Paul D. Stern

The appellant, a paralegal, acted as an agent for an accused in a Provincial Offences Act trial.

After the trial, the justice of the peace initiated proceedings under s. 50(3) of the Act and barred the appellant from appearing before him as an agent.

The appellant's application for certiorari was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction to make the order after the trial concluded and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had jurisdiction under the second branch of s. 50(3), which relates to an agent's general conduct and understanding of their duties, and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued a judge who had submitted a complaint about him to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The motion judge struck the action under Rule 21.01, finding the judge was protected by judicial immunity and absolute privilege, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the appellant argued the complaint was motivated by racial animus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complaint was protected by absolute privilege and judicial immunity, and that the circumstances did not support an inference of racial profiling.

The costs award was upheld due to the unsubstantiated allegations of racial animus.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering threats, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that excessive force was used, and that the elements of the threatening charge were made out.

The court amended the information for the threatening charge as there was no prejudice.

Leave to appeal the sentence was denied as the appeal was utterly without merit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a Highway Traffic Act offence and was fined.

Due to a clerical error by the justice of the peace, the committal warrant incorrectly stated the appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, leading to his arrest and alleged assault in jail.

The appellant sued the justice of the peace, correctional officers, and others for wrongful arrest and imprisonment.

The motions judge struck the claims against the justice of the peace and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to plead malice or bad faith with particularity as required to overcome judicial immunity.

The applicant brought an application to quash an order of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that granted intervenor status to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in two stay motions.

The stay motions were based on allegations of witness tampering by an LCBO employee.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision to grant intervenor status was incorrect, as the LCBO had no interest in the stay motions and its intervention would distort the adversarial process.

The order granting standing to the LCBO was quashed.

The applicants sought judicial review of orders made by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario directing that a hearing proceed in camera and restricting the attendance of counsel for interested persons.

The Divisional Court quashed the orders, emphasizing that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the common law strongly favour open hearings.

The Court found that the Board failed to consider less restrictive measures to address its concerns regarding the presence of counsel while witnesses were excluded.

The appellants, young offenders, were convicted of aggravated assault after jointly attacking the victim, resulting in severe head injuries.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence on causation, failed to draw an adverse inference from the victim not testifying, and erred in finding they acted jointly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of causation or joint liability.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal for one appellant, reducing the disposition from one year to six months of secure custody followed by probation, citing the spontaneous nature of the violence and the appellant's positive antecedents.

The appellants, Canadian citizens, faced extradition to the United States for telemarketing fraud.

During the extradition process, an American judge and prosecutor made threatening statements indicating that uncooperative fugitives would receive maximum sentences and face sexual violence in prison.

The extradition judge stayed the proceedings, finding these threats violated the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, ruling the judge should have deferred to the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the stay, holding that the extradition judge has jurisdiction under the Charter and common law to remedy abuses of process that directly taint the committal hearing, without waiting for the executive phase.

The appellants challenged search warrants issued under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act in aid of foreign money laundering investigations, arguing that once improperly obtained material was excised, the warrants lacked sufficient foundation and should also be quashed for abuse of process.

The court held that review of the warrants was governed by the Garofoli standard, not a de novo reconsideration of whether the reviewing judge would himself or herself have issued the warrants.

Applying that standard, the remaining information was sufficient and also established that an evidence-gathering order under s. 18 would not have been appropriate.

The court further held that allegations concerning Charter breaches and investigative abuse were more properly addressed at the s. 15 hearing on whether seized materials should be sent to the requesting states.

The appeal was dismissed.