be reduced to reflect divided success on the issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding the issue was not truly novel and declining to make a distributive costs award.

The respondent was awarded costs of $83,875.85.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action following the death of a 22-year-old man in hospital.

The deceased had been switched from morphine to Dilaudid by the respondent physician, and the appellants alleged the dosage was excessive and caused his death by opioid overdose.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's expert evidence that the dosage met the standard of care and that the cause of death was not an opioid overdose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to liability, standard of care, or causation.

Two personal injury appeals were heard together to determine the scope of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses.

The Court of Appeal held that Rule 53.03 does not apply to 'participant experts' (such as treating physicians) or 'non-party experts' who form opinions based on their observation of or participation in the events at issue, rather than being engaged by a party for the litigation.

In Westerhof, the trial judge's erroneous exclusion of such evidence warranted a new trial.

In McCallum, the trial judge correctly admitted the treating practitioners' opinion evidence.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against a grocery store after the deceased was struck by another customer's overloaded shopping cart.

The appellants argued the store's safety policies were inadequate and that employees failed to intervene despite seeing the hazard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the store's general safety policy was reasonable and did not require a standard of perfection.

The court also found it was reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that the store employees did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene in the seconds before the tragic accident occurred.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a motion judge's decision that allowed an Ontario supervisory judge to sit outside the province with judges from British Columbia and Quebec to hear motions regarding a national class action settlement, without requiring a video link to an Ontario courtroom.

The Court of Appeal held that while superior courts have the inherent jurisdiction to conduct hearings outside their home province, the open court principle under section 135 of the Courts of Justice Act requires a video link to a reasonably accessible Ontario courtroom.

The appeal was allowed to amend the order to require a video link.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice after the respondent developed compartment syndrome following the application of a full circumferential cast.

The trial judge had strongly criticized the appellant's counsel for reviewing and discussing draft reports with their expert witnesses, ruling that such practices were improper under the 2010 amendments to Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, confirming that consultation between counsel and expert witnesses is essential and protected by litigation privilege absent a factual foundation of improper influence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by using expert reports not in evidence to contradict viva voce testimony.

However, the Court concluded these errors did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the respondent's expert evidence was overwhelmingly stronger.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and respondent reached a settlement in a copyright infringement class action, which the motion judge refused to approve.

The appellant appealed the refusal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that an order refusing to approve a class action settlement is an interlocutory order, not a final order, because the litigation continues and the merits of the case remain to be determined.

Therefore, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lies with the Divisional Court, with leave, rather than the Court of Appeal.

The appellants were passengers injured when another passenger, who was experiencing delusions, grabbed the steering wheel of a Greyhound bus, causing it to crash.

The appellants sued the bus company, the driver, and police officers who had interacted with the passenger before he boarded.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care by any of the respondents.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by excluding expert evidence on police crisis management and bus safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the expert evidence because it was not necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining the applicable standards of care.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court declined to award costs to any party, citing the tragic circumstances of the case and the reasonableness of the appeal, which raised bona fide legal issues.

The respondents successfully sued the appellants in a jury trial for negligence after a glass Dutch oven shattered, causing severe injuries.

The jury found the appellants 75% liable for failing to adequately warn of the dangers associated with the product.

On appeal, the appellants argued the claim against one defendant was statute-barred, the jury's causation finding lacked an evidentiary basis, and the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the limitation period and liability, finding the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $25,000 aggravated damages award due to an erroneous jury instruction.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim following the death of a mother from post-partum haemorrhaging hours after a caesarean section.

The trial judge found that while one anaesthetist breached the standard of care by failing to promptly notify an obstetrician of the patient's deteriorating condition, this breach did not cause her death, which the judge attributed to an untreatable blockage in her lung caused by disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the cause of death and lack of causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's cause of death theory was unsupported by the evidence and not advanced by either party.

The respondent, a bricklayer, was totally disabled following two falls.

The appellant insurer paid disability benefits for a short period before terminating them based on surveillance evidence, despite medical opinions supporting total disability.

The trial judge found the insurer breached its duty of good faith and awarded contractual damages, $200,000 in punitive damages, and $100,000 in mental distress damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the punitive damages award, finding the insurer's conduct was high-handed and adversarial.

However, the Court reduced the mental distress damages to $25,000, finding the trial judge's award was inordinately high and disproportionate.

The appellant, who was involved in operating a restaurant on City property, sued the respondent, a mayoral candidate, for libel over comments made during a newspaper editorial board interview.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the comments did not refer to the appellant and were not defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the respondent's comments focused on the City Council process rather than the appellant personally, and explicitly disavowed accusing anyone of corruption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against a municipal election candidate.

The candidate had delivered a confidential letter to City Council referencing allegations of improper influence regarding an untendered lease agreement with the appellant's family business.

The trial judge found the letter defamatory but protected by qualified privilege, and found no express malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the communication was reasonably appropriate to the occasion and that the appellant failed to prove malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, representing former Barbados participating policyholders of Manulife, brought a class action for negligence.

They claimed Manulife owed them a duty of care to protect their interests when it transferred their policies to another insurer in 1996, three years before Manulife demutualized and distributed $9 billion to its participating policyholders.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while harm was foreseeable, policy reasons negated a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claim was for pure economic loss and did not fall within established categories.

The Court found no prima facie duty of care because the relationship lacked sufficient proximity, as the policyholders had no legally recognized right to share in a future demutualization at the time of the transfer, and the governing legislation permitted Manulife to terminate the relationship.